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Decision-making has traditionally been modelled as a serial process, consisting of
a number of distinct stages. The traditional account assumes that an agent first
acquires the necessary perceptual evidence, by constructing a detailed inner repre-
sentation of the environment, in order to deliberate over a set of possible options.
Next, the agent considers her goals and beliefs, and subsequently commits to the
best possible course of action. This process then repeats once the agent has learned
from the consequences of her actions and subsequently updated her beliefs. Under
this interpretation, the agent’s body is considered merely as a means to report the
decision, or to acquire the relevant goods. However, embodied cognition argues that
an agent’s body should be understood as a proper part of the decision-making pro-
cess. Accepting this principle challenges a number of commonly held beliefs in the
cognitive sciences, but may lead to a more unified account of decision-making.
This thesis explores an embodied account of decision-making using a recent frame-
work known as predictive processing. This framework has been proposed by some
as a functional description of neural activity. However, if it is approached from an
embodied perspective, it can also offer a novel account of decision-making that ex-
tends the scope of our explanatory considerations out beyond the brain and the body.
We explore work in the cognitive sciences that supports this view, and argue that
decision theory can benefit from adopting an embodied and predictive perspective.
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Who’s Making The Decisions Around Here?
Consider the following situation: you are busy writing a doctoral thesis, which has
a deadline that is fast approaching. You have already been writing for a couple
of hours without a break, and begin to notice that your productivity is decreasing.
What should you do?
It is almost lunchtime, and you consider the fact that your tiredness is a product
of your hunger. However, there is a chance that if you take too long of a break you
will be unable to pick up where you left off. Perhaps you should continue working
for a bit longer and have lunch once the word count has been reached, or maybe it is
better to simply take a short break now to make a coffee, and hope that the caffeine
will allow you to persist with the writing for a bit longer. Should you stop here?
Does this set of options collectively characterise the decision problem? What about
doing something else entirely? Far from being a simple matter of choosing between a
few well-delineated options, it appears that you must also figure out what options are
available to you. Everyday decisions, such as these, do not come fully-formed, neatly
representing a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive options to choose between.
It seems that agents like ourselves are first required to determine a set of options
prior to deliberating about, and then committing to one of them. However, is this
the right way to characterise what is actually happening when we make decisions?
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A complete account of how we make decisions, among other things, should be
able to explain the full breadth of these processes. Unfortunately, the apparent
simplicity of the current example belies an enormous complexity that is found at the
level of the mechanisms involved in making these sorts of everyday decisions. For
example, how is the initial process of specifying the possible options achieved? It will
be argued that answering this question, as well as others, requires an appreciation
of multiple levels of scientific explanation, spanning multiple disciplines and physical
scales. This will involve challenging the idea that the brain is the seat of decision-
making, a picture that casts some central executive region as computing the relevant
decision variables, before instructing the body of the agent to carry out the necessary
behaviour. It will also involve looking beyond the physiological boundaries of the
agent, to understand the inseparability of ecological considerations from the process
of decision-making. To do this, over the course of this thesis we will develop and
defend an embodied version of a framework known as predictive processing. We will
then use this perspective to explore an account of decision-making. Such a view, we
argue, is preferable to alternative accounts of decision-making.
Before we can answer the question, “Who’s making the decisions around here?”
(as specified in the title of this section) we need to first determine what it is we are
looking for, and also where we should look. Of course these are just vague ways of stat-
ing the following questions: which system or phenomenon are we trying to explain,
and which theoretical framework (and corresponding methodology) is relevant for
our purpose? As we are interested in the study of decision-making, an answer to the
first question should provide details that help us demarcate which physical processes
can usefully be described as constituting, and contributing to, decision-making. The
second question should specify the theoretical framework that attempts to provide an
account of the mechanisms that are involved in the phenomenon under investigation.
Framed as it is currently, the first question assumes that a satisfactory definition
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of decision-making has already been provided. To rectify this, we shall take decision-
making to be the process of selecting an action from a set of alternative options. We
will allow, as in the example above, for an incomplete set of possible options to be
specified prior to selection. We will also allow for the act to be both epistemic and
pragmatic in nature, and state that the set of alternative options be restricted to
only those that are viable for the system in question. This definition will suffice for
the present discussion, and will be made more precise in the relevant chapters.
What about the second question? Should we turn to decision theory to provide
the necessary answers? Of course the answer is an obvious ‘yes’, but we need to
be a bit more precise, as decision theory is an interdisciplinary project to which
philosophers, economists, psychologists and statisticians, among others, contribute.
There is also the fact that decision theory is separated into descriptive and normative
approaches, where the first is viewed as an empirical approach that aims to provide
an account of how decisions are made, and the second is understood as providing
prescriptions for what decision-makers are rationally required to do (Peterson, 2009).
The separation of the two approaches is sensible given the unsurprisingly large
number of questions we could ask about a variety of decision-making systems, which
may also differ widely in their capacities. To understand why two systems differ
comparatively, it may be necessary to point to a difference in the mechanisms that
the two systems utilise, as well as providing a general (and justifiable) standard for
the evaluation of the systems under investigation. The former is considered the do-
main of descriptive decision theory, whereas the latter is considered the domain of
normative decision theory. However, it is also sensible to ask whether the evaluative
standard we adopt is appropriate given the systems we are interested in understand-
ing. Kant’s famous doctrine of ‘ought implies can’ (Kant, 1781), though by no means
uncontroversial (cf. Stern, 2004), is widely accepted as a constraint on normative re-
quirements. In short, if a system is incapable of acting in the manner prescribed
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by a norm of decision theory, the application of the norm is inappropriate. Despite
a personal interest in the relationship between descriptive and normative decision
theory we restrict discussion in this thesis to the former.
Given the simple definition provided of decision-making as the process of select-
ing an action from a set of alternative options, we can begin to narrow our search
by asking which systems can usefully be described as making decisions. Should a
flower that appears to track the movement of the sun through the process known
as heliotropism be described as making a decision to do so? What about the insect
that exhibits similar phototaxic behaviour, but which ends up moving towards a fa-
tal source of artificial light? Was this ostensibly “suicidal” behaviour the product of
a decision-making process, or can an alternative, and more appropriate explanation
be given for its behaviour? If asked to draw a line that demarcates systems that
can be usefully described as possessing the capacity for decision-making from those
that do not, it is likely that most would draw a line that subsequently delineates
a subset of living systems—probably based on some perceived degree of organisa-
tional complexity. Though there will invariably be disagreement about whether it is
inappropriate to ascribe decision-making capacities to the plant and not the insect,
most would agree that a rock at least makes no decisions at all. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to explore these sorts of debates in any real depth, and therefore
we initially restrict our discussion to human cognition, appealing to studies using
non-human animals insofar as they have explanatory interest to humans. However,
there is also a theme of evolutionary continuity that runs throughout this thesis, and
in the final chapters we will return to some of these topics. The following section




The first two chapters are summative in nature, providing the reader with some
necessary context and terminological clarification.
In chapter 1 we begin by providing a short history of the cognitive sciences. This
history will introduce some of the concepts and debates that help to clarify and
situate our understanding of the two questions posed in the previous section. It
starts from the time that a unified discipline emerged in the 1960s, and ends with
a discussion concerning embodied cognition. Embodied cognition is sometimes seen
as a post-cognitivist paradigm, and to demonstrate why this is the case, this chapter
contrasts the two approaches. However, embodied cognition is also composed of a
number of separate approaches, and we review some of the themes that have been
defended by those who work in this area. It should be noted that we do not commit
ourselves to any particular theme throughout the course of this thesis. Instead,
given that embodied cognition is best understood (at present) as a research program,
we try to emphasise the need for explanatory pluralism where possible. This does
not mean ignoring conflicting explanations, but neither does it mean we need to
become involved with every micro-debate that arises in the course of discussion (e.g.
representationalism versus anti-representationalism). The position we wish to defend
over the course of this thesis is that decision-making (in the descriptive sense) is
best understood from an embodied perspective, and that predictive processing offers
a promising framework to develop our understanding of this process. As long as
the core of embodied cognition (i.e. a rejection of cognitivism and an inseparable
explanatory role for the body) is maintained, it should not matter whether all of the
themes are vindicated. We can accept this, while at the same time acknowledging
that greater focus on the conceptual foundations of the embodied cognition research
program is a worthwhile pursuit.
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In chapter 2, we provide an introduction to the contemporary framework known as
predictive processing. This framework overturns the idea that the brain is a passive
system that receives inputs from, and constructs a detailed representation of, the
world. Instead, predictive processing argues that the brain evolved to help coordinate
adaptive action selection by anticipating salient future states of the world on the
basis of top-down predictions of sensory information. These predictions emerge from
a hierarchically-organised generative model, which is encoded by the brain, and is
constantly updated on the basis of incoming information from the world. We will
argue that, contrary to some interpretations, the predictive processing framework
need not be construed as supporting an internalist conception of the mind. Instead,
we will argue the framework is best understood from an embodied perspective.
Before we explore how predictive processing accounts for decision-making, we
first explain what it means to say that decision-making is embodied. This is done
in chapter 3 where we look at a number of approaches to understanding decision-
making. First, we explore the traditional cognitivist picture of decision-making and
problem-solving. Second, we briefly introduce the contemporary field of neuroeco-
nomics, alongside an introduction to expected utility theory. Lastly, we argue that
recent neurophysiological evidence challenges these conceptions, and instead points
to a need to reconsider decision-making from an embodied perspective.
In chapter 4, we start to explore how the idea that decision-making is an em-
bodied behaviour can be accommodated by an embodied account of predictive pro-
cessing. This requires blurring the boundaries between perception, cognition, action
and emotion, and also reconsidering the fundamental role of the brain, body and
world in shaping cognition. As a consequence of this, the traditional cognitivist
picture—a picture that views perception, cognition and action as separate, encap-
sulated processes—is severely undermined. This also means rejecting the cognitivist
conception of decision-making as a serial process of deliberation and commitment,
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which is also independent of sensorimotor processes.
In chapter 5, having undermined the cognitivist account of decision-making, we
begin to further develop our account of decision-making. Turning our attention first
to the brain, we explore more fully the notion of precision-weighting that is intro-
duced in chapter 2. This notion is an important component of predictive processing,
and we explore how work in cognitive neuroscience presents a compelling reason
to reconsider the brain in a more interactive manner. To explain how the interac-
tive, predictive brain is able to support effective decision-making, we are required to
first give up on the traditional ontological commitments of cognitive psychology, and
begin to look outwards beyond the brain for a new taxonomy.
To complete our discussion of embodied decisions and the predictive brain, we
turn in chapter 6 to build a novel proposal for how the body and the world provide
important constraints on decision-making. Most of the empirical evidence that will
have been explored in earlier chapters pertains to habitual decision-making, but this
is only one form of decision-making. Therefore, we begin by discussing the differences
between habitual and deliberative decisions, and why it is important that predictive
processing is able to account for both forms. Initially it appears as though embodied
decision-making is only able to account for the former. To respond to this worry,
we turn to consider some of the ways that additional processes constrain our choice
behaviour, and whether this affects our understanding of embodied decision-making.
This chapter identifies a novel approach to decision-making, but acknowledges that
a full analysis requires further development.
We end with some further remarks regarding the interpretation of decision theory,
and also bring the discussion back to some of the questions raised in this introductory





“One might say that cognitive science has a very long past but a relatively
short history.” (Gardner, 1985)
As discussed in the introduction, the focus of this thesis is decision-making, and
we will be exploring this process from the perspective of cognitive science. This
chapter serves as both a motivation and a foundation for the subsequent chapters.
Gardner’s characterisation of the dual history of cognitive science recognises the
long interest we have had in questions pertaining to the mind and behaviour, but
also acknowledges the more recent emergence of a recognised scientific framework in
which to study these phenomena. The disciplines that formed the interdisciplinary
framework were initially unified in terms of their rejection of some aspects of the
preceding paradigms (e.g. introspectionism and behaviorism).1 However, on its own,
1Given the interdisciplinary nature of cognitive science, it is tempting to opt for the pluralis-
tic label of the ‘cognitive sciences’, rather than the singular and arguably more monolithic term
‘cognitive science’. Though the latter is more frequently used in the literature, increased usage of
the former is advisable, in order to recognise the pluralistic nature of the scientific practice and
study of mind and behaviour. Throughout this thesis, we will opt for the following: when historical
accuracy is called for, we will use the singular term, but otherwise the plural term will be adopted.
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the foil of a previous paradigm cannot stand as an appropriate foundation for the
unification of a diverse set of distinct disciplines, even if it helps a nascent framework
develop. So what provided unification?
1.1 The Birth of Cognitive Science
In their wonderful book, How the Body Shapes the Way We Think, Rolf Pfeifer
and Josh Bongaard (2007) discuss the inception of the field of artificial intelligence,
which the authors claim is best viewed as commencing with the Dartmouth confer-
ence in 1956 where the “fathers of AI” such as, Marvin Minsky, John McCarthy,
Allen Newell, Herbert Simon, and Claude Shannon, discussed “the conjecture that
every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so
precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it.” (Dartmouth Arti-
ficial Intelligence Project Proposal, McCarthy et al., Aug. 31, 1955, cited in Pfeifer
and Bongaard, 2007, p. 28). However, 1956 was not just a pivotal year for artifi-
cial intelligence. Research in AI had a number of early successes with information
processing and abstract symbol manipulation, which many of those attending the
conference had been involved in formalising. Due to this success the idea that in-
telligent behaviour could be thought of as rule-governed symbol manipulation was
quickly picked up by other fields. George Miller—an influential psychologist during
these formative years—singles out 11th September 1956 as “the moment of con-
ception of cognitive science” (Miller, 2003, p. 142). It was the day of a symposium
organised by the ‘Special Interest Group in Information Theory’ at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Instead of being restricted to artificial intelligence, this sym-
posium gathered researchers from psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence and
neuroscience, and Miller states,
“I left the symposium with a conviction, more intuitive than rational,
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Figure 1.1: Solid lines represent relations that Miller claims were established on the basis
of a respectable research programme in the late 1970s. Dotted lines represent
connections that have been made since (e.g. relationship between philosophy
and the neurosciences). Adapted from (Miller, 2003).
that experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and the computer
simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces from a larger whole and
that the future would see a progressive elaboration and coordination of
their shared concerns.” (ibid., p. 143)
His conviction was well-founded, and following this pivotal year, the interdisci-
plinary project of cognitive science took off. The interdisciplinary ties at the time,
were characterised in a report by Miller, which claimed the relations between the var-
ious disciplines were those depicted in Figure 1.1. These relations were characterised
by the methodological tools shared by the respective disciplines, which in turn led to
novel interdisciplinary frameworks (e.g. neuroscience and computer science could be
connected by approaches such as cybernetics). Miller acknowledges that nowadays
all 15 possible links could be argued to exist, on the basis of respectable research
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programmes. But is there a non-trivial assumption that is shared by the various
disciplines?
1.2 Cognitivism
Although the foil of behaviourism, as previously discussed, is not an appropriate
unifying thread on its own, it does point us towards a reason for the emergence of
cognitive science as an interdisciplinary project in 1956.
In discussing a conversation that took place with Noam Chomsky, Miller claims
that “defining psychology as the science of behavior was like defining physics as the
science of meter reading. If scientific psychology was to succeed, mentalistic concepts
would have to integrate and explain the behavioral data” (ibid., p. 142, emphasis
added). Psychological behaviourism is often seen as eschewing the use of mental
states as theoretical posits.2 As the previous quotation highlights, in the 1950s this
methodological limitation was becoming a contentious issue for those who desired a
truly explanatory and integrative framework. The response to this limitation, has
since become known as one of the defining features of cognitivism: the classical view
of cognitive science that emerged in the late 1950s.
The proponent of cognitivism views cognition as a system of internal, brain-
based processes that are formed on the basis of sensory input, and stored as abstract
symbols, which can then be transformed in a deterministic manner for the control
of motor behaviour (Neisser, 1967). Cognition is, therefore, a form of information-
processing, and in line with the historical considerations above, the dominant metaphor
of this perspective views the brain as some sort of computational system. The
computations are taken to operate over a set of stored symbols, which stand-in or
2Though see (Barrett, 2012) for a less dogmatic reading.
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represent some object or event. These symbols function both as perceptual and
conceptual stand-ins for the world, and when appropriately transformed, as instruc-
tions for motor behaviour. Therefore, they are understood as the internal causes
of behaviour, and are not identical with behaviour itself. This leads to a rejection
of the behaviourist’s guiding methodological and philosophical perspective. As Bar-
rett (2012, p. 18) highlights, “[a]lthough internal rules and representations are not
available for direct inspection, they can, however, be inferred, via observation and
experiment, from the behaviour they cause.” As such, the cognitivist framework
allowed researchers and experimenters to posit explanatory representational states
in order to overcome the limitations of the behaviourist paradigm and to focus on an
abstract problem-solving characterisation of cognitive tasks. With a sufficient level
of abstraction, these tasks could in turn be implemented in the so-called “expert
systems” of artificial intelligence (Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007, p. 27). Such systems
are indicative of the classical approach to AI, or in Haugeland’s (1985) terminology,
“Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence”.
This classical perspective places a particular conception of human intelligence
centre-stage, and focuses on readily formalisable processes such as natural language,
knowledge acquisition and representation, formal reasoning, and playing games such
as chess—all areas that were amenable to the methods being discussed at the afore-
mentioned Dartmouth conference. The expert systems of AI were positioned to
replace human experts in these circumscribed domains, and when coupled with the
philosophical theory of functionalism, this classical cognitivist approach flourished.
As Thompson (2007, emphasis added, p.5) states:
“Cognitivism goes hand in hand with functionalism in the philosophy of
mind, which in its extreme computational form holds that the embodiment
of the organism is essentially irrelevant to the nature of the mind. It is
the software, not the hardware, that matters most for mentality.”
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As with any good philosophical debate, opposition quickly emerged, taking issue
with the thoroughly brain-bound position of mind and cognition that was emerging.
Understanding the correct target of this opposition, however, first requires us to
make a number of conceptual distinctions and subsequent clarifications about termi-
nological usage. The following sections will briefly explore these foundational issues,
but will fall short of providing a complete critical analysis.
1.2.1 The Computational Brain
To begin, we can distinguish the notion of computation from computationalism, where
the former refers to a formalisable concept that is well-defined by the theory of
computation, and the latter, by contrast, refers to the view that the mathematical
apparatus of the theory of computation can be applied to model various cognitive
phenomena. For example, neurocomputationalism would be the more exclusive view
that the activity of neurons can be modelled (and subsequently explained) as com-
puting in the sense defined by the theory of computation.
This distinction may seem straightforward, but is complicated by a number of
conceptual worries. Firstly, though the notion of computation is well-defined mathe-
matically, it is an abstract definition that is independent from any particular physical
system. Therefore, its usage often varies depending on the context of discussion, and
can be viewed as highly restrictive (e.g. language of thought hypothesis (Fodor,
1975)) or fully general (e.g. pancomputationalism (Putnam, 1991)). This is impor-
tant, as many disagreements turn on whether a particular theory in the cognitive
sciences is computational or not, but if the notion is being employed without a fixed
or precise meaning, then it will be hard to settle the debates. For example, it is
common to hear that classical cognitive architectures are differentiated from later
connectionist architectures due to their computational commitments:
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“Connectionism gives solace [...] to philosophers who think that relying
on the pseudoscientific intentional or semantic notions of folk psychology
(like goals and beliefs) mislead psychologists into taking the computa-
tional approach [...]” (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1993, p. 4)3
Therefore, we need to provide a way of understanding the notion of computation,
such that we can determine whether several theories are truly in conflict with one
another. So, what is computation?
The Theory of Computation
In his (1936/37), Turing set out the now-famous notion of a Turing machine, with
the aim of providing a method for answering the Entscheidungsproblem: the decision
problem of whether an effective method could be found for determining the provability
of statements expressed in first-order logics. Along with Alonzo Church, Turing
established that no effective method could in fact be determined, but the notion of
an effective method (or algorithm), for determining the solution to a function (i.e.
the output value of a function for a particular input), led to the formation of the
Turing machine: an abstract mathematical device or system that functions in an
algorithmic manner. In short, any function that could be solved by an algorithmic
process (i.e. a set of rules that necessarily lead to a solution) would be computable by
a Turing machine, or using the equivalent notion of recursion from Church’s (1936)
lambda calculus. Turing noticed that the two formal definitions provided by himself
and Church were coextensive with the informal notion of computation as effective
3It is important to note, that Fodor and Pylyshyn (1993) did not believe that connectionism
was non-computational, but differed from classical cognitive architectures due to its rejection of
the latter’s commitment to discrete symbolic processes, which were the atomic digits that the
computations were defined over.
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method, leading to the formation of what is now known as the Church-Turing thesis.
We will here focus on the notion of a Turing machine for simplicity.
A Turing machine has two components: a (potentially) infinite tape, and a finite-
state machine with a read/write head. The tape is divided into finite cells, on which
there is written a symbol (taken from a finite alphabet), or simply a blank space. This
tape serves as both the vehicle for input into the system, and as a working memory
store for the computational process. The finite-state machine positions its read/write
head over each cell, and then depending on a) the current state of the machine, b)
the symbol on the cell being read, and c) the rule specified by the machine table (or
programme in the case of a universal Turing machine), the finite-state machine can
perform a number of operations (i.e. move left or right, or write a new symbol on
the tape). An explanation of how this abstract machine is able to compute functions
need not concern us.4 More important is the fact that this description is necessarily
abstract, and thus independent of any physical implementation.
Any system that is able to realise the functional roles specified by the above
components, can be considered computational in a generic sense. This leads to an
often overlooked aspect of Turing’s work, which both Wells (2005) and Anderson
(2014) have emphasised as important, and is evident in the following quotes:
“Computing is normally done by writing certain symbols on paper.” (Tur-
ing, 1936/37, emphasis added, p.249)
A ‘computer’ in Turing’s time was a human, employed to perform laborious cal-
culations by following algorithmic processes by writing on a piece of paper. The
abstraction away from these details, into the suggestive notion of a Turing machine,
was supposed to bring greater generality to the notion of computation, while retain-
ing the emphasis on an algorithmic process. The generality was important, as the
4See (Clark, 2013a) for a simple introduction.
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Figure 1.2: A portion of a tape in a Turing machine.
continuation of the above quote highlights:
“We may suppose that there is a bound B to the number of symbols of
squares which the computer can observe at one moment. If he wishes
to observe more, he must use successive observations.” (ibid., emphasis
added, p.250)
Unlike an abstract Turing machine, a human observer realising the functional
role of one is limited by their perceptual apparatus, not merely in the temporal
sense that Turing highlights, but also in the level of discernible details that they
are receptive to. Imagine you are instructed to compute in the sense defined by a
Turing machine. The cells on the tape can contain a number of dots, which are to be
processed according to a finite set of instructions laid out in the machine table. You
proceed as usual, until you come to the cell depicted in Figure 1.2. Such a cell would
obviously be a terrible design choice for a human computer as it is too difficult to
determine the exact number of dots.
Far from simply being a limitation for human computers, however, the above
example highlights a technical challenge that all engineers working in information
and communication technologies will be acutely aware of—the problem of signal
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noise. That is, how to ensure that the range of symbols a machine must compute
is not so large, or too fine-grained, that the receiver (or read/write head in Turing’s
terminology) is unable to distinguish between two distinct states. When dealing
with analog currents of electricity as the vehicle for communication, one solution is
to map ranges of the analog signal onto a restricted set of discrete (or quantized)
states. As far as the receiving system is concerned, this discreteness need only exist
at the level of symbols being computed, the underlying vehicle may in reality be a
continuous (or analog) input. This means that understanding the commitments of a
computational theory requires us to understand the claims made about the properties
of the symbolic representations, as well as whether they are neurally-plausible in
terms of their implementation. Why is this important?
Piccinini and Scarantino (2010) argue that the notion of computation outlined by
a Turing machine is an example of what they term digital computation. They state:
“[...] the computation of a Turing-computable function is a digital compu-
tation because Turing-computable functions are by definition functions of
a denumerable domain—a domain whose elements may be counted—and
the arguments and values of such functions are, or may be represented
by, strings of digits.”
This can be contrasted with what they term generic computation, and analog
computation. They define the former as the processing of vehicles according to rules
that are sensitive to certain properties of the vehicles and, specifically, to differences
between portions of the vehicles.5 This is general enough to include both digital
5Given the fact that generic and analogue notions of computation need not take strings of
discrete symbols as inputs, the more encompassing notion of ‘vehicle’ is adopted to account for this
greater level of generality. A vehicle therefore refers to any input that is computed by one of the
notions of computation.
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Figure 1.3: Types of computation. Reprinted from (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010).
computation and analog computation, the latter of which they describe as the ma-
nipulation of continuous variables, which can vary continuously over time and take
any real values within certain intervals—it is therefore uncountable and differentiated
from digital computation. The relationship between the different notions is depicted
in Figure 1.3.
These distinctions are important to note, as when proponents of computation-
alism make claims about cognition being a form of computation, depending on the
type of computation being discussed, we should expect corresponding differences in
the properties of the vehicles being processed.6
Computationalism
With the necessary distinctions in place, we can now turn to the notion of com-
putationalism, which we previously defined as the view that the formal notion of
computation can be applied to model various cognitive and neural phenomena. One
of the first attempts to do this was put forward by McCulloch and Pitts (1943), who
6More in-depth details of each subset of computation is explored further in (Piccinini and
Scarantino, 2010). However, as this thesis is not directly concerned with whether any of these
particular notions is applicable to the brain and cognition, further discussion is unnecessary.
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noted that neural activity, due to its “all-or-none” character, could be described as a
type of digital computation. By “all-or-none”, they were referring to the observation
that an action potential (or spike) produced in the soma of a neuron, was indepen-
dent of the strength of incoming signals from neighbouring neurons. In short, if the
threshold for the production of an action potential is sufficiently met, the strength
of the stimulus is irrelevant—either it occurs or it does not.
They argued that this property supports an argument that what the brain does
is best understood as digital computation, as the spikes can be considered the basic
atomic components of the strings of symbols that form the inputs to the computa-
tional process. However, not long after the publication of their work, others argued
that this picture overlooked the important role that neurotransmitters (and the en-
docrine system) have on neural activity. For example, (Gerard, 1951, p. 12) stated:
“[...] chemical factors (metabolic, hormonal, and related) which influence
the functioning of the brain are analogical, not digital. What is perhaps
not fully recognized is the tremendously important role that these play
not only in the abnormal but also in the perfectly normal functioning of
the nervous system.”
Here we see a dispute that may potentially be resolved by means of accumulating
empirical data (e.g. what processes are in fact responsible for regulating neural
activity). If, as McCulloch and Pitts (1943) argue, the action potential is the primary
vehicle of computation, and is importantly digital rather than analogue, then perhaps
the brain is a digital computer. However, if the vehicles of computation extend
to include analog processes, then perhaps (Gerard, 1951) is correct. Piccinini and
Scarantino (2010, p. 12) are ambivalent with respect to this debate, but nevertheless
maintain that:
“[...] current evidence suggests that the vehicles of neural processes are
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neuronal spikes and that the functionally relevant aspects of neural pro-
cesses are medium-independent aspects of the spikes—primarily, spike
rates. [...] spike trains appear to be another case of medium-independent
vehicles, in which case they qualify as proper vehicles for generic com-
putations. Assuming that brains process spike trains and that spikes are
medium-independent vehicles, it follows by definition that brains perform
computations in the generic sense.”
This position could be challenged, as there are a number of ways in which it
is possible to encode a pattern of spikes (e.g. a rate code (average production of
spikes), a timing code (specific timings of spikes), a population code (population-
wide groupings of neural spikes), and a synchrony code (synchronicity across neurons)
(Eliasmith and Anderson, 2003, p. 7)). This is likely the reason why Piccinini and
Scarantino (2010) adopt the weakest notion of generic computation in order to remain
ambivalent. However, is this move entirely appropriate?
Note that what is being defended is a notion of neurocomputationalism, which we
defined earlier as the view that the activity of neurons can be modelled as computing
in some sense (whether digital, analog or merely generic). However, it is not imme-
diately evident what would be wrong with accepting this position, but choosing
to remain agnostic with regards to whether the mind should therefore be under-
stood in computational terms as well. Perhaps one could appeal to something like
the personal/sub-personal distinction (Dennett, 1969), or the notion of sub-doxastic
states (Stich, 1978) to justify an explanatory pluralism. If so, then we could retain
the explanatory power of computational modelling as it applies to the neural level,
which has been enormously productive in the field of computational neuroscience,
without being limited by the constraints of the computer metaphor at other levels
of explanation. Although we will not directly argue in favour of either position, it is
important to understand this debate in order to subsequently understand the lim-
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Figure 1.4: The Classical Sandwich Model.
itations of adopting a computationalist account of the mind. As a bridge into this
discussion, it is helpful to turn to the work of Susan Hurley (1998), and her critique
of the “classical sandwich model” of the mind.
1.2.2 The Classical Sandwich
Hurley’s purpose in describing the ‘classical sandwich model’ was to explore the main-
stream (at her time of writing) view of the mind (cognitivism), which she claimed
was committed to a couple of things.
Firstly, it took perception and action to be distinct processes, separate from one
another and peripheral to the inner symbolic processing associated with cognition
(see Figure 1.4). Perception, as described by this view, is an incremental process by
which the detachable symbols used in computation are produced in a serial manner,
first detecting simple properties such as lines or edges and progressively building
up to richer, more complex representations of the environment. Action is the end
product of the transformative, algorithmic process, whereby the representational
symbols are combined with various goal representations such as desires, in order to
guide behaviour.
Secondly, this implies that cognition, as a process of symbolic manipulation,
was “virtually central, even if the mere implementation of cognitive processes is
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distributed”7 (ibid., p. 401). Furthermore, perception and action are not simply
separate from each other, but also separate and encapsulated8 from cognition, and
therefore if the mind is a product of these encapsulated processes, “[t]he mind is a
kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling” (1998, p. 401).
Hurley took the ‘classical sandwich model’ to highlight three important questions.
First, is cognition ‘classical’ in the sense of being a computational process operating
over symbolic representations? Second, is cognitive processing central and distinct
from perception and action? Third, are perception and action separate from each
other? We have already touched upon some of the difficulties of settling the first
question. However, it may arguably be easier to answer it when couched in terms of
classical computation, rather than computation tout court, due to the additional con-
straints placed upon the types of vehicles that the former postulates (e.g. strings of
symbols with sentence-like properties) (Fodor, 1975). We will return to this question
shortly.
Answering the other two questions satisfactorily will require a more prolonged
discussion, which will require the remainder of this thesis to achieve, even in the
restricted case of decision-making. However, it is possible to make a few tenta-
tive remarks at present. The argument to be defended in this thesis is that cur-
rent theoretical and empirical evidence supports a negative answer to the latter two
7Important to note, is that although often seen as critiquing classical cognitivism in the sense
defended by (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1993; Fodor, 1975), Hurley’s addition of the possible implemen-
tation of cognitive processes being distributed, means that some forms of feed-forward connectionist
architectures would also captured by the sandwich model.
8The term encapsulated may be unfamiliar to some readers. It is commonly used in discussions
of modularity and cognitive penetrability (Fodor, 1983), where the mind is thought of as realised
by distinct neural structures or modules, which have specific functions. These modules are consid-
ered encapsulated if their functions are cognitively impenetrable or unaffected by other cognitive
domains.
23
questions—cognition is not central and distinct from perception and action, and nei-
ther are perception and action separate from one another. However, adopting this
view is not grounds for dismissing the idea that some processes in brain, at the right
level of description, are computational. Many have seen the rejection of cognitivism
to be a rejection of its computational underpinnings. However, this move would be
too rash, and is likely a result of too monolithic an understanding of cognitivism. It
is important to bear in mind that even if we can reject the claim that cognition is
not classical computation, it may still be possible to argue for some form of neuro-
computationalism, or a different notion of cognitive computation altogether. As we
will see in the next section, what aspects of cognitivism are rejected by embodied
cognition is not always shared equally among the various positions.
1.3 Embodied Cognition
Even the most cursory glance at the literature on embodied cognition is sufficient
to instill the idea that the label ‘embodied cognition’ is employed in a number of
ways, and to sometimes incompatible ideas or methodologies. To make matters more
confusing, there has been a recent tendency to move away from the label of ‘embodied
cognition’ to the more encompassing label ‘4e approaches to cognition’ (Barrett,
2015; Hohwy, 2016; Menary, 2010). Here, ‘4e’ highlights the conjunction of four
views known as: embodied, embedded, extended and enactive (sometimes another
term ‘affective’ is included, despite its unwillingness to conform to the pattern).
In order to bring cogency to the discussion, some have attempted to specify the
themes or commitments of embodied cognition. Wilson (2002), for example, claims
that it is composed of six views (here paraphrased):
1. Cognition is situated in the context of a real-world environment.
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2. Cognition is time-pressured, and should be understood in terms of how it func-
tions under these constraints.
3. Cognition is offloaded on to the environment as a result of information pro-
cessing constraints of the organism.
4. Cognition is constituted in part by the environment, and the idea of a brain-
bound mind is therefore an inappropriate object of investigation.
5. Cognition is carried out primarily for action and the guidance of an organism
in its environment.
6. Off-line cognition is body-based and grounded in mechanisms that primarily
evolved for the guidance of action.
The explanatory strength of these views is varied, as is the amount of support that
each receives. For the time being, it is worth highlighting that, unlike cognitivism,
embodied cognition is still in its relative infancy, and a guiding set of principles on
which practitioners and advocates agree is yet to form.9 An understanding of the
reasons behind this lack of conceptual and methodological structure must certainly
come from recognising the interdisciplinary nature of the cognitive sciences, and the
multitude of explanatory interests that are to be found within the many disciplines.
However, can we be more specific?
9It would not be inappropriate to say that embodied cognition represents a revolutionary turn
away from the normal practice of cognitive science qua cognitivism, in the sense expressed by
Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) famous account of scientific practice. It is also fair to state that it has not
yet acquired the status of ‘normal science’.
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1.3.1 Post-Cognitivism: The Symbol Grounding Problem
In a similar vein to the cognitivist’s response to the limitations of behaviourism,
embodied cognition also emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with some of the
conceptual challenges raised by its predecessor (cognitivism). An oft-cited problem
in the context of this conceptual shift is the symbol grounding problem—in short, the
problem of determining the meaning of abstract symbols.
To emphasise this problem, Harnad (1990) explores some of the commitments of
cognitivism in relation to explaining and understanding ‘physical cognitive systems’
(he adopts Newell’s (1980) term “symbol systems” in lieu of cognitive systems):
“A symbol system is:
(1) a set of arbitrary physical tokens (scratches on paper, holes on a tape,
events in a digital computer, etc.) that are
(2) manipulated on the basis of explicit rules that are
(3) likewise physical tokens and strings of tokens. The rule-governed
symbol-token manipulation is based
(4) purely on the shape of the symbol tokens (not their “meaning”), i.e.
it is purely syntactic, and consists of
(5) rulefully combining and recombining symbol tokens. There are
(6) primitive atomic symbol tokens and
(7) composite symbol-token strings. The entire system and all its parts—
the atomic tokens, the composite tokens, the syntactic manipulations
(both actual and possible) and the rules—are all
(8) semantically interpretable: The syntax can be systematically assigned
a meaning (e.g. as standing for objects, as describing states of affairs).”
(ibid., p. 336)
Harnad states that for cognitivists such as (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984) these
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commitments also apply to mental phenomena such as beliefs and desires, and not
merely neural processes. The problem with these commitments is that they lead
to a problem of ‘content determination’, whereby it is hard to see how the symbols
can be said to refer intrinsically to any states in the world, or to paraphrase, how
the symbolic representations can mean anything without the presence of an external
observer viewing them. This is because by (1) and (4), the symbols are necessarily
arbitrary, and manipulated according to just their syntactic properties. Furthermore,
as a result of (2), (3), (5), (6) and (7), all parts and processes of the system are
accounted for in this manner, such that semantic meaning cannot creep in artificially
at some higher-level. Therefore, and in accordance with (8) it is only the system,
taken as a whole, which can be interpreted semantically, and this necessarily requires
an observer. However, though this may be satisfactory for cognitive systems such as
computers, it seems to leave open the well-known question of how systems such as
ourselves can be said to have mental representations that carry non-derived content.
To illustrate this problem, Harnad describes the problem of an agent with no
knowledge of the Chinese language, attempting to determine the meaning of Chinese
symbols using only a Chinese-Chinese dictionary. In a manner that is reflective of
Searle’s (1980) famous Chinese room thought experiment, Harnad (1990, p. 340)
argues that it is difficult to see how one could “ever get off the symbol/symbol
merry-go-round”, and how symbol meaning is “grounded in something other than
just more meaningless symbols?” This is the worry that has come to be known as
the symbol grounding problem:
“How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made
intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our
heads?” (Harnad, 1990, p. 335)
In other words, how can thoughts acquire meaning if they are simply arbitrary
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strings of symbols, related to other arbitrary symbols. Meaning cannot arise in this
manner; it must be grounded in something else. Defenders of the cognitivist frame-
work have attempted to provide various responses to this challenge, such as positing
some sort of casual-dependancy relation between the symbol and the referent in the
world (Fodor, 1992), or through an information-theoretic account of reliable corre-
lation (Dretske, 1981). However, one of the motivations for turning to an embodied
framework is that this issue doesn’t arise for an embodied account (Robbins and
Aydede, 2009).10
Proponents of embodied cognition claim that the way around the symbol ground-
ing problem is to claim that meaning is necessarily grounded in facts about the
agent’s embodiment. The manner in which this is explained can vary. Some begin
by arguing for a pragmatic solution, such that if an agent is capable of exploiting
the incoming sensory information in an appropriate way (e.g. fulfilling its purpose
of acquiring food) then this is all that needs to be said of meaning, as the agent has
“understood” the meaning of the sensory stimulation (Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007).
However, this only pushes the problem back a step, as we then need to account for
the notion of purpose, in order to determine when a representation is appropriate,
10It should be noted that many varied attempts in the philosophy of mind literature have tried to
solve the problem of meaning, or the problem of representation more generally. In fact, an incredible
amount of time and research has been dedicated to the topic of mental representations since the
decline of psychological behaviourism (Anderson and Rosenberg, 2008; Brooks, 1991; Clark and
Toribio, 1994; Cummins, 1989; Dretske, 1981; Field, 1978; Fodor, 1992; Grush, 2004; Millikan,
1995; Ramsey, 2015). This makes a summary of the highly disparate viewpoints so challenging
as to seem like a fool’s errand unless fundamental to the task at hand. Simply put, there is not
enough space to rehearse them here, and the aim of this thesis is not to decide, which of them
is most likely correct. Instead, I have chosen to use the symbol grounding problem as a bridge
between cognitivism and embodied cognition to highlight one (of several) contrastive areas between
the two frameworks.
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or when it is inappropriate, perhaps due to mis-representing the object in some way.
Others emphasise the situated (or embedded) nature of cognition11, leading to the
claim that cognition is dynamic, and always unfolding in the environment, such that
the meaning of any mental state is determined naturally during agent-environment
interaction (we will explore some examples of this view shortly).
One of the most influential accounts comes from the work of psychologist Lawrence
Barsalou (1999) and his work on perceptual symbols (also see Barsalou, 2008; Prinz
and Barsalou, 2000). The notion of perceptual symbols draws a contrast between the
arbitrary, amodal symbols postulated by classical cognitivism, and the modal sym-
bols of Barsalou’s embodied account. When an agent perceives the world, they do so
through different modes of sensation (e.g. vision, audition, proprioception), though
the perception of token objects need not be presented in all of the possible modes
(e.g. I can hear a bird singing without being able to see the bird). The cognitivist
would require that these perceptual signals from the world are transduced, at the
point of contact with the various sensory receptors, into some neutral or amodal code
(akin to something like the binary code of a computer), in order to be transformed,
combined and possibly decoded and recoded into some action plan—Barsalou claims
this is unnecessary. Instead, he argues, “cognition is inherently perceptual, shar-
ing systems with perception at both the cognitive and the neural levels.” (Barsalou,
1999, p. 577) During perceptual experience, he claims, the task of the brain is to cap-
ture bottom-up patterns of neural activation in sensorimotor regions, so that these
patterns can be stored as modal symbols, and later reactivated (or simulated) for
a wide-range of cognitive tasks (e.g. conceptualisation, reasoning, decision-making
etc.). Importantly this simulation redeploys the same sensorimotor regions (or parts
of them) that were initially activated during perception. For example, thinking of
11The distinction between situated and embedded cognition is sometimes collapsed, though see
(Robbins and Aydede, 2009) for an account of their differences.
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kicking a ball, or even the word ‘kick’ would re-activate the same sensorimotor re-
gions that would have been involved in past experiences of kicking a ball (Hauk,
Johnsrude, and Pulvermu¨ller, 2004; Pulvermu¨ller, 1999).
Three points are noteworthy. Firstly, the emphasis that Barsalou places on the
use of symbols should give us pause to consider what exactly is being rejected in
the cognitivist picture. Barsalou explicitly states that “traditional approaches (i.e.
cognitivism) are correct in postulating the importance of symbolic operations for
interpreting experience” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 622). Although this may allow for the
retention of computational processes, the arbitrariness of the amodal symbols cannot
be retained—a new account of representation is therefore required. Secondly, when
Barsalou claims that cognition is inherently perceptual, and involves the reactivation
of stored perceptual symbols, he is also denying the centrality of cognition. This
means that, contra the ‘classical sandwich model’, cognition is not an encapsulated
process, separate from perceptual or motor systems in the brain, but is instead
intertwined with, or constituted by, sensorimotor activity. Finally, by arguing that
these symbols are necessarily perceptual, their meaning is grounded in facts about
the agent’s embodiment. For example, the type of perceptual capacities that the
agent has will necessarily shape the thoughts it can have, as well as the content they
carry—a congenitally blind person will not have the same set of thoughts as a fully
sighted individual; a chameleon will not have the same neural representations as a
fly. This provides important explanatory constraints on the sorts of theories that the
cognitive sciences should pursue.
Irrespective of how the symbol grounding problem is approached12, the empha-
12For example, Chemero (2011) adopts a Gibsonian notion of affordances, and argues for a more
direct approach to understanding perception, cognition and action. This approach eschews the
notion of representations in favour of dynamical modelling, whereas Hutto and Myin (2013) take
an even more radical perspective and try to dismiss the problem of content altogether by eliminating
30
sis is on the agent’s embodiment and dynamic interaction with the environment.
This requires understanding cognition and behaviour as arising not from within an
encapsulated central system that merely crunches symbols, but as a dynamic and
interactive process that is inseparable from the embodied behaviour of the agent.
Furthermore, it requires understanding the representational (and indeed conceptual)
capacities of the agent as being fundamentally shaped by the two aforementioned
processes. Here we reach a potential source of disagreement among embodied theo-
rists: are all of these themes necessary conditions?
1.3.2 Three Themes of Embodiment
Shapiro (2011) aims to capture the idea of embodiment by outlining three themes:
Conceptualisation: an organism’s acquisition and use of conceptual knowledge,
on which it relies to understand its world, is determined in some sense by the
(dynamic) properties of its body and sensory organs.
Replacement: mental representations, which were ubiquitous in cognitivist expla-
nations of behaviour, are inappropriate and in some cases misleading tools for
understanding an organism’s skilful interaction with the world. They should
be replaced by alternative tools, such as dynamical systems theory, which em-
phasise the coupled, reciprocal nature of extended systems, rather than brain-
bound processes.
Constitution: the constituents of the mind might comprise objects and properties
apart from those found in the head, which were traditionally understood as
mere causes of cognition.
it from their framework entirely.
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As with Wilson’s six views, these three themes are also accepted and dismissed
to varying degrees throughout the community of self-described embodied cognition
researchers, with some ongoing disagreements arising about whether they are all
compatible with one another. Let’s explore each in turn.
Conceptualisation
The term ‘embodied’ for the proponent of the conceptualisation thesis means two
things. First, cognition and thought depend upon the kinds of experience that arise
from the possession of a body with various sensorimotor capacities—a type of embod-
ied action. Therefore, understanding cognition requires understanding the capacities
of the body. For example, the properties of the visual system or the range of actions
afforded by the agent’s body (e.g. gripping or flying). Second, these capacities are to
be understood as being embedded in a wider environmental context, which is taken
to include a biological and socio-cultural context. This means exploring not only
how an agent interacts with its local, physical environment, but also its evolutionary
lineage and any relevant socio-cultural norms. Shapiro cites Varela, Thompson, and
Rosch (1991) (VTR) as being a prototypical case of the conceptualisation thesis.
For VTR, understanding cognition requires understanding embodied action. They
claim that “sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally
inseparable in lived cognition” (ibid., p. 173). The emphasis on lived cognition, is
motivated by Varela’s earlier work with Humberto Maturana (Maturana and Varela,
1980), in which they outlined the theory of autopoiesis. In short, the theory was con-
cerned with the dynamic, self-producing processes that sustain life.13 The term ‘au-
topoiesis’ was coined to stand-in as a label for the processes of circular-organisation,
which they argued constitute the basis of life, and within which they situated their
13We will have more to say of the theory of autopoiesis in chapter 4.
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understanding of cognition as a fundamentally lived experience. Within this frame-
work, perception and action not only enable an agent to successfully interact with
their environment, but also change the agent’s experience. For example, as I move
throughout the world, I open up new possibilities for perceptual experience, and
simultaneously close off others. Action determines new perceptions, which in turn
disclose possible future actions, which in turn determine further perceptions, which
in turn... you get the idea! However, this intertwined nature of embodied action is
further shaped by the various properties of the agent’s body. One needs only think
of a non-human animal with a radically different perceptual (or motor) system to
our own (e.g. monocular versus binocular vision) to appreciate the truth of this
statement.
This idea was explored by O’Regan and Noe (2001), who introduced the notion of
sensorimotor contingencies, and were also influenced by the work of James Gibson
(1979) and the ecological approach to psychology. Central to their view was the
acknowledgement that there is more information available in the environment to an
organism that is capable of interaction than is available to a purely passive perceiver.
Active perceivers can detect invariant features in the dynamics of sensory input,
relative to their interactions with the environment. For instance, as an organism
moves directly towards an object, it will increasingly fill a larger portion of the
visual field relative to the speed and movement of the agent. This occurs when the
object is stationary with respect to the active perceiver, and thus provides additional
information about the world. An active perceiver can exploit these reliable properties
of sensorimotor interactions in order to learn about the features of the world, which
would otherwise require inferential processes (Gregory, 1980). These predictable
relationships between action and perceptual input are what they term sensorimotor
contingencies (O’Regan and Noe, 2001).
A further feature of the ecological approach to perception is to highlight the
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action-oriented nature of perceptual processes. On a more traditional theory of per-
ception, information only becomes available for the guidance of action once a percep-
tual representation has been formed and passed on to cognitive systems. However,
this need not be the case for active perceivers. This is because the kinds of com-
plex invariant features that can be detected by an active perceiver have immediate
relevance for action. Rather than first perceptually representing external objects
and then inferring the consequences for action, active perceivers are able to directly
perceive affordances, which are best understood as opportunities for action (Gibson,
1979).14
As described, the first aspect of the conceptualisation thesis (outlined at the
start of this section) may seem relatively uncontroversial, but difficulties arise with
the second aspect. The issue arises when we try to understand the nature of the
embedding relation. Why is it important to understand the capacities as embedded
in a wider context? Shapiro points to a section of VTR’s work, where they discuss
two positions:
Chicken Position: The world out there has pregiven properties. These exist prior
to the image that is cast on the cognitive system, whose task is to recover them
appropriately (whether through symbols or global subsymbolic states).
Egg Position: The cognitive system projects its own world, and the apparent re-
ality of this world is merely a reaction of internal laws of the system. (Varela,
14There are a number of metaphysical complications that arise on closer inspection of the notion
of affordances. Rather, than dealing with this huge literature, we will instead use the term action
opportunities throughout the thesis to distance our view from that of Gibson’s. We acknowledge
that plenty of conceptual challenges remain, but regretfully do not have the space to deal with
them directly in this thesis. Chemero (2011) provides a useful summary of some of the challenges
with Gibson’s theory of affordances, and discusses a significant portion of the literature that has
subsequently been published in response.
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Thompson, and Rosch, 1991, p. 171, cited in Shapiro, 2011)
These positions can be seen as endorsing realism and idealism about properties
of the world respectively. But which comes first in the case of perceptual experience
for VTR?
The chicken position is untenable, as perception of the world depends on the
sensorimotor capacities of the organism. However, the egg position is also untenable
if we acknowledge the evolutionary factors that shaped our sensorimotor capacities
over time—denying a mind-independent reality, as idealism would have us do, is
inconsistent with this. Therefore, VTR wish to collapse the distinction between
these two positions, and allow that biological and socio-cultural factors determine and
shape our experience (denying idealism), while also maintaining that all perceptual
experience of the world is necessarily organism-relative (denying realism). To do
this, they argue, requires understanding the capacities of an agent as necessarily
embedded in its environment—always and everywhere inseparable from it, unless we
want to risk collapsing back into one of the aforementioned positions.
These topics have been explored in depth by more recent work in enactivism (one
of the 4E approaches), and are certainly worthy of continued investigation (Noe, 2004;
Thompson, 2007). In addition, the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) has been of
considerable interest to researchers in fields such as anthropology and linguistics in
exploring the way our bodies and their dynamics alter and shape our conceptual and
linguistic practices (Boroditsky and Gaby, 2010; Casasanto, 2009).
Replacement
The second theme of embodied cognition is primarily concerned with the method-
ological tools used to model and explain cognition. Most notable in this regard is
the use of dynamical systems theory (a mathematical theory that describes how
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rule-governed systems change over time) as a replacement for the symbolic represen-
tations of cognitivism. As such, cognition is modelled as a dynamic process that is
closely coupled with its environment, and the behaviour of cognitive systems should
be understood in a similarly dynamic manner. This involves the use of differential
equations that describe the continuous changes in the state of a system—the com-
plete map of these changes is accordingly known as the the state space. Three points
need to be made explicit regarding the notion of replacement and dynamical systems:
the emergence of self-organisation as a property of dynamical systems, the idea of
coupling, and the commitment to antirepresentationalism.
A number of researchers defend what Shapiro calls the replacement theme. Of
note are developmental psychologists Esther Thelen and Linda Smith (1994), roboti-
cists Randy Beer (2000) and Rodney Brooks (1991), and philosopher Tony Chemero
(2011). Rather than looking at specific cases, it will be more instructive to see what
is common to their approaches. For this we can turn to the prototypical example of
dynamical systems presented in (Kelso, 1995): Rayleigh-Be´nard convection.
As with the aforementioned dynamicists, Kelso believes dynamical systems theory
to be a superior alternative to cognitivism. He states:
“This is an entirely different image from the brain as a computer with
stored contents or subroutines to be called up by a programme. In na-
ture’s pattern-forming systems, contents aren’t contained anywhere but
are revealed only by the dynamics. Form and content are thus inextrica-
bly connected and can’t ever be separated.” (ibid., p. 1)
As an example of these “pattern-forming” systems, he describes the simple system
of oil being heated from below and cooled from above.15 When the oil is heated
weakly from below there is no large-scale motion. The oil is in a rest state as the
15He is also careful to highlight that the simplicity of this example is no guide to the complexities
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Figure 1.5: Rayleigh Rayleigh-Be´nard convection - at a critical value of the temperature
gradient the molecules in the oil display an emergent collective behaviour and
begin to roll.
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heat is able to quickly dissipate, and the molecules continue to move in a random
motion with no overall discernible pattern. However, as the temperature increases,
the random motion of the molecules begins to organise into a coordinated whole,
following an orderly rolling motion (depicted in Figure 1.5). The reason for this is
due to the rising of the less dense oil at the bottom, met with the falling of the cooler
oil at the top.
In this example, the temperature gradient is known as a control parameter, be-
cause it controls or affects the state of the oil molecules, and the amplitude of the
convection rolls that emerge are known as the collective variable (or order para-
mater). Of interest for proponents of the replacement thesis is that the collective
variable is emergent and self-organising. As Kelso (ibid., p. 7) states:
“[T]he control parameter does not prescribe or contain the code for the
emerging pattern. It simply leads the system through the variety of
possible patterns or states.”
Once the pattern has emerged, the behaviour of the individual molecules is in turn
governed by the convection rolls; the emergent collective behaviour of the system
influences the behaviour of the lower-order constituents. This circular causality,
as Kelso describes it, is one of the main conceptual differences between dynamical
systems and the serial computational processing in cognitivism.
This leads to the idea of coupling. Components of a system are coupled when
the mathematical description of the behaviour of one component includes as a term
the behaviour of the other (as is the case in the equations which describe the above
system, see (ibid.)). In coupled systems it is not possible to isolate the behaviour of
of dynamic pattern formation in the brain. He explores dynamic modelling and coordination of
neural states in (Kelso, 2012).
38
one of the components from the others. Therefore, understanding the behaviour of
the system and its components requires a broader perspective.
Some argue that when a complete mathematical description of a system’s be-
haviour can be determined, thus providing a predictive, counterfactual supporting
model, the task of explaining the system’s behaviour has been provided (cf. Chemero,
2011). In addition, supporters of the replacement theme go further in arguing that
the parameters and variables that make up the mathematical descriptions of dy-
namical systems are not representational in the manner defended by the cognitivist.
This latter point is a source of contention, and continues to be debated (see (Bechtel,
2009) and (Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey, 2011) as an example of this debate).
Chemero (2011) has provided a comprehensive reason as to why this debate has
been sustained for so long, and argues that we should restrict the debate over rep-
resentationalism and anti-representationalism to an epistemic question. We should
ask whether the best explanation of cognitive systems involve representations, rather
than the metaphysical question regarding the nature of cognitive systems (i.e. do
they contain representations). Anderson and Rosenberg (2008, p. 56) also draw
attention to the explanatory role of representations—highlighting the distinctively
epistemic nature of question. They claim that the debate should ask “not what a
representation is, but what it does for the representing agent”. Both authors ac-
knowledge that whether cognition can be explained without positing representations
is an empirical matter that has not been settled.
Shapiro (2011, p. 156) argues that the types of behaviour that are amenable
to dynamical modelling represent “too thin a slice of the full cognitive spectrum”
to argue in favour of replacement wholesale. Instead it may be preferable to seek
a rapprochement between dynamical modelling for minimally-cognitive behaviours
(e.g. perceptually-guided action), and those which Clark and Toribio (1994) call
“representation-hungry” behaviours (e.g. long-term planning or reasoning involv-
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ing a distal (decoupled) object, which requires representation). Following Chemero
(2011), any further discussion of representations in this thesis, will be restricted to
the question of whether they are suitable explanatory posits.
Constitution
Finally, we come to the theme of constitution, which can be described as the view
that cognition is comprised of objects, events and their properties that are not nec-
essarily found solely within the brain. This means that cognitivism, which claims
that cognition is simply the processing of symbolic representations in the brain, is
incomplete. However, constitution does not have to be interpreted as entirely anti-
computational, nor a wholesale rejection of cognitivism.
As an example of this work, Shapiro (2011) cites Andy Clark (e.g. 1997a, 2008).
Of interest are the following two themes16:
Nontrivial Causal Spread: behaviours that the cognitivist claims result from the
product of inner symbol-crunching (or from an otherwise well-demarcated sys-
tem in more general cases) are in fact best explained by appealing to external
mechanisms spread across the body and the world (Clark, 2008; Wheeler and
Clark, 1999). The motion of so-called “passive walkers” is an example of non-
trivial causal spread, as their ability to perform the function of walking depends
(nontrivially) on “far-flung” environmental factors, i.e. gravity, friction, incline
of a slope (Clark, 2008).17
Principle of Ecological Assembly: problem-solving depends on the environmen-
16Shapiro (2011) explores further themes, which due to space limitations have not been consid-
ered directly here, but will appear in later discussion
17For those unfamiliar with them, many videos displaying the behaviour of passive walkers are
available to watch on YouTube.
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tal resources an organism has available to it, where the environment can be
considered to include the body. How much the organism contributes to the
task, and how much is exploited from the environment, will be determined
largely by what is most efficient. As an example, Clark (ibid.) gives the case
of a tile-assembly task studied by Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pook (1997), which we
discuss in detail in chapter 3. He claims that the principle of ecological assem-
bly can be described as the view that “the canny cognizer tends to recruit, on
the spot, whatever mix of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable
result with a minimum of effort.”
Note that Nontrivial Causal Spread is not making the uncontroversial, and some-
what trivial claim that worldly objects have causal effects on the body and the mind.
Rather, as with the earlier distinction made by Chemero (2011), this is a claim about
how best to understand and explain the causes of a cognitive system’s behaviour (i.e.
what theoretical posits are required for a complete account of behaviour, and are they
found entirely within the symbol-processing brain). Developing on this thread, the
principle of ecological assembly adopts an evolutionary perspective, and argues that
adaptive behaviours are likely to result from the exploitation of any resources that
contribute to efficient and effective problem-solving, irrespective of where they may
fall on some brain-environment boundary (e.g. orienting ingredients in a particular
order to simplify the task of following a recipe). This goes beyond the trivial causal
claim mentioned above, and leads to the following theme, which bears resemblance
to aspects of both the conceptualisation and replacement theses:
Open Channel Perception: rather than positing inner symbols, which mediate
between the world and action by constructing rich representations, open chan-
nel perception can often exploit the invariants in the optic array, which correlate
reliably with certain features of the world. This idea is often discussed in eco-
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logical psychology (Gibson, 1979), but is also a key aspect of embodied robotics
(Brooks, 1991; Steels, 2003). One of Clark’s favourite examples to highlight
this point is the idea of optical acceleration cancellation in the trajectory of a
fly ball in baseball (Clark, 1997a, 2008, 2015). Rather than requiring complex
computation of a trajectory, in order to guide motor behaviour towards some
spot in the outfield, a baseball player can simply keep perception of the ball
fixed in their line of sight by running at the appropriate speed and in the appro-
priate direction. By doing this, the outfielder will naturally arrive in the right
spot so as to catch the ball, simply by exploiting the close coupling between
their perceptual and motor systems, and without any complex computational
resources. We will explore this example more thoroughly in chapter 3.
It is important to note that Clark is by no means an anti-representationalist,
and acknowledges the importance of representations in accounting for some aspects
of cognition (Clark and Toribio, 1994). Furthermore, he has argued in defence of
a conciliatory role for the computational explanations that posit representations,
and the more dynamic accounts outlined above (Clark, 1997a). The following two
strictures he outlines demonstrate this more inclusive attitude:
1. Beware of putting too much into the head. Adaptive behavior
emerges from a complex balancing act that incorporates neural, bod-
ily, and environmental influences.
2. Beware of narrow visions of the form and content of putative inter-
nal representational systems. Such systems may involve indexical-
functional (action-oriented) contents and may not require expres-
sion in the form of compositional codes and classical programmes.
(Clark, 1997b, p. 475)
Whereas theorists such as Chemero (2011) and Kelso (1995) may wish to abolish
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the use of computationalism and representationalism from the cognitive sciences,
Clark believes them to be ineliminable.
We can interpret this complementarity of computation and dynamicism, which
is inherent in Clark’s theory, as motivated by an idea he has defended in detail—
cognition and the mind extend beyond the brain into the environment (Clark, 2008;
Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Whether one chooses to defend this claim with its
original functionalist commitments (e.g. Clark and Chalmers, 1998), or to reinterpret
the constitutive claim evident in the principles above as a non-functionalist account
(e.g. Menary, 2007) is unsurprisingly a contested matter. Regardless of how one
chooses to defend the account (or which version is the target of criticism), it should be
clear why the notion of embodiment is of central explanatory importance, and in what
regards it differs from cognitivism. The body and the environment are the brain’s
partners in constituting cognition, and different types of explanation may be better
suited to accounting for different aspects of them. Nevertheless, any explanation
that pertains to the sort of varied, adaptive and intelligent cognitive behaviour,
which we often attribute to agents such as ourselves, ignores the environment at its
peril—symbol processing simply isn’t enough.
1.3.3 Proper Embodiment
Although the idea is not addressed by Shapiro (2011), it is also worth considering
what Stapleton (2016) calls ‘proper embodiment’. This idea aims to more carefully
consider the importance of fine-grained, particular details of the organism’s body,
with emphasis on findings from affective science. The use of the qualifying adjective
(proper) draws attention to Stapleton’s claim (echoed by (Colombetti, 2013)) that
although developments in embodied cognition have acknowledged the importance of
modelling organism-environment interactions, it has been slower to acknowledge the
importance of affective neuroscience. This latter focus, she argues, is important for
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uncovering specific details about how our physiology contributes to cognition and
consciousness. The thesis of proper embodiment thus states that:
“[...] (at least some of) the details of our physiology matter to cognition
and consciousness in a fundamental way such that (at least some of) the
mechanisms of cognition are so fine-grained that specifying the algorithm
for cognition would entail specifying parts of the internal body normally
considered to be background or enabling conditions for cognition.” (Sta-
pleton, 2016, p. 21)
By retaining the functionalist commitments of cognitivism, Stapleton claims some
versions of embodied cognition end up retaining some of the neurocentric shortcom-
ings that it was supposed to overcome when turning away from cognitivism. To
highlight this, Stapleton breaks the thesis of proper embodiment down into two in-
dependent theses: internal embodiment and particular embodiment. They are defined
as follows:
Internal Embodiment: “the internal “gooey” body matters to cognition and con-
sciousness in a fundamental way.”
Particular Embodiment: “the particular details of our implementation matters
to cognition.” (ibid.)
Neither of the definitions make much sense in isolation, so let’s expand on them.
With regards to internal embodiment, the emphasis on ‘internal’ is to draw attention
to the importance of interoception. This term was originally introduce by Charles
Sherrington (1947) to refer to the sensation of the visceral body. However, Craig
(2002, p. 655) has more recently extended its usage to include other sense such as
pain, temperature and light touch, on the basis of shared neural pathways and pro-
cessing areas. He argues, “interoception should be redefined as the sense of the
44
physiological condition of the entire body not just the viscera.” In short, interocep-
tion provides the brain with a general sense of how the body is coping.
Stapleton argues that the importance of interoception for cognition lies in uncov-
ering the role of affectively significant sensory signals that originate from the internal
environment of the body, and in turn motivate behaviours and provide perceptual
states with value. By overlooking this crucial aspect, researchers may fail to appre-
ciate an important aspect of how evolved cognitive systems interact and adapt to
their environment.
However, while it is not true that embodied cognition research has completely
overlooked interoception, according to Stapleton it has only considered the role that
interoception plays in shaping cognition from within a functionalist framework. As
such, embodied cognition is committed to certain tenets of functionalism, most no-
tably multiple realisability and supervenience. Although Stapleton takes no issue
with these tenets in general, she claims that adherence to these tenets (and more
specifically, multiple realisability) has led researchers to overlook the importance of
particular implementational details for understanding cognitive systems. This brings
us to the second of her theses.
A commitment to functionalism means abstracting away from the messy physical
realisers, so that what is important is identifying the causal role that some cognitive
process plays within a larger system. Functionalism, with its commitment to multiple
realisability, allows the researchers to effectively ignore the messy implementational
details, focusing instead on what algorithmic processes are likely to be shared by
different cognitive systems performing the same computational task.
In contrast, Stapleton presents an interesting example from research in evolu-
tionary robotics that demonstrates why this functionalist strategy often overlooks
important details. She discusses research on GasNets, a class of neural networks
that aim to model non-synaptic gasotransmitters such as nitrous oxide, which have
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long been identified as an important mechanism in neural signalling. In a study
performed by Smith et al. (2002), two classes of neural networks were simulated, and
allowed to evolve according to equivalent measures of fitness, based on success in the
task being studied (see (ibid.) for details). One of these classes of neural networks
was designed to only simulate standard synaptic signalling (NoGas), whereas the
other was designed to simulate gasotransmission (GasNet). Both networks achieved
the same level of functional success, but the GasNet class adapted much faster than
the NoGas class. Smith et al. (ibid.) claimed that this flexible adaptivity was a direct
result of the gas diffusion mechanisms. Stapleton (2016) argues that this example
supports the idea that a particular physical feature of an organism’s embodiment
plays a key role in evolvability, and should therefore be considered as relevant to
embodied cognition more generally. A narrow focus on the functional equivalence of
the two classes, she argues, is the wrong level to focus on if we wish to understand
what is key to each networks ability to succeed in the task environment.
This short discussion of proper embodiment is presented here to provide a more
complete (though admittedly patchy) overview of the embodied cognition literature.
As we are interested specifically in decision-making, we will postpone critical remarks
until later chapters. However, as a preview, a couple of questions can be raised.
First of all, does the acceptance of any one theme mean a complete rejection of an
alternative, or can a conciliatory approach be achieved? Conditional on the answer to
the first, what would count as a satisfactory embodied approach, and can we provide
a list of criteria or constraints that would allow us to identify a truly embodied
theory? Over the course of the thesis we will favour a more conciliatory approach,
motivated by a commitment to explanatory pluralism in the cognitive sciences, but
also an acknowledgement that attempting to provide a satisfactory response to the
second question seems to be unlikely given the current empirical research. As we will
see in the next section, this is no reason to abandon embodied cognition.
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Figure 1.6: Adapted from (Shapiro, 2011, p. 201).
1.3.4 Whatever it is, it’s not cognitivism!
As well as providing a useful way of understanding the various commitments of em-
bodied cognition, there is a secondary purpose to Shapiro’s (2011) themes—what he
terms a ‘meta-theme’. The meta-theme is whether cognitivism and embodied cogni-
tion offer competing explanations of the same phenomena? He poses the following
questions, which we can represent as a decision tree (Figure 1.6). In discussing this
decision tree, he quickly argues that the right-hand side of the decision tree can be
ignored, as embodied cognition and cognitivism do in fact have the same subject
matter (e.g. perception, decision-making, motor control etc.), irrespective of which
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of the three themes is adopted. This leaves the left-hand side of the tree.
As we saw in the previous sections, each of the three themes is opposed to cogni-
tivism in sometimes shared, and sometimes different manners. If one is committed
to a particular theme, then this may require some sort of rapprochement between
the aspects of cognitivism and embodiment that are compatible (as with constitu-
tion), or attempting to find further theoretical and empirical support to widen the
explanatory support (as with replacement).18 However, there are many commonali-
ties between the themes, which means categorising any particular piece of research
can be challenging. For example, conceptualisation and replacement share an em-
phasis on the dynamic interaction between body and environment; replacement and
constitution acknowledge a role for dynamical modelling (albeit to a different degree)
in explaining an agent’s situated behaviour, and constitution and conceptualisation
point to the importance of body-environment interaction as a potentially illuminat-
ing source of our conceptual knowledge. As these commonalities between the themes
become more intertwined, it can begin to look like taking one of them as the primary
defining characteristic of a position is a somewhat arbitrary decision.
This may lead one to think that adopting an embodied framework places any
theory on unstable foundations, unless one can explicitly outline all of the assump-
tions that are being made, and provide independent justification for each of them in
turn. Otherwise, the critic could always argue that the disarray caused by the myr-
iad positions threatens the cogency of the position being defended. However, though
we will endeavour to make clear over the course of this thesis exactly what commit-
ments to embodiment are being made, explicitly outlining all of our commitments
isn’t necessary at this stage for a couple of reasons.
Unlike cognitivism, embodied cognition should still be seen as in its infancy, and
18See Chapter 7 of (ibid.) for further details relating to each theme.
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without an orthodox set of constraints—perhaps this is why (Calvo and Gomila,
2008, p. 3) define embodied cognition as a “post-cognitivist approach”? Despite the
point raised at the start of this chapter regarding the insufficiency of a foil to act
as a delineating constraint, we are forced to accept it for the time being—whatever
embodied cognition may be, it certainly isn’t cognitivism!
Shapiro (2007) has been careful to point out the varied roots of embodied cog-
nition, while at the same time arguing that its somewhat nebulous nature is no
reason for one dismissing it. He stresses that for the time being it is best to refer to
embodied cognition as a research programme, rather than as a theory, to avoid the
appearance of strict unity of methodological practices. Is this enough to satisfy the
cognitivist? Surely not. However, they should pause before celebrating their unitary
conceptual framework. For as Menary (2010, emphasis added, p.460) states of the
4E programme:
“[...] we are in a position of abundance, not disarray : if one looks at the
array of empirical cases that are provided by the, now rich, 4E literature,
one finds the need for a battery of different explanatory methods that are
suited to the differences in those cases.”
Over the course of this thesis we will discuss a wide variety of these empirical
cases, and it will be argued that explanatory pluralism is at present the best method-
ological stance to adopt in the cognitive sciences. Although we will not take a firm
stance on any one of the three themes outlined above, we will acknowledge when
significant disagreements arise between them. It may turn out that these disagree-
ments are nothing more than the product of blind scholars grabbing at different
parts of an elephant—as illustrated in the famous parable. Alternatively, these dis-
agreements may turn out to be more problematic and thus require resolution in the
future. For the time being, and indeed for this thesis, it will suffice to show why the
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embodied cognition research programme is preferable to cognitivism. Therefore, the
focus will be less on whether the varieties of embodied research are competing with
one another, and more on whether they collectively provide a genuine alternative to





The success of the information-processing approach to cognition should not be un-
derstated. As we saw in Chapter 1, the ability to formalise key notions provided
a common vocabulary and valuable conceptual tools for the emerging discipline of
cognitive science. However, despite the mathematical rigour that this brought to cog-
nitivism, the assumption that information-processing is a bottom-up, serial process
(e.g. the classical sandwich model) has recently been challenged by a contemporary
framework known as predictive processing (PP).
Whereas cognitivism treats perception as a largely bottom-up process of incre-
mental feature detection, PP overturns this conception, instead placing an emphasis
on top-down predictions about expected sensory data (section 2.1). These predic-
tions emerge from hierarchical generative models, which are encoded by the brain
in a probabilistic manner (section 2.3), and are continuously modified by bottom-up
error signals that communicate mismatches between predictions and actual activity
(section 2.2). This initial process is also accompanied by expectations of the preci-
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sion of incoming sensory data (section 2.4).1 Each of these claims requires unpacking,
but there are two ways we could proceed. On the one hand, the PP framework can
be described in a manner that leads to understanding the role of the brain from a
neurocentric, internalist perspective (Hohwy, 2013) (section 2.5). On the other hand,
the framework can be described in a manner that uncovers a deep affinity with the
embodied perspective (Clark, 2016b). Unsurprisingly, we favour the latter, but for
expository purposes it is best to consider the former as our starting point.
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, we will outline the contemporary frame-
work known as predictive processing (PP) following the work of Jakob Hohwy. He
has claimed that, within the PP framework, many diverse phenomena such as per-
ception, action and attention can be modelled as a form of statistical inference,
which in turn may provide a unifying account of the brain’s diverse activity. The
unifying mechanism, according to Hohwy (2014, p. 2) is known as prediction-error
minimisation (PEM), and is claimed to be the “only principle for the activity of the
brain”. In order to evaluate this claim, we will discuss the main components of the
framework (as outlined above), as well as theoretical and empirical research that
supports them. We will then look at some of the conceptual challenges with this
interpretation. This will set the groundwork for later chapter, where we will argue
in favour of an embodied interpretation of PP, and in turn explore an account of
decision-making.
2.1 Overturning Tradition
Network-based approaches in cognitive neuroscience view connections in the brain as
massively recurrent, and dynamically interacting with other local networks (Sporns,
1Although a brief overview of PP is provided in this chapter, for more in-depth overviews and
introductions, see (Clark, 2016b; Hohwy, 2013), For formal details, see (Friston, 2010; Seth, 2013)
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2011). As such, information does not just feed forward in a serial, incremental
manner starting with perception and ending with motor control. Rather, feedback
connections exist at multiple levels of the neural architecture, integrating, influencing
and inhibiting ongoing activity. The extent of these feedback connections should not
be downplayed. As Sporns (ibid., emphasis added, p.150) notes:
“Even in regions of the brain such as primary visual cortex that are clas-
sified as “sensory,” most synapses received by pyramidal neurons arrive
from other cortical neurons and only a small percentage (5 percent to
20 percent) can be attributed to sensory input. Cortical areas that are
farther removed from direct sensory input are coupled to one another
via numerous mono- and polysynaptic reciprocal pathways. This preva-
lence of recurrent anatomical connections suggests that models which
focus exclusively on feedforward processing in a silent brain are likely to
capture only one aspect of the anatomical and physiological reality. [...]
[R]ecurrent or reentrant processes make an important contribution to
the shaping of brain responses and to the creation of coordinated global
states. This coordination is essential for the efficient integration of mul-
tiple sources of information and the generation of coherent behavioural
responses.”
How should we model the function of these recurrent connections? A recent
proposal known as predictive processing (PP) treats the recurrent connections as
encoding top-down predictions about the incoming sensory data, and bottom-up
activity as signalling what the predictions got wrong (i.e. an error signal). Figure
2.1 represents this principle by way of a simplified schematic. Each layer in this
network encodes what is known as a probabilistic generative model, which tries to
predict the activity at the layer below it. Furthermore, the system considered as a
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Figure 2.1: A simplified schematic of the principle of predictive processing. Each higher
layer generates predictions about the neural activity at a lower layer. Only
the residual error (unpredicted activity) is signalled to the higher layers.
whole encodes a multi-level, probabilistic generative model that tries to predict the
sensory information from the environment.
The notion of a generative model has its roots in machine learning with the
famous Helmholtz machine and wake-sleep algorithm (Dayan et al., 1995; Hinton et
al., 1995). It is often contrasted with the notion of a discriminative model, which is
constructed by a neural network on the basis of successive training on some data set.
In this latter instance, the neural network aims to correctly classify (or discriminate)
the incoming data, and the parameters of its models can be iteratively adjusted
in order to increase the accuracy of its classifications. This method is appropriate
for simple data sets (e.g. sets that are accurately modelled using univariate linear
regression), but can perform poorly (if at all) when uncovering the hidden causes
of data generated by a large number of non-linearly interacting hidden causes. For
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example, consider the case of a data set representing house sales, and the task of
fitting a model that successfully predicts future house prices on the basis of the
data received. A neural network operating with a discriminative model may be
able to model the relationship between a number of interacting variables (e.g. plot-
size, year of build, quality of schools in 1-mile radius, average price of neighbouring
buildings and so on) inherent in the data set, but will likely struggle in cases where the
variables interact in unconventional ways. For example, which weighted combination
of variables accurately captures ‘market demand’?
An alternative strategy is to use a generative model. As the name implies, this
strategy allows the network to generate its own data, structured around previously
learned expectations, and compare the accuracy of this simulated data against the
actual data it receives. These simulations are based on predictions about what
the network expects to be the most likely cause of the data it receives, and these
expectations are updated by signalling what is known as a prediction error that also
acts as a learning signal for the network. This means the latter is not restricted
solely to detecting pre-classified patterns in the data it receives, in order to refine
the parameters of its models. As (Clark, 2016b, p. 20) highlights:
“The Helmholtz Machine was an early example of a multilayer architec-
ture trainable without reliance upon experimenter pre-classified exam-
ples. Instead, the system ‘self-organised’ by attempting to generate the
training data for itself, using its own downwards (and lateral) connec-
tions.”
A system that can effectively use a generative model in this manner is one step
closer to effectively representing the hidden causes of the sensory data (in section 2.2
we will explore the second necessary component). However, the world is an uncertain
and multifaceted place, and the same input is often consistent with a number of
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causes (e.g. a number of houses could be the same price but for different underlying
reasons), some of which may themselves be an emergent product of interacting causes
(e.g. market demand). Therefore, to maintain predictive accuracy, a generative
model should be hierarchical and probabilistic, such that the most likely cause (or as
we will see shortly, the one with the highest posterior probability) should be selected
by the system as the true cause of its input. The motivation for adopting a multilevel
or hierarchical setting, reflects both the efficiency of predictive architectures (e.g. the
predictive coding example discussed shortly), but also a recognition that the world is
equally composed of highly-structured causes that need to be understood. As Clark
(ibid., pp. 24-25) notes:
“This is important since structured domains are ubiquitous in both the
natural and human-built world. Language exhibits densely nested compo-
sitional structure in which words form clauses that form whole sentences
that are themselves understood by locating them in the context of even
larger linguistic (and non-linguistic) settings. Every visual scene, such as
a city street, a factory floor, or a tranquil lake, embeds multiple nested
structures (e.g., shops, shop doorways, shoppers in the doorways; trees,
branches, birds on the branches, leaves, patterns on the leaves). Musical
pieces exhibit structures in which overarching sequences are built from
recurring and recombinant sub-sequences, each of which has structure of
its own. The world, we might reasonably suggest, is known by us humans
(and doubtless most other animals too) as a meaningful arena populated
by articulated and nested structures of elements.”
In order for agents such as ourselves to understand the dynamic complexities of
the world, this property seems indispensable, and applied to neurobiological phe-
nomena, this idea finds empirical support from recent work by Bastos et al. (2012),
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Kanai et al. (2015), and Mumford (2003) as well as work in predictive coding.
2.1.1 Evidence from Visual Cortex
An early attempt to model neural systems using a hierarchical predictive architecture
was put forward by Rao and Ballard (1999) for the case of visual cortex. This
model had the additional virtues of a) being able to independently accommodate
the existence of extra-classical receptive-field effects, which had been detected in
several visual cortical areas, and b) demonstrating an efficient method of information-
processing that could be implemented by the brain.
The receptive-field (RF) of a neuron is the region of sensory space to which the
neuron is optimally tuned, such that when a relevant stimulus is present in that
region of space it will trigger the firing of that neuron. It is possible to construct
a probabilistic representation of the neuron’s receptive field, known as its ‘tuning
curve’, which takes the form of a probability density function over the relevant stim-
ulus parameters. The extra-classical receptive-field effect that was investigated by
Rao & Ballard is known as the “endstopping” effect. It refers to the initial pres-
ence of a tuned response to an optimally oriented line segment, which is reduced (or
eliminated) when the same stimulus happens to extend beyond the neuron’s classical
receptive field (e.g. a line segment that extends beyond the peripheries of the visual
field).
Extra-classical effects have some interesting properties. For example, rather than
increasing activity, many in fact inhibit or suppress activity. Though some proposals
had been put forward prior to their paper, Rao & Ballard claimed that they failed
to generalise outside of the visual cortex. However through the development of an
alternative account based on the principle of predictive coding (PC), Rao and Bal-
lard came to the interesting finding—by developing hierarchical PC models of visual
cortex—that these extra-classical receptive field effects may be a direct consequence
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of the brain’s use of hierarchical predictive coding.
PC claims that neural networks need only signal deviations from the expected
statistical regularities in the sensory input to higher levels for processing, subject to
an internal generative model being able to generate predictions that flow downwards
through the network. Importantly, they add “[t]his reduces redundancy by removing
the predictable, and hence redundant, components of the input signal.” (1999, p. 79)
With regards to efficiency, note that only the residual error, or unpredicted ac-
tivity is signalled to the higher layer, which in turn reduces the redundant signalling
of information, increases efficiency, and provides a hierarchical structure to the gen-
erative model encoded by the network.2
As an illustration, consider the case of compressing a RAW photographic image
file (depicting the French flag) into a format like JPEG. Large portions of this image
will contain pixels whose value will be strongly correlated with the value of its closest
neighbours (i.e. large sections of blue, white and red). Where significant deviations
exists, they will be representative of features such as edges (e.g. the edge between
the blue and white segments). Therefore, encoding only the unexpected variation
(e.g. the cases where the actual value was not predicted by the generative model)
allows the network to only transmit the difference between the prediction and the
actual data (the prediction error), which is a more efficient method than attempting
to transmit large swathes of data to each layer of the system.
Further evidence of efficient coding was explored by both Mumford (2003) and
Hosoya, Baccus, and Meister (2005). The latter explored the contextual effects on
retinal ganglion cells, under the assumption that they implement an efficient coding
2The mathematical properties of hierarchical generative models means that they can be com-
posed of many additional nested generative models. The whole hierarchy could thus be considered
as one single generative model, and the whole hierarchy minus the bottom levels could also form
another generative model, and so on (Friston, 2008).
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scheme such as predictive coding, but also display contextual effects based on higher-
level priors that rapidly modulate the expectations of the lower-levels. Clark (2013c,
p. 184) highlights two important findings from their work:
“Putting salamanders and rabbits into varying environments, and record-
ing from their retinal ganglion cells, Hosoya et al. confirmed their hy-
pothesis: Within a space of several seconds, about 50% of the ganglion
cells altered their behaviors to keep step with the changing image statis-
tics of the varying environments [...] there are neuronally plausible ways
to implement such a mechanism using amacrine cell synapses to mediate
plastic inhibitory connections that in turn alter the receptive fields of
retinal ganglion cells so as to suppress the most correlated components
of the stimulus. In sum, retinal ganglion cells seem to be engaging in
a computationally and neurobiologically explicable process of dynamic
predictive recoding of raw image inputs, whose effect is to “strip from
the visual stream predictable and therefore less newsworthy signals.”
2.2 Predictions and Prediction Error in the Brain
Intuitively it seems obvious that we are able to generate predictions about future
events, which range from the trivial (e.g. what I expect to find in my fridge), to
the potentially transformative life experiences (e.g. what life will be like if I have a
child). Recent theories have begun to entertain the idea that the primary function
of the cortex may be the prediction of such future states in our environment (Bar,
2011a; Clark, 2016b; Hohwy, 2013; Kveraga, Ghuman, and Bar, 2007). Ouden, Kok,
and De Lange (2012) provide a comprehensive list of the various applications that
these family of ideas have been applied to, including visual and auditory processing,
somatosensory perception, motor control, language, memory, cognitive control, and
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motivational value processing.
Since the environment is constantly in flux, there is an ineliminable source of
uncertainty that an agent must deal with if they’re to successfully interact with the
world. Therefore, if an agent is to maintain accurate inner models, she must have a
way of determining when they go wrong. As well as sharing a commitment to the
importance of prediction, by necessity these theories also share a commitment to a
second notion—the possibility of prediction error.
We can define prediction error as the mismatch between an agent’s prior expec-
tation and the actual state of affairs in the environment. As a simplified illustration,
consider the following: you are trying to bake a cake. You have a slice of the cake
you wish to reconstruct, and have been given all but two of the ingredients (in the
right quantities) to make the cake. You are competent enough of a baker to de-
termine that only two ingredients (baking powder and vanilla essence) are missing,
but do not know what their quantities are. The complete set of ingredients (with
the right quantities) can be considered the hidden cause of the cake that you are
trying to reconstruct (we denote this as θ). Given that this is the most delicious
cake you have ever tried, you decide to bake several cakes, varying the quantities
of baking powder and vanilla essence across the different trials. You end up with
six different cakes which you label (P1, P2, ..., P6) respectively—these represent your
predictions. We can also think of the set of hypothesised ingredients, independently
from their particular quantities, as akin to the generative model (and its parameters)
from which we derive the individual predictions. You proceed to compare the cakes
against the original slice (the sensory input). The first cake (P1) has the same height
and texture as the original, but is a lot more bland. You conclude that recipe P1
has too little vanilla essence—there is a corresponding error generated by the dif-
ference in height of the two cakes. Next you compare cake P2, but this time find
that although the flavour is correct, it has not risen as much as the original. You
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may be able to conclude at this point that you have sufficient information to de-
termine the complete set of ingredients: the amount of baking powder from P1 and
the amount of vanilla essence from P2. However, it is also possible that there is a
further undiscovered relation between the two ingredients when their quantities are
changed. Therefore, you continue to test the additional cakes and eventually find
that in order to mask the bitter taste caused by increasing the baking powder to get
the right height, you now need slightly more vanilla essence than was initially used
in recipe P2—this is corrected by the quantities used in P6. By forming predictions
in this manner, and comparing them with the original cake, you eventually manage
to minimise the prediction error between your prediction of θ, and its corresponding
effect (the original cake).3 This example is reminiscent of hypothesis-testing in sci-
ence, whereby a scientist forms individual hypotheses and tests them against some
set of data and attempts to find the closest fit. The similarity is no accident, as we
shall see shortly (section 2.3).
The continual testing of different predictions should also reflect the brain’s on-
going attempt to learn from its prior experience. In PP, the prior expectations (or
predictions) are generated by an agent’s model of the environment, which as we will
3There are some important differences between this example and PP. For one, the set of ingre-
dients is considered finite, whereas there is a possibly infinite number of hidden causes that could
generate the input our brains receive. Secondly, in PP there is a difference in kind between the
inner generative model and the hidden cause (θ) in the environment, which is overlooked in this
example in favour of a more personal-level description. The inappropriate use of personal-level ter-
minology is highlighted in case one mistakenly worries that we are further attributing inappropriate
terminology to the brain (see section 2.3). Finally, there is also the overlooked case of the brain’s
ability to control action. Therefore, we could extend θ to include the actions taken by the original
baker (e.g. mixing and baking) within our predictions. As we will see later, this is an important
component that needs adding, but unfortunately we have not yet introduced enough material to
elaborate further at this time.
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see is partly constrained by the structure of its neural circuits, and partly shaped
by the statistical regularities inherent in the flow of sensory inputs that the agent
experiences over the course of its lifetime. The latter is derived from the fact that a
prediction error, by signalling an inaccuracy in part of the agent’s inner models, calls
for an update of the model’s parameters to take place. This is why authors such as
Hohwy (2014, p. 2) claim that:
“[...] the brain is an organ that on average and over time continually
minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of
its model of the world and the actual sensory input.”
The inclusion of “on average and over time” is important, as it points to a need
to consider a sufficient amount of flexibility in the models to avoid the problem often
referred to in statistics as overfiitting. To be predictively successful a model should
not be either too complex (i.e. containing too many parameters such that it reacts
to minor fluctuations or noise by generating significant error), nor too general (i.e.
unable to spot an underlying trend in the incoming data) (cf. Hohwy, 2013, chapter
2, for a simple illustration). Although each prediction is trying to account for the
evidence in as accurate a manner as possible, the global performance of the system
takes priority, to avoid running into tricky problems such as the dark-room problem
(cf. Friston, Thornton, and Clark, 2012). In short, this is the issue of how to explain
why an agent trying to minimise prediction-error does not simply go into a dark-
room and predict to experience nothing at all. As we will see, in chapter 4, resolving
this requires understanding the predictions being generated in an organism-relative
manner, one which acknowledges the agent’s phenotype.
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2.2.1 Evidence of Prediction Errors
A recent review paper by Ouden, Kok, and De Lange (2012) considers what empirical
evidence there is for the idea that the brain generates prediction errors. Not only do
these authors provide an extensive review of recent prediction error research in the
cognitive sciences, but they also point to two important experimental paradigms that
are commonly used throughout the literature: the oddball and omission paradigms.
The former refers to the presentation of a deviant (or oddball) stimulus in a
sequence of repeated standard stimuli, and the expectation that the presentation of
an oddball will elicit larger neural activity over the relevant sensory areas. The latter
refers to the instance where a subject is primed to expect a subsequently withheld
(or omitted) event, and a corresponding neural response is measured. Both can
be quantified as a measure of surprisal, which is an information-theoretic measure
that refers to how improbable (or surprising) some outcome is, conditioned upon a
model.4
In the case of the oddball paradigm, researchers aim to measure what is known as
the mismatch negativity (MMN) component of an event-related potential (ERP): the
electrophysiological response that results from the presentation of an odd sensory,
cognitive or motor event in a sequence of events. To try to dissociate MMN from
repetition suppression (i.e. the decrease in activity as result of the repetition of the
same stimulus), Tervaniemi, Maury, and Na¨a¨ta¨nen (1994) played subjects a series of
initially non-repeating, rising auditory tones, with the inclusion of a single repeated
identical tone (the unexpected oddball) at an unknown stage in the sequence. Their
4Formally, it is the negative log of how probable the outcome of an event is (−logP (e)), the
long-term average of which can be considered the entropy of a random variable. This measure is
intuitive when one considers that as the probability of an event goes up the negative log value goes
down—an event that is highly probable is unsurprising.
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findings included an observed MMN at the time of the repeated tone, suggesting
that there was a violation of the agent’s expectations.
Perhaps more interestingly for PP are the robust findings supporting the omission
paradigm. This is because the increased activity is hard to account for using standard
bottom-up accounts, as there is no stimulus to evoke a response. However, PP
naturally accounts for this, due to the ubiquity of prediction error transmission that
it assumes. As Kok et al. (2011) state:
“Since predictive coding theories state that the response in sensory cortex
is largely determined by the violation of predictions, it may be expected
that the failure of a predicted stimulus to appear would similarly evoke
a response (prediction error) in the relevant sensory cortex, even though
no physical stimulus is presented.”
Indeed, a number of studies using the omission paradigm, reported by Ouden,
Kok, and De Lange (2012, p. 4), measured evoked responses in the absence of ex-
pected physical stimuli, which in connection with the other evidence they summarise,
leads the authors to claim that, “PEs appear ubiquitously throughout the brain, lend-
ing support to the notion that coding of PEs is a general neural coding strategy.”
Returning to Figure 2.1, we can see that the role of bottom-up information in
PP is the transmission of prediction-error to the higher-levels of the hierarchy, sig-
nalling how accurate the higher-level predictions were at accounting for the sensory
evidence.5 A claim made by proponents of PP is that this process occurs at each
5The exact manner in which we measure this accuracy (or inaccuracy) is still an open question
that depends on the acquisition of further empirical evidence. At present, authors such as Hohwy
(2013) and Friston (2010) favour a measure known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence (or relative
entropy) because of certain properties it has (i.e it is always non-negative and non-symmetric).
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layer of a multi-level hierarchical system. For example, each of the layers depicted in
Figure 2.1 encodes a model, which generates predictions pertaining to the expected
neural activity at the layer below, and are continuously updated by the ongoing flow
of predictions errors. If translated into a formal model, such a schema implements
a version of Bayesian inference often referred to as empirical Bayes or variational
Bayes (see section 2.3).6 As Hohwy (2014, p. 4) states:
“Computationally, perception can then be described as empirical Bayesian
inference, where priors are shaped through experience, development and
evolution, and harnessed in the parameters of hierarchical statistical mod-
els of the causes of the sensory input. The best models are those with
the best predictions passed down to lower levels, they have the highest
posterior probability and thus come to dominate perceptual inference.
Error is minimized through some minimization scheme such as gradient
descent, expectation maximization, or variational Bayes.”
This close connection with Bayesian statistics provides Hohwy with the formal
support for what he describes as the hypothesis-testing brain.
These properties make the KL-divergence a suitable measure for the PP framework and a more
generalised notion known as the free-energy principle, but other authors such as Clark (2016b) point
to the wealth of possible variant architectures for PP that are currently under investigation, and
the many ways of conceiving of the notion of prediction-error (Ouden, Kok, and De Lange, 2012,
cf.). For the time being, these matters will be put aside as the formal details are not necessary for
our discussion.
6Though these schemas are considered to be Bayes-optimal, unlike true Bayesian inference, the
use of sensory information to update posterior beliefs proceeds is only approximated (Friston, 2010).
This is considered preferable due to the computational intractability of trying to estimate hidden
variables in the sort of sensory data indicative of real-world systems.
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Figure 2.2: The above image could have been produced by a cat occluded by a fence,
or a series of cat slices placed opportunely between the bars of a fence. The
problem of perceptual inference can be seen as the task of determining which
of these two possibilities is responsible for the sensory evidence received by
the organism.
2.3 Hypothesis Testing
Hohwy (2013) introduces the PP framework through the analogy of hypothesis-
testing. In the case of perception, this view has origins in the work of Helmholtz
and Gregory, but Hohwy also notes that it dates as far back as ca. 1030 with the
work of Ibn Al Haytham who stated that “many visible properties are perceived by
judgment and inference” (quoted in Hohwy, 2016, p.1). Though sharing roots with
these authors, the PP framework is a more modern example of what has recently
been termed the Bayesian Brain hypothesis (cf. Deneve, 2008; Doya et al., 2007).
The Bayesian Brain hypothesis (BB) defends the claim that the brain imple-
ments processes that approximate the rational method of weighing new evidence
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against prior beliefs (i.e. conditionalisation), by using Bayesian methods to success-
fully model the functional activity of the brain.7 As an analogy, consider the scene
depicted in Figure 2.2. You need to determine what is behind the fence; is it a cat
standing still or a carefully placed series of cat slices designed to trick you? This
basic perceptual task is akin to the inferential task faced by the brain according
to BB. There are hidden causes in the world that are responsible for the perceptual
state currently instantiated in the brain, and the brain has to determine which of the
possibilities is most likely given the sensory evidence it is receiving. Each of these
possibilities can be referred to as a hypothesis, and thus the task is to determine
which of these hypotheses is the correct one. This turns perception into an infer-
ential problem; how is the right hypotheses shaped and selected? Unsurprisingly,
advocates of BB state that the problem should be approached using Bayes’ rule.
P (Hi | E) = P (E | Hi)P (Hi)
P (E)
(2.1)
In the current example, the evidence (E) refers to the sensory signal received by
the visual system, and the hypotheses (Hi) would be either a cat or a series of cat
slices. Whichever hypothesis has the highest posterior probability P (Hi | E) is the
one that is selected by the brain. However, this simplified account poses a number
of challenges. For example, what does it mean to say that the brain is performing
7Clark (2013c) highlights an important comment made by Spratling (2013) in response to his
overview of predictive processing, which also acknowledges BB. Spratling calls PP and the BB
hypothesis examples of intermediate-level accounts. They do not specify implementational details,
and instead opt for identifying the “common computational principles that operate across different
structures of the nervous system and across different species”, and seek “integrative explanations
that are consistent between levels of description”. By doing so, Spratling (ibid., p. 232) claims
“they provide functional explanations of the empirical data that are arguably the most relevant to
neuroscience.”
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Bayesian updating; who sets the prior (P (Hi)), and what evidence is there that
perception is actually like Bayesian updating (let alone the brain in its entirety)?
With regards to the question of what it means to say that the brain is performing
Bayesian updating, and whether the brain in some sense knows Bayes’ rule, Hohwy
responds by stating that although examples such as the one above are useful heuristic
devices to convey the idea that perception is inferential, it is more appropriate to state
that perception is unconscious inference in the sense put forward by Helmholtz (cf.
Hatfield, 2002). Rougly speaking, this is the idea that the phenomenal content and
nature of perception is produced by inferences or judgments, which are unnoticed or
unconscious by the agent in question. This idea was also developed by psychologists
such as Gregory (1980), who further argued that the notion of hypotheses should be
considered in a non-propositional manner in order to exploit the tools of information
theory for modelling purposes, and more closely draw an analogy with hypothesis-
testing in science. Echoing the sentiments of Helmholtz and Gregory, Hohwy (2013,
p. 23) argues that the application of Bayes’ rule to the brain carries with it the risk
of neuroanthropomorphism, which he defines as “inappropriately imputing human-
like properties to the brain and thereby confusing personal level explanations with
subpersonal level explanations.” Instead, Hohwy argues on functionalist grounds
that in order to understand how a brain engages in unconscious perceptual inference
we must also be able to understand how neurons realise the functional rule set out
by Bayes’ rule. This is a well-rehearsed issue in philosophy of science and philosophy
of mind, and throws up a number of questions such as, the autonomy of functional
descriptions, the nature of realisation in general, and questions about whether we
should adopt a realist stance towards models of this kind.8 Given that we will be
8Colombo and Serie`s (2012), for example, argue that currently we should have an instrumentalist
attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. They state that we can hope to learn that
perception is Bayesian inference, or that the brain is a Bayesian machine, only to the extent that
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largely favouring an alternative conception that eschews the hypothesis-testing gloss,
it is not necessary to delve into this matter further.
In the previous section, it was mentioned that PP implements what is known as
Empirical Bayes. By appealing to Bayesianism, advocates of PP (or indeed BB in
general) are thus required to say who sets the priors. Far from being a tedious math-
ematical requirement, it also reflects a longstanding commitment in the cognitive
sciences, which states that in order to effectively engage the world, an agent must be
able to incorporate constraints based on the statistical regularities inherent in the
environment. In the case of probabilistic schemas such as BB, this means tuning your
priors to reflect the underlying regularities in your sensorimotor input, and in turn
implicitly embody tacit knowledge of the structure of the world (Feldman, 2013). In
the case of the above example, this means tuning your priors to a world full of cats;
not cat-slices.
We saw an initial reason why the hierarchical structure of PP was important
in section 2.1. A further reason is that in the case of empirical Bayes, priors are
extracted from higher-level models (in the form of top-down predictions) that have
been shaped by previous experience. This schema allows for the brain to learn
and adapt to the current experiential context by estimating the priors from the
data through the iterative process of PEM previously outlined, maintaining accurate
models that can be subsequently used as the basis for future priors. It has been
argued that many of these priors could have been formed through long-term exposure
to the sort of sensory signals inherent in an organism’s developmental environment,
these models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects’
perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. However, they argue
that Bayesian models in neuroscience do not provide mechanistic explanations, and are only useful
devices for predicting and systematising observational statements about people’s performances in
a variety of perceptual tasks.
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but also that some priors may have been hard-wired over an evolutionary time-scale
(Hohwy, 2012). If this is the case, and it is certainly speculative at this stage, then
it would be expected that different priors will be revisable to different degrees based
on an organism’s history. Nevertheless, Empirical Bayes is certainly well suited to
modelling a hierarchically-organised system such as the brain, for as Friston notes:
“Empirical Bayes harnesses the hierarchical structure of a generative
model, treating the estimates at one level as priors on the subordinate
level. This provides a natural framework within which to treat corti-
cal hierarchies in the brain, each level providing constraints on the level
below. This approach models the world as a hierarchy of systems where
supraordinate causes induce and moderate changes in subordinate causes.
These priors offer contextual guidance towards the most likely cause of
the input.” (Friston et al., 2015, p. 822).
This provides a further compelling reason for adopting Empirical Bayes; by ex-
tracting priors from higher levels, predictions at lower levels will be subject to con-
textual modulation. For this to be effective, and to support learning, the hierarchy
should thus be structured according to an increasing spatio-temporal scale, such
that higher levels are tuned to the larger and slower statistical regularities in the
environment.
A couple of examples will be illustrative at this point. Bar (2011b) and Kveraga,
Ghuman, and Bar (2007) have shown how novel visual scenes trigger rapid ascending
projections of low spatial frequency to allow the brain to get the “gist” of the scene
before the arrival of the higher spatial frequency information, which in turn provides
additional detail. Bar (2011b, p. 7) argues that the low spatial frequency version
could be responsible for rapidly activating what he calls a “prototypical context
frame” in memory, which is “sufficient in most cases to generate rapid predictions
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that guide our pressing goals, such as navigation and avoidance.” In the case of
PP this context frame would be the higher-level predictions that contextualise the
information expected by lower-levels. Imagine, for example, looking for a lost golf
ball in tall grass. When initially trying to find the ball, it is far better to be attentive
to the low spatial frequency information (i.e. the roundness of the ball), rather than
the higher spatial frequency details such as any text printed on it.
Additionally, Kiebel, Daunizeau, and Friston (2008) explored how hierarchical
modelling of birdsong could be used to uncover multiple scales of temporal informa-
tion inherent in the signal, which could be used by other birds to recover information
about the bird that is singing. As examples, the authors state that longer time-scales
may be used to measure how long a bird has been singing, providing information of
the bird’s fitness, whereas at shorter time-scales, the amplitude and frequency spec-
trum inherent in the dynamics of the birdsong could reflect the bird’s strength and
size. Although their birdsong models are offered as proof of principles, the authors
also reviewed evidence that supports the idea of a hierarchical organisation of the
cortical hierarchy, which is reflected in the increasing spatiotemporal scales of their
models. They argue that regions of the brain that are farther away from primary
sensory areas, encode representations of the environment that change more slowly
than the rapid fluctuations at more peripheral layers.
2.3.1 Evidence from Binocular Rivalry
The idea of the hypothesis-testing brain receives wide-ranging theoretical and em-
pirical support from the BB hypothesis (see Chater et al., 2010; Ernst and Banks,
2002, for some examples), with particular emphasis being given to the idea that neu-
ral populations can encode probability distributions (Pouget et al., 2013). However,
perhaps the most striking (and certainly less technical) example comes from the
phenomenon of binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry occurs when subjects have dif-
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Figure 2.3: A simplified account of binocular rivalry explained in Bayesian terms.
Reprinted from (Hohwy, Roepstorff, and Friston, 2008).
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ferent images presented to each of their eyes, by using some sort of specially adapted
headset. When this is done correctly the subjective visual experience of the subject
continues to alternate between the two images, rather than settling on one of the
images. Hohwy, Roepstorff, and Friston (2008) argue that this phenomenon can be
understood as the brain engaging in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference
about the causes of its current sensory input. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, where
each of the candidate hypotheses the brain is said to entertain is outlined (i.e. the
sensory input is a) a face, b) a house or c) a face-house). The authors argue that
rivalry occurs because there is no single hypothesis that from a Bayesian perspec-
tive consistently enjoys both high likelihood P (E | Hi) and a high prior probability
P (Hi). Although one of the hypotheses may temporarily explain the sensory input
to one eye, at the same time it fails to capture the incoming evidence from the other,
leaving a significant portion of the bottom-up signal unaccounted for. Over time, the
instability in the perceptual state rises forcing a transition to the rival hypothesis.
The authors add that the reason a conjunct of a face and a house is not perceived
(despite the occasional gradual transition between the two images) is due to the low
prior that a hypothesis such as ‘a face-house’ would have in our world—how often
do you see a face superimposed on a house?9
Though this example is insufficient on its own to fully account for the claims made
by the BB hypothesis or PP, Hohwy, Roepstorff, and Friston (ibid.) argue that it is
able to jointly explain factors about binocular rivalry (i.e. alternation and selection)
that were hitherto accounted for separately, and in ways that were often difficult to
reconcile. Therefore, the virtue of their explanation’s simplicity, when situated in
the wider explanatory scope of PP more generally, offers a compelling reason to take
9Interestingly, this may also explain the regularity with which we report seeing things such as
faces in inanimate objects (also see Clark, 2016b; Hohwy, 2013, for a discussion of how PP can
account for other perceptual illusions).
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Figure 2.4: A simplified schematic of the principle of predictive processing with precision-
weighted expectations about the incoming sensory evidence.
such a view seriously.
2.4 Precision-Weighting
An important component of the PP framework was missing from Figure 2.1, which
is added in Figure 2.4. The importance of precision expectations is best seen when
we note that not all prediction errors are created equally.
As prediction errors are responsible for the updating of generative models, it is
important that those which are unreliable have a smaller impact. What does it mean
to say that an error signal is unreliable? Consider the following scenario: you are
in a noisy room trying to converse with a friend, and struggling to hear what they
are saying. In this instance the auditory signal is less informative, but if you are
adept at lip-reading you may be able to determine what is being communicated by
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paying more attention to the visual information. Conversely, imagine that you are in
a darkened room. In this situation, it would be better to rely on touch than vision
if trying to navigate to some region of the room.
The use of the term ‘attention’ in the above examples is no accident. In PP,
attention is considered to be a process by which the brain increases the gain on
prediction errors that are estimated to be the most informative (Feldman and Fris-
ton, 2010; Hohwy, 2012).10 Those that are noisy (e.g. visual signals from dark
room, or auditory signals from noisy room) carry greater uncertainty, and should
not lead to drastic model revision. This is what it means to say that a prediction
has low uncertainty (high precision); it is more informative, ceteris paribus, than a
prediction that has high uncertainty (low precision) over a range of possible states.
Importantly, this noise or uncertainty will be state-dependent, and therefore the
precision-expectations should be conditioned on higher-level expectations of the cur-
rent environment. Whether the sensory signal is a suitable indication of the actual
state of affairs in the environment determines to what extent the models are updated.
How can a system learn and employ these precision-weightings? The answer
is to again appeal to the hierarchical generative models. Firstly, given that these
models are encoded in the brain as probability density functions, we can appeal to
the variance of the functions as a measure of the expected precision of the sensory
data—the inverse of variance is precision. This idea also receives support from the
10Admittedly, attention is a complex and multifaceted phenomena, and one may worry that
by equating it with precision-weighting, some important nuances are missed. For example, how
are covert and overt shifts of attention explained in terms of precision-weighting? How does the
framework accommodate local versus global forms of attention (e.g. blocking out background stimuli
in order to narrowly attend to a subtle stimulus as in mindfulness practice, versus a global situational
awareness of many disparate stimuli as is reported in police and bouncers)? Unfortunately, a more
detailed discussion on these points would be too tangential, and we therefore point the interested
reader to (Hohwy, 2012; Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole, 2016) for two different perspectives.
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Figure 2.5: (A) In the study performed by (Ernst and Banks, 2002) subjects were required
to estimate the width of a bar that could be touched and looked at. (B) The
combined distribution over the estimated width of the bar (green curve) is a
product of the visual (blue curve) and haptic (red curve) estimations. The
combined distribution is shifted toward the more reliable (smaller variance)
input (i.e. vision). Reprinted from (Pouget et al., 2013).
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BB approach to cognition, and specifically from work on optimal integration.
Ernst and Banks (2002) found that humans are able to optimally combine dif-
ferent sources of sensory input, which vary according to how precise the information
is from each sense modality. Figure 2.5 depicts a simple example where two distri-
butions representing different sources of sensory information are integrated into an
estimation of a single variable (in this example the width of a bar). Each initial
estimation is weighted according to the reliability of the information source. In the
example depicted, the distribution corresponding to the haptic information has a
greater variance, and is therefore considered less reliable.
In the case of PP, an analogous situation occurs when a prediction is compared
with a corresponding error signal. Each generative model encodes additional pre-
cision expectations of how precise the error signal is expected to be in order to
optimally combine the predictions with the incoming error signals. However, as we
just discussed, whether a certain input (or indeed sense modality) is reliable is state-
dependent (i.e dependent on the type of environment the agent is in). Therefore, it
is also important that these precision expectations are conditioned upon higher-level
expectations, which provide contextual constraints on the sorts of precision expec-
tations selected at each level in the hierarchy. As with before, the PP proponent
appeals to the empirical Bayes schema that is implemented by hierarchical genera-
tive models, where the higher layers act as hyperpriors11 that flow top-down through
the hierarchy, contextualising the lower layer precision expectations. In the case of
higher-level expectations concerning low visibility, precision expectations of incom-
ing sensory data from the visual system should be adjusted accordingly, in order to
11Not to be confused with hyperparamaters, which are parameters of prior distributions. In
contrast hyperpriors are prior distributions on a hyperparameter. In PP hyperpriors are employed
as higher-level priors regarding precision-expectations, whereas hyperparameters are higher-level
parameters that act as predictions for lower levels.
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avoid unncessary model revision. This addition of precision expectations to the PP
framework should not be taken as shifting an emphasis entirely onto the precision
of error signals—variability is not the only factor relevant for model revision. The
brain must carefully balance the predictions, precision expectations and error signals
in order to minimise prediction error most effectively. Nevertheless, the inclusion of
this additional mechanism is an indispensable component of the PP framework, and
we will have a lot more to say about it in chapters 4 and 5. It is vitally important
for an agent to be able to determine whether its predictions fail to account for the
sensory inputs because they are disconfirmed by it (i.e. genuinely inaccurate) or be-
cause the sensory inputs are too noisy. Reliable belief revision should only be made
on the basis of the former. By including estimates about the reliability of an error
signal, and weighting them accordingly, an agent can more effectively modulate its
learning and future interactions with its environment.
2.4.1 Evidence from Neuromodulation
It was stated in the previous section that by weighting the precision of prediction er-
rors, attention is able to modulate the influence that they have for ongoing inference
and learning. A number of studies have recently shown that this is equivalent to the
alteration of synaptic gain on specific sensory neurons (here understood as encoding
prediction errors) (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Ouden, Kok, and De Lange, 2012).
Moreover, a number of studies performed by Kok, Jehee, and De Lange (2012) and
Kok et al. (2011) have shown how the silencing of upwards propagating error signals
by successful predictions can be reversed by increased attention to those same re-
gions, which by contrast enhances the activity in those same sensory regions. Which
mechanisms could be responsible for this attentional enhancement?
Friston et al. (2012) have proposed that the variance or uncertainty associated
with a prediction error could be encoded by synaptic gain, and that key neurotrans-
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mitters such as dopamine may play an integral role in modulating this gain. In
effect, this means that the dopaminergic system contributes to controlling the pre-
cision of sensory cues that are responsible for model revision, and as we will see
later, engendering action (section 2.6). Given that we will be exploring this notion
in significant depth in chapters 4 and 5 we will postpone any further discussion or
empirical evidence until then.
2.5 Self-Evidencing
Generative models that are successful in explaining away the sensory signals (i.e.
minimising prediction error) can be said to generate their own evidence for their
success—they are self-evidencing. This is illustrated in an example Hohwy adapts
from (Lipton, 2004). Suppose you look out from your window on a snowy morning
and observe footprints in the snow that has settled on your lawn. In attempting
to explain the occurrence of the footprints, you form the hypothesis that a burglar
attempted to break in during the night. If someone were to ask you what evidence
you have for this hypothesis, you would be justified in pointing to the occurrence
of the footprints, despite the fact that this is the very evidence that initially led to
the formation of the hypothesis. Though it has the appearance of circular reasoning,
this form of inference is a common epistemic practice according to Hempel (1965),
and is what he describes as a self-evidencing explanation.12 It is also an important
component of the notion of hierarchical Bayesian inference that Hohwy (2014, p. 6)
12This phrase is initially confusing, and may give the appearance of conflating the notions of
hypothesis and evidence. However, it should not be interpreted as arguing that the hypothesis
provides evidence for itself. Instead, the evidence that supports the hypothesis is also the same
evidence that leads to the production of the hypothesis in the first place. As such, the hypothesis
and the evidence are still distinct.
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claims characterises PP:
“The internal model that generates hypotheses that over time makes the
evidence most likely, and does so most precisely and simply, will have
its own evidence maximized. That is, as a model generates hypotheses
that explain away occurring surprising evidence (i.e., minimize prediction
error) it maximizes the evidence for itself. Prediction error minimization
thus constitutes self-evidencing.”
We here begin to see the roots of the neurocentricism at play in Hohwy’s ac-
count of PP. According to Hohwy (ibid.), the hidden causal structure of the world
is always being inferred by the brain from within what he terms the “Evidentiary
Boundary.” It is the existence of this boundary, in combination with the emphasis on
self-evidencing that entails Hohwy’s neurocentricism. In addition to the aforemen-
tioned support this picture receives from BB, the idea of an evidentiary boundary
finds additional theoretical support, as well as a mathematical generalisation, from
a theory known as the free-energy principle.
The free-energy principle states that any (ergodic) self-organising system, which
can be described in terms of a Markov blanket, will appear to model and act on its
world to preserve its functional and structural integrity. This unfolds in virtue of
the minimisation of an information-theoretic measure (free energy), which bounds
surprising sensory states (see section 2.2.1) for the system, and in turn leads to ho-
moeostasis (e.g. Friston, 2010, 2013). It has been formally shown how the theory can
provide a unifying account that bridges many disciplines (e.g., Bayesian inference, ex-
pected utility, information entropy, and optimal control), and it should also be noted
that Hohwy (2014) has acknowledged the importance of the free-energy principle in
providing theoretical support for the PEM account. This is because under simpli-
fying assumptions, free-energy minimisation can be reformulated as prediction-error
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Figure 2.6: A Markov blanket defined over the node X. The Markov blanket consists of
the parent nodes that X is dependent on (green nodes), the child nodes that
are dependent on X (the purple nodes), and the remaining parent nodes of
X’s children. The “inferentially secluded” or independent nodes are the blue
nodes that are separated from X by the aforementioned Markov blanket.
minimisation (Hohwy, 2013, p. 52). In what follows, many of the technical details
have been omitted, and we refer the reader to key papers (e.g. Friston, 2010, 2013)
for further information.
The fundamental notion to look at is Hohwy’s reliance on a Markov blanket. If
the future value of the state of a system can be determined based solely on the value
of the present state of a system, and no further knowledge of the past states would
change this value, we can say that such a system satisfies the Markov property.
Now consider a complex system composed of many interacting nodes (variables).
Pearl (1988) demonstrated how the Markov property could be extended to these
more complex systems (e.g. a Bayesian network), leading to the notion of a Markov
81
blanket. The graph in figure 2.6 depicts a highly simplified network comprised of
nodes (coloured circles) and connecting edges (directed arrows), which represents a
set of random variables (the nodes) and the conditional dependencies between them
(the edges). There is also a quantitative component that represents the strengths of
the conditional dependencies (not included). Within a Bayesian network, a Markov
blanket is defined over a node X; the set of nodes that comprise its parents (i.e.
the green nodes that X is dependent on); its children (the purple nodes that are
dependent on X); and the other parents of all of its children (the remaining green
nodes). Any nodes in the network that fall outside the scope of the Markov blanket
are independent of X when conditioned on the set of nodes that comprise the Markov
blanket. A Markov blanket thus creates a partition of states into inner states and
external states, such that learning information about any of the external states will
give no further information about the internal states. In short, the Markov blanket
is defined for some given node X, such that the value of X is fully determined (and
could be predicted) by knowing just the values of the nodes in the Markov blanket.
The notion of a Markov blanket helps to make precise Hohwy’s commitment to a
neurocentric boundary for the mind, or what he terms an “evidentiary boundary”,
as any state within the Markov blanket is “inferentially secluded” from the states on
the other side. He states his claim in two ways. Firstly:
“[...] the mind begins where sensory input is delivered through extero-
ceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive receptors and it ends where
proprioceptive predictions are delivered, mainly in the spinal cord.” (Ho-
hwy, 2014, p. 18)
Then, in a footnote to the above quote:
“In slightly more technical terms (Friston, 2013), the sensory input and
output at this boundary forms a so-called Markov blanket (Pearl, 1988)
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such that observation of the states of these parts of the system, together
with observation of the prior expectations of the system in principle will
allow prediction of the behavior of the system as such. Causes beyond
this blanket, such as bodily states or external states, are rendered un-
informative once the states of the blanket are known.” (Hohwy, 2014,
p. 25)
The parameters in the models of the brain are thus considered inner states,
whereas the hidden states of the environment (including the body) exist on the other
side of the boundary that is induced by the Markov blanket. According to Hohwy,
by describing the brain in terms of a Markov blanket (or Evidentiary Boundary), the
picture of the mind that falls out is one that appears to be “neurocentric” (ibid.).
Anything outside of the brain must of necessity be deemed “inferentially secluded”
from the internal models, and is treated as a “hidden cause” that must inferred by
the brain. We can construct Hohwy’s argument as follows:
1. The existence of a Markov blanket entails an evidentiary boundary between
the inner states of a system and its external environment.
2. An evidentiary boundary requires the inner (generative) models of a system to
be self-evidencing (i.e. to generate their own evidence).
3. If the brain is a self-evidencing system, then it must infer all external causes
about the incoming sensory information from within the evidentiary boundary.
4. The evidentiary boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to
skepticism, and entails a neurocentric perspective where the mind is inferen-
tially secluded from its environment.
5. PP implies that the brain is a self-evidencing system that generates hypotheses
about the world from within an evidentiary boundary.
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6. The mind is therefore inferentially secluded from the world, and forces us to
resist conceptions of the mind where it is embodied or extended.
There are a number of implicit assumptions in the above formulation, and there-
fore, a number of areas to take issue with. The first, and perhaps most obvious
objection to the above is to undermine the notion of a Markov blanket as employed
by Hohwy. At present, Hohwy’s commitment to the notion is based largely on the
theoretical work of Karl Friston and the free-energy principle (FEP) (Friston, 2013).
Though persuasive, inasmuch as it rests on some compelling theoretical modelling
that demonstrates the wide explanatory scope of the FEP, it is not without its con-
ceptual worries. Some of these worries have even been expressed by Friston himself.
For example:
“[...] is there a unique Markov blanket for any given system? [...] a
system can have a multitude of partitions and Markov blankets. This
means that there are many partitions that—at some spatial and temporal
scale—could show lifelike behaviour. For example, the Markov blanket
of an animal encloses the Markov blankets of its organs, which enclose
Markov blankets of cells, which enclose Markov blankets of nuclei and so
on [...] there are probably an uncountable number of Markov blankets in
the universe. (ibid., p. 10, emphasis added)
In the case of PP, this issue is particularly pressing due to the framework’s com-
mitment to hierarchically-organised, generative models.
Many of the models PP posits exist at specific levels in the hierarchy and only
model the neural activity at the level below them (Friston, 2008). As a result, the
overwhelming majority of modelling is intra-neural. Only the most peripheral lay-
ers of the hierarchy directly model anything beyond the brain, and these operate at
extremely small spatial and temporal scales (Kiebel, Daunizeau, and Friston, 2008).
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As such, all that they can be said to model (or predict) are fleeting moment by
moment impacts on small regions of our sensory receptors. As Hohwy (2014, p. 15)
acknowledges, in principle we could isolate the entire system minus the most periph-
eral layer, and we would still have a prediction-error minimising system, complete
with its own evidentiary boundary that separates it from the external world plus the
peripheral layer. This process could be repeated, leading to a proliferation of nested
hierarchical models, each with their own evidentiary boundaries. This is problem-
atic for Hohwy’s account, as it requires him to provide a reason for privileging any
of these possible boundaries as the one that defines the mind-world boundary. His
favoured solution is to:
“[...] rank agents according to their overall, long-term prediction error
minimization (or free-energy minimization): the agent worthy of explana-
tory focus is the system that in the long run is best at revisiting a limited
(but not too small) set of states. It is most plausible to think that such a
minimal entropy system is constituted by the nervous system of what we
normally identify as a biological organism: shrinked agents are not able
to actively visit enough states, and extended agents do not maintain low
entropy in the long run.” (ibid., p. 16, emphasis added)
We can respond to this suggestion in a number of ways. As we have already
seen, Hohwy favours a neurocentric perspective, where “[...] the mind begins where
sensory input is delivered through exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive
receptors and it ends where proprioceptive predictions are delivered, mainly in the
spinal cord.” However, one may argue that any attempts to delineate the mind
from the world, or the cognitive from the non-cognitive are simply doomed to failure
at the outset. An example of such a view comes from Ross and Ladyman (2010,
p. 156), who claim that there is simply no scientifically credible basis for delineating
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a cognitive from a non-cognitive system as in the proposal above. They state:
“Modelers will and should draw system boundaries in whichever ways
maximize efficient capture of local phenomena. Of course, as models are
aggregated into more general theoretical perspectives, local optima should
often be expected to be sacrificed for the sake of more parsimonious and
powerful global models. But this is compatible with the suggestion that
even a fully general theory of cognition—as information processing by
relatively autonomous goal-driven systems—need incorporate no single
overarching account of limits on the boundaries of cognitive systems. A
cognitive system might simply be anything described by the hypothetical
fully general theory, and be open to limitless cross-classification with re-
spect to biological or chemical (etc.) principles for system identification.”
Ross and Ladyman view their position as being opposed to any thesis that at-
tempts to locate the mind, whether it be within the head, outside the head, or dy-
namically shifting across the skin-skull boundary. Their justification for this is that
“composition in real science, as opposed to in metaphysics and stylized science, is
usually a dynamic and complex idea that does explanatory work by reference to dis-
tinctive features of specific applications.” (ibid., p. 160). An example of a “dynamic
and complex idea” that they cite is the identity relation ‘water is H2O’. Instead of be-
ing identifiable as a synchronic relation, water is composed by oxygen and hydrogen
in various polymeric forms that are constantly forming, dissipating and reforming
over short time scales. Only in this more dynamic manner, and from a diachronic
perspective, do the familiar macroscopic properties of the kind water arise. The syn-
chronic description, they argue, therefore misses a rich (albeit currently incomplete)
scientific picture. The restrictive boundary advocated by Hohwy suffers from the
same problem—the concept of the mind, as with the multi-disciplinary approach of
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the cognitive sciences, calls for more than one overall explanatory perspective, and
by proxy no single physical boundary.
A further concern is that despite providing an appealing answer to the afore-
mentioned worry of nested agents, there are a number of problematic assumptions
with Hohwy’s favoured solution. Firstly, he states, “It is most plausible to think
that such a minimal entropy system is constituted by the nervous system of what
we normally identify as a biological organism”. However, no justification is given for
why we should agree with the “most plausible” qualifier. Hohwy simply points to
an argument by Friston in support of the claim. Interestingly, in the cited paper,
Friston (2013) raises similar worries about the answer to whether there is a unique
Markov blanket for any given system. Although, in line with Hohwy, he appeals to
the statistics of the Markov blanket to speculatively claim that the system with the
lowest entropy is perhaps the agent of interest, he equates this with the biological
organism, rather than the nervous system. It is unclear, therefore, why we should
accept Hohwy’s claim that the states that are revisited most over time are those of
the nervous system, rather than those of the body.
Secondly, Friston (ibid., p. 10) acknowledges that “a system can have a multitude
of partitions and Markov blankets. This means that there are many partitions that—
at some spatial and temporal scale—could show lifelike behaviour”, and, therefore,
“minimum entropy is clearly not the whole story”. Taking each of these points in
turn, it is important to first see what is meant by the claim that a system can
have a multitude of partitions. It is increasingly common in the cognitive sciences
to see the employment of formal methods that were initially developed in systems
biology. This is particularly helpful in the case of evaluating formal models that aim
to capture specific cognitive phenomena. In this manner, one begins by appealing
directly to systems biology to uncover and identify the sorts of variables (or states)
that are relevant to the modelling of a situated agent in question. As an example
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Figure 2.7: A partition of states for a system that acts on its environment. Reprinted
from (Kilner et al., 2016, p. 164).
of this, Kilner et al. (2016) offer the partition depicted in Figure 2.7. This partition
captures an agent that acts on its environment (α). It considers the distinction
between external states of the world (x), which are hidden from the internal states
of an agent (µ) by the sensory states (s), in the same manner as Hohwy’s account
of PP. Once a partition of states has been identified, it is then possible to make use
of various optimality principles to define rational “as if” theories of cognition, which
themselves are concerned with one of the states being optimised—there will typically
be multiple, sometimes competing rational theories for any given situation. Finally,
each theory leads to a number of hypotheses that realise the optimisation by way
of certain processes, and these process models are tested according to the empirical
behaviours that they predict.
With this process laid out, it is clear that the neurocentricism inherent in Hohwy’s
account can be traced to the initial partitioning of states, which leads to the formation
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of a Markov blanket, and thus the separation of inner states (i.e. neural states and
processes) from outer states (i.e the world). However, we can again ask what the
justification for this initial partitioning is, and whether there are alternatives that
are consistent with the PP story. Kilner et al. (ibid., p. 163) claim that the partition
depicted in figure 2.7 is “necessarily implied by a system that is acting within its
environment”, but again do not consider whether it is appropriate to focus only on
the brain. Nevertheless, there is an important piece of the picture that we have
hitherto been missing that they raise—we have said nothing of how PP accounts for
action. However, as we will see adding action to the picture does not help Hohwy’s
case for neurocentricism, but in fact opens up the path to a truly embodied account
of PP.
2.6 Adding Action to the Picture
In PP, perception, cognition and action are unified by the underlying imperative of
prediction-error minimisation (PEM). PEM can be understood in a number of ways,
two of which are noteworthy here. According to Hohwy (2013) either the system
can update the parameters of the inner model in order to generate new predictions
about what is causing the incoming sensory data (what he refers to as ‘perceptual
inference’), or it can keep the generative model fixed, and resample the world such
that the incoming sensory data accords with the predictions (what he refers to as
‘active inference’). Why is this?
In a particularly lucid account of the mechanisms underlying PEM, Hohwy presents
PEM by comparison to scientific hypothesis testing. To begin, he demonstrates the
inadequacy of passive evidence accumulation (taken on its own) for hypothesis selec-
tion by drawing a parallel with the debate between associationist statistical inference
and causal inference. The former observes mere associations in data (e.g. between
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two random variables), but is unable to distinguish whether X causes Y, Y causes
X or if they have a third common cause Z. The latter by contrast sees intervention
as a fundamental tool for discerning causal relations between two variables, e.g. if
intervening on X has an effect on Y, but not vice-versa, then X is a cause of Y (cf.
Woodward, 2003). It is in this latter manner of hypothesis-testing that Hohwy sees
a natural place for action.
Action, according to Hohwy, is a form of intervening on the interacting hidden
causes in the world in order to test perceptual models, and is therefore a necessary
companion to perception, which is otherwise “hostage to the whims of the incoming
sensory data” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 76). Moreover, in PP, action is accommodated as a
form of statistical inference in its own right, known as active inference, which assists
in the overall process of prediction-error minimisation by resampling the world to
further test the inner generative models. As Hohwy states:
“Action makes decent inferences better. For example, I am more confi-
dent I am looking at a man’s face after successful active sampling of the
world according to this hypothesis. This helps decrease uncertainty es-
pecially in cases where the winning hypothesis did not have a very much
higher posterior than its competitors at the outset.” (ibid.)
For Hohwy then, action and perception are intimately related in respect of the
underlying imperative to minimise prediction-error. Insofar as PEM is concerned,
perception equates to forming or selecting better hypotheses about how the world
is on the basis of sensory evidence (perceptual inference), and action equates to
intervening on the world to better test and select competing hypotheses (active
inference). What is the support for such a picture as it applies to the brain and
motor control?
The first point to make is that it is not merely the world that causes our sensory
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inputs. Our actions in the world have important effects on the changes in sensory
input as well. For example by moving my head relative to the objects that are
situated on the desk in front of me, previously hidden features come into view (e.g.
the initially occluded handle on my mug). In this manner, behaviour can be seen as
the control of perception, to borrow a phrase from Powers (1973). Recall that in the
case of PP, perceptual experience is determined by successful predictions of sensory
input (e.g. binocular rivalry). Importantly, the sensory input that the brain receives
is not merely exteroceptive (originating from the outside world), but also extends
to include proprioception (sensation of the position and movement of the body) and
interoception (sensation of the internal physiological states of the body) that will be
affected by action. Any unexpected (or surprising) sensory input, regardless of its
source, generates prediction error that propagates upwards through the hierarchy,
and the primary task of the brain is to minimise this prediction error generated by
all types of sensory input (exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive). Friston
has provided a formal basis for this picture, starting from the premise that adaptive
agents must necessarily occupy a limited set of states as defined by their phenotype
(Friston, 2010, 2013; Friston et al., 2010). These states are essentially a bounded
region (or attractor in dynamical systems theory) of all the possible states an agent
could be in, and in order to maintain homeostasis, and crucially avoid death, the
agent should revisit these states most frequently. The most important surprising
states (or those which generate the most prediction error) in terms of homeostasis
are those that reflect unwanted changes in the organism’s internal milieu:
“The fixity of the milieu supposes a perfection of the organism such that
the external variations are at each instant compensated for and equili-
brated [...] All of the vital mechanisms, however varied they may be, have
always one goal, to maintain the uniformity of the conditions of life in
the internal environment [...] The stability of the internal environment is
91
the condition for the free and independent life.” (Bernard, 1974, quoted
in Friston et al., 2010, p. 231)
However, a system that can only minimise prediction error passively (i.e. by
updating its models) can do nothing to avoid those sensory states that indicate
maladaptive situations (e.g. a fish out of water). By contrast, an agent that is able to
actively navigate its environment, can utilise behaviour to control perceptual states,
and thus minimise prediction error by resampling its world and avoiding states that
are least desirable. One may worry that this addition implies that an agent should
therefore simply navigate to a darkened room where no further sensory signals are
received. However, two points can be made in response to this worry. Firstly, sensory
input is here taken to include interoceptive information, which means that there will
be an increasingly urgent signal from the body informing the agent to obtain food and
water if it is to remain alive. Secondly, it is possible for this fact to be learned, such
that higher-level contextualising predictions may override the lower-level tendencies
to simply seek out a dark-room, and the agent may not expect itself to inhabit these
types of environment (Friston, Thornton, and Clark, 2012). In short, real ‘dark-
rooms’ simply do not exist in nature (aside from a state of death). Putting aside
the validity of these assumptions, it is important to note that for Hohwy’s claim
of PEM as a unifying mechanism to be warranted it is vital that the mechanisms
responsible for implementing perceptual inference (e.g. predictions, error signals and
precision-expectations) apply equally to active inference.
To demonstrate why this is in fact the case, it is first helpful to note that the
motor system is also structured hierarchically, in much the same way as visual cortex.
This allows organisms with the appropriate neural structures to control behaviours
in a similarly hierarchical manner, with higher levels specifying more abstract plans
(e.g. make a cup of coffee) that can be unpacked into more finer-grained motor
behaviours at lower levels (e.g. grab kettle). Recent neuroanatomical evidence paints
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an interesting picture of how this process unfolds in the brain. For example, Adams,
Shipp, and Friston (2013, p. 1) argue that “descending projections from the motor
cortex are, anatomically and physiologically, more like backward connections in the
visual cortex than the corresponding forward connections.” Furthermore, (Friston,
Mattout, and Kilner, 2011, p. 138) state:
“The primary motor cortex is no more or less a motor cortical area than
striate (visual) cortex. The only difference between the motor cortex
and visual cortex is that one predicts retinotopic input while the other
predicts proprioceptive input from the motor plant.”
What this means is that top-down signals in both visual and motor cortex are
functionally similar, and within PP this translates to a shared commitment to the
prediction of incoming swathes of sensory information (albeit from different sources).
But how could motor control be determined by predictions?
The view defended by proponents of PP, resembles the ideomotor theory at-
tributed to William James, and developed more recently under the guise of the the-
ory of event coding (Hommel et al., 2001). Ideomotor theory claims that thoughts
or mental representations, when unimpeded by other factors (e.g. inhibitory mech-
anisms), can cause a corresponding muscular action by activating reflex arcs. PP
makes use of this principle in a novel way. Under the previously mentioned label
of active inference, PP claims that descending predictions in motor cortex aim to
predict the incoming sensory data from ascending proprioceptive signals. However,
in the case of desired movements (i.e. those not yet currently obtained), the error
signal will obviously be high as the incoming sensory information (error signal) will
not correspond to the desired state. Consider the following: if I predict that I am
holding a mug, but the mug is in fact on the desk in front of me, I am doing a poor
job of predicting the proprioceptive (and indeed exteroceptive) signals. The trick,
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according to PP, is to then minimise the prediction error, not by updating the inter-
nal models (perceptual inference), but by allowing the descending motor predictions
to cause the necessary motor behaviours that will bring about the desired sensory
state that matches the agent’s expectations. To bring an action about, motor cortex
responds to the incoming error signals by temporarily down-weighting the associated
precision expectations for proprioceptive feedback, and responding with the desired
(and previously learned) control trajectories that lead to the desired state (more
will be said about this in chapter 4). These predictions thus have a subjunctive
nature—they don’t merely make predictions about what probably will happen, but
make predictions about various things that would happen conditional on an array of
possible actions (i.e. what perceptual states are expected if this behavioural routine
is performed).
The consequence of this view, as argued by (Adams, Shipp, and Friston, 2013,
p. 4) is that the “perceptual and motor systems should not be regarded as separate
but instead as a single active inference machine that tries to predict its sensory input
in all domains: visual, auditory, somatosensory, interoceptive and, in the case of the
motor system, proprioceptive.” We here see the dissolving of any clearly delineated
computational boundaries between perception and action, although as both (Hohwy,
2013) and (Clark, 2016b) acknowledge, there remains an important difference in
direction of fit. Nevertheless, with the dissolution of these boundaries, there begins to
emerge an obvious challenge to the classical cognitivist picture introduced in chapter
1. However, before we explore how PP overcomes this challenge by connecting with
work in embodied cognition, we shall turn in the next chapter to look specifically at




“[...] the concepts of separate perceptual, cognitive and motor systems,
which theoretical neuroscience inherits from cognitive psychology, are not
appropriate for bridging neural data with behaviour.” (Cisek, 2007, p.2)
The primary concern of the current chapter is to explore some different proposals
in decision theory regarding how we make decisions, and the mechanisms by which
we do so. Decision theory is often considered an interdisciplinary project to which
philosophers, economists, psychologists, neuroscientists and statisticians, among oth-
ers, contribute. It can also be separated into descriptive and normative approaches,
where the first is viewed as an empirical approach that aims to provide an account
of how decisions are made, and the second is understood as providing prescriptions
for what decision-makers are rationally required to do (Peterson, 2009). These two
approaches are often considered independently of one another, and as we are inter-
ested in the mechanisms that underlie decision-making, the focus of this chapter will
be on descriptive decision theory.
Section 3.1 begins by highlighting some of the limitations of adopting a traditional
decision-theoretic account for modelling real-world behaviour due to underlying cog-
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Heavy Traffic (30%) Light Traffic (70%)
Route A 24 minutes 14 minutes
Route B 18 minutes 17 minutes
Table 3.1: Traffic Example
nitivist assumptions. These limitations have led some researchers to turn away from
the underlying cognitivist assumptions inherent in classical decision theory, towards
a notion of embodied decisions (Cisek and Pastor-Bernier, 2014; Cisek, 2012; Lepora
and Pezzulo, 2015). In section 3.3, we will explore this more recent embodied ap-
proach, which views decision-making as inextricably intertwined with sensorimotor
processes, and is contrasted with the neuroeconomics approach outlined in section
3.2.
3.1 The Traditional Cognitivist Account of Prob-
lem Solving and Decision-Making
Consider the following decision: you must choose between two routes to work. Route
A takes you through a city that has a high risk of heavy traffic, but is short in
distance. The other route is less likely to be affected by the increased congestion,
but is longer than the former. Suppose you know from previous experience that,
given the time you are leaving, it is more likely that the traffic will be light, and your
preference is always for the shortest time spent travelling. What should you do?
Table 3.1 represents a decision under risk. Here, the agent has full knowledge of
the available options and probabilities attached to the relevant states. In situations
like this, deciding what to do is relatively straightforward, and a number of decision
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rules exist that provide guidance for what is rational to do in these situations. For
example, the principle of maximising expected utility (MEU) would suggest taking
Route A, as the following demonstrates that it has the shortest expected duration
(and therefore the greatest expected utility, assuming that utility is a negative linear
transform of duration):
Expected Duration of Route A = 0.3 x 24 + 0.7 x 14 = 17
Expected Duration of Route B = 0.3 x 18 + 0.7 x 17 = 17.3
Savage (1954, p. 16) famously referred to these situations as ‘small worlds’, where
it is possible to “look before you leap”, by which he meant an agent has knowledge
of the states of the world and all of the options available to her. Even in cases where
the probabilities attached to the states are unknown (decisions under uncertainty),
many decision-theoretic norms (e.g. dominance and subjective expected utility max-
imisation) exist to help guide this process. However, unlike small worlds, the real
world is not so neatly circumscribed. Instead, most everyday decisions can be viewed
as ‘large worlds’.
Unfortunately, there are a number of assumptions that hold in small worlds, that
might not hold in large worlds. For instance, in small worlds, the agent has knowledge
of the options available to here (e.g. Routes A and B). In addition, there is a clear set
of possible worlds (e.g. set of Heavy Traffic worlds and Light Traffic worlds), and the
agent knows for sure that she falls into one or the other of these, but not both—they
form a partition of states. Finally, the agent knows the utilities assigned to each of
the cells within a given world. In large worlds, any of these assumptions may fail. For
instance, recall the example in the introduction of choosing an action to perform in
light of the increasing feeling of tiredness while writing the paper. As we saw, there
was always the possibility that some other unconsidered option exists, which may or
may not have a higher utility than those considered. That is, you were unable to
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come up with an exhaustive partition, including the set of possible worlds and their
corresponding utilities. Simply tagging on the state ‘something else’ doesn’t solve the
issue, as such a state is likely heterogeneous—that is, it could contain worlds that are
incommensurable with one another. This level of uncertainty is a serious challenge
for decision theory, as the possibility of framing a genuine decision problem requires
that an agent already has options to deliberate over. Even hallmarks of rationality
such as Bayesianism have been criticised as inapplicable in these types of large worlds
(Binmore, 2008).
It may be argued that this is not really a problem for decision theory per se. On
this line of thought, the issue of determining options is a problem for the perceptual
system to initially solve, whereas decision-making, which is decomposable into a
process of deliberation (i.e. calculating the values of the relevant decision variables)
and commitment (i.e. selecting an action) merely evaluates the presented options.
As such, the brain is faced with the task of constructing a representation of features
of the environment, which can then be used as the basis for making decisions (along
with abstract representations of related decision variables such as expected gains or
potential risk). Furthermore, behaviour is simply the means by which a decision is
reported, and can be used to reveal an agent’s preferences (Sen, 1971). We wish to
resist this characterisation.
This account of decision-making is based on a number of cognitivist assumptions,
which are nicely captured by Hurley’s (1998, p. 401) critique of the “classical sand-
wich model” of the mind (Figure 1.4), which we first saw in Chapter 1. Recall, in
this model, the outer slices of perception and action are peripheral to the inner fill-
ing of cognition, and thus separate from one another. They are also separate from
cognition, which interfaces between perception and action. First, perception builds
a reconstructive representation of features of the external world. These discrete,
abstract representations are then transformed by cognitive processes into a motor
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plan for action, according to the agent’s beliefs and desires, and subsequently carried
out by the motor system. Within this model, decision-making would reside within
the middle box, and deliberation and commitment could take place in some ‘cen-
tral executive region’ such as the prefrontal cortex, which could integrate relevant
information from other systems such as working memory (Baddeley, 1992).
Hurley saw a number of problems or limitations with this account, and a similar
set of problems can be uncovered by exploring the more general notion of problem
solving.1 Kirsh (2009) discusses the traditional view of problem solving, in which
agents first delineate the problem to be solved by constructing a representation of
it—a problem space. The problem space could be represented in an abstract manner
by using a graph with nodes and edges that determine the possible states of the
problem, and the connections between them. Solving the problem is then understood
as the deployment of various rules to search the possible paths in the problem space,
moving from an initial state (or the current state) to some desired goal-state.
This method was recognised by Simon and Newell (1971) as a fruitful way of
visualising the task faced by agents in idealised situations. Mindful that science
often starts from idealisation, Simon and Newell sought to place problem-solving on
the same firm-footing, with the intention of generalising from well-defined problems
to a broader class of ill-defined cases. They took games and puzzles to be a hallmark
type of problem solving that could be treated as the well-defined type of problems
to be studied, due to a number of salient properties they possess. Firstly, the rules
1We assume here that many decisions can be viewed in terms of problem solving. For example,
the decision introduced at the start of this thesis regarding what to do about the unfinished paper is
easily recast as the search for the optimal action that leads to the most productive solution. This is
not to deny important differences between problem solving and decision-making, but by exploring
their commonalities, we stand to gain a greater understanding of some of the challenges faced by
the traditional cognitivist picture.
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Figure 3.1: Tower of Hanoi Game
Image reprinted from Wikimedia Commons under Creative Commons Licence 3.0:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Tower_of_Hanoi [Accessed:
16/08/16]
of games and puzzles are self-contained, generating a well-defined object of study for
the experimenter, which Simon and Newell (ibid.) termed a task environment—an
abstract structure that corresponds to the problem space of the agent.2 Secondly,
puzzles and games are easy to represent abstractly, and can often be instantiated in
various physical forms. For example, consider the well-known Tower of Hanoi puzzle,
in which a stack of discs must be moved from one peg to another, such that the order
of the discs in the initial state is replicated at the goal-state (see Figure 3.1). It is
relatively easy to formulate an abstract representation of this task (see Figure 3.2).
From the perspective of the experimenters, the abstract structure of the task en-
vironment allows for specific behaviours to be deemed irrelevant in the experimental
setting. For example, an agent scratching their head is not considered to be a task-
2Interestingly, as Kirsh (2009) notes, the use of the term ‘environment’ was selected to acknowl-
edge that subjects who improve their performance, are in some sense adapting their behaviour to
the constraints of the task environment.
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Figure 3.2: Tower of Hanoi Problem Space - each node represents a possible state of the
game and the edges denote the legal moves between them.
Image reprinted from: http://www.suffolkmaths.co.uk/pages/images/Hanoi.png
[Accessed:16/08/16]
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relevant behaviour, based on the structure of the task environment. Rather, what is
studied is the method by which agents search the problem space, and the operations
or methods they perform to move towards the goal-state. Thus, problem-solving is
understood as the method of search that is performed once an adequate representa-
tion of the problem space is generated by the agent (Kirsh, 2009), in much the same
way as the deliberation and commitment stages in a decision task occur once the
decision problem is represented. However, why should we think that this is a) the
most interesting or essential part of problem solving or decision-making, and b) why
should we think that it is encapsulated from other processes that both precede and
succeed it?
Consider another problem. One of your colleagues is on holiday, and has handed
an urgent administrative task over to you to complete in their absence. The task
had been started prior to their departure, but is left unfinished. The problem for
you is that they have not specified where in the process they got to before leaving.
Which is the harder of the tasks: (a) determining where in the process they were
before their departure, or (b) continuing with the process once you know where they
were?
Arguably the former is harder, or at least on a par. And yet the former doesn’t
seem to be a case of searching a pre-defined problem space in the traditional sense, but
is rather understood as merely the framing of the task environment before proceeding
with the main task.
To highlight this, Kirsh (ibid.) labels the various modular components of a prob-
lem solving task as follows:
Framing: determining which states or processes in the world are salient to the task.
Representation: constructing an abstract structure of the problem to be solved.
Search: finding a (potentially optimal) solution to the task.
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Registration: reinterpreting the results of the task and connecting the solution
back to the physical world.
By decomposing a problem solving task into these modular components, we are
able to explore some of the issues with the cognitivist conception of decision-making.
For example, it is clear that before you can even begin the administrative task—
perhaps by following a pre-specified set of rules—you must first determine where-
abouts in the task your colleague left you.
3.1.1 Criticisms of the Classical Cognitivist Picture
The routine described above is informative as it exposes a number of issues with
cognitivist conceptions both of decision-making and problem solving in general. Re-
call that, according to the classical sandwich model, perception and cognition are
encapsulated from one another. In the above problem-solving routine this translates
into the separation of framing and representation (purported constituents of the per-
ceptual processes), from search and registration (purported cognitive tasks). Action
would again be understood as the agent’s way of reporting the solution in whatever
manner is appropriate for the task. There are a number of issues with this picture:
1. How to account for cases of problem solving or decision-making that are ill-
defined.
2. The assumption that the process of problem-solving or decision-making is serial
and modular.
3. No explanation given for how agents solve the problems of framing and regis-
tration.
4. A failure to recognise additional behaviours or resources that may be part of
the agent’s method of problem-solving.
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We will explore each of these points in turn.
Ill-Defined Problems or Decisions
By focusing on the well-defined task environments of games and puzzles, Simon and
Newell (1971) wished to demonstrate that the classical theory of problem solving
has a formal elegance, which lends itself to clearly defined experimental procedures.
Experimenters could learn a lot by starting with the clear cases, prior to moving
outwards to the ill-defined ones. However, the move towards ill-defined cases gener-
ates problems that expose some flaws of the traditional picture, as many real-world
problems are difficult to represent abstractly for a number of reasons. Firstly, many
problems have multiple goal-states, and no unambiguously right answer (e.g. getting
from point A to point B may have multiple paths of equal distance). Secondly, some
problems do not have a well-specified goal-state in advance of beginning the task,
and part of the problem-solving routine may therefore be to find adequate solutions
(e.g. creative or design problems such as cooking, music or painting.) Finally, other
problems may have some vaguely defined goal-state, but no clear set of rules or op-
erators to define the problem space (e.g. novel tasks that employ new methods). In
many of these cases, it may be inappropriate to consider the problem solving task as
a simple search for the right solution. Instead, focus should be drawn to the manner
in which an agent decides to frame and represent the task environment.
Serial and modular
As mentioned previously, the classical cognitivist account takes framing and search
to be separate, modular processes, where the latter is considered to be the real core
of the problem-solving task. However, what is the justification for doing so? From
the perspective of the psychologist studying the behaviour of a subject during the
performance of some task, it may be convenient to break problem-solving down into
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Figure 3.3: Subjects are required to copy the model by moving the blocks in the resource
area over to the workspace. Numbers correspond to points in time. The
dashed line responds to the subject’s hand movement. The solid line responds
to the subject’s eye movements. Figure adapted from (Ballard, Hayhoe, and
Pook, 1997).
modular, sub-routines, in order to isolate relevant variables for study. This perhaps
explains why the increased interest in the novel formal methods originating in the
1960s (see chapter 1) made ‘search’ an easy target for cognitive science, thanks to
an ability to construct algorithmic models that could explain how the process could
be performed efficiently. However, this narrow focus on abstract symbol systems
likely contributed to a failure to overlook important agent-level behaviours that play
a significant role in the process of problem solving and decision-making.
The first thing to note is that in the absence of an external memory source
(e.g. a pen and paper), searching an abstract representation of a problem space
in working memory can be very demanding. However, depending on the resources
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available to an agent, there may be an alternative to constructing a highly-structured
mental representation in the first place. A famous experiment that explored this was
performed by Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pook (1997), who had subjects move blocks (in
a computer program) from one area to another in order to construct a replica of a
model that was displayed on screen (see figure 3.3). During the performance of this
task, eye-tracking technology recorded where the subjects were looking. The classical
problem-solving routine assumes an agent formulates a representation of the problem
before executing the plan. However, the study performed by Ballard et al. recorded
behaviours that were inconsistent with this account.
Their study found that numerous saccades to the model were made during the
performance of the task, both before and after picking up a block. This suggests
that the subject is only storing a minimal amount of information at any one time,
either the colour or the position of the block to be copied. To test this, Ballard et
al. switched the colour of one of the un-copied blocks while the subject was looking
elsewhere (determined using eye-tracking technology). The assumption is that if a
representation had been formed prior to the execution of the task (and consulted by
working memory processes), then the end model would be inaccurate after a change
of colour. However, the subjects were not found to make this mistake, suggesting
again that only the current/next block is stored in working memory, and regular
saccades are made between the areas throughout the task.
In this experiment, the usual process of ‘search’ can be viewed as an interactive
process that makes regular call-backs to the world, challenging the idea that it is
separate from representation and/or registration. Rarely do people solve problems
like this in their head and then announce the solution all at once. Instead, they
interact with the world to break the task environment into multiple sub-tasks, tri-
alling different stages as they go along. Maintaining the strict demarcation of the
purported modules is strained by examples such as the one offered by Ballard, Hay-
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hoe, and Pook (ibid.), but is not entirely refuted. It is still possible to maintain
that the serial and modular process occur in a cyclical fashion, looping through the
various stages repeatedly. However, this is challenged by another criticism offered
by Brooks (1991).
Brooks (ibid.) offered a criticism of what he termed the ‘sense-model-plan-act’
(SMPA) model of robotic intelligence. The idea that Brooks wished to challenge was
that if a robot was a) required to gather information from its environment (sensing),
in order to b) build a richly reconstructive representation (model), with which to
c) formulate a plan of reaching some desired goal-state (plan), before d) effecting
the necessary movements (act), then outside of a carefully designed and controlled
laboratory setting, such a serial process would be insufficiently dynamic to cope with
the time pressures of a constantly changing environment. In the time taken to build
a model, the environment may have changed (e.g. the colour of a block may have
changed), which would render the current model (and any actions based on it) inac-
curate. Utilising the SMPA model in ecologically-valid scenarios would mean either
the robot would incur an accuracy cost (subject to the environment changing) if it
were to pass through the stages once before completing the full action plan, or it
would incur a drastic speed cost if it cycled through the stages performing incremen-
tal, but carefully controlled-actions. Instead, Brooks’ suggestion was to implement
a more straightforward sensorimotor coupling approach, where the internal models
were replaced with a more direct sensitivity to the environment, and the environment
directly elicited certain behaviours with no need for mediating representations. In
his own words, “The world is its own best model.” (ibid., p. 15)
This worry about the urgency of performing an action in ecologically-valid scenar-
ios is particularly pressing when applied to the case of decision-making. In traditional
decision theory, models of decision-making do not incorporate the time constraints
of agents, and therefore fail to account for a number of additional pressures that
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the agent is faced with. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) refer to these types of mod-
els as instances of ‘unbounded rationality’ or ‘optimisation under constraints’. The
first finds its clearest expression in traditional forms of expected utility maximisation
where an agent is expected to perform the full calculations required by rationality as-
sumptions, and show “little or no regard for the constraints of time, knowledge, and
computational capacities that real humans face” (ibid., p. 7). Of course, no one really
defends the claim that humans indeed have the sort of Laplacean superintelligence
that is required for these calculations, but rather defend them on either a normative
basis, or on the basis that humans act as if they were unboundedly rational. By
contrast, optimisation under constraints acknowledges the importance of search as
an external process, and thus looks to implement rules, which allow the agent to
determine when enough information for the decision problem has been acquired. For
example, an agent could implement a rule that translates to “stop search when costs
outweigh benefits” (ibid.). This appears at first glance to acknowledge the sorts of
ecological constraints that unbounded rationality overlooks, but as Gigerenzer and
Todd note, these types of models can still be incredibly computationally demand-
ing. For example, imagine you are considering possible options in the thesis writing
example (see introduction), and have written down two possible options. Before
proceeding to write down a third, you will have to calculate whether the benefits
of continuing search will outweigh the possible costs, and this latter step requires
consideration of all the possible options available to you in order to estimate their
utilities and probabilities. This step would need to be repeated each time another
option is considered, and so as Gigerenzer and Todd state, “constrained optimisation
invites unbounded rationality to sneak in through the back door.” (ibid.)
It is worth reiterating the point regarding application again. These models are
not held up as examples that capture the actual mechanisms that underlie human
decision-making, and almost all will undoubtedly appreciate their limitations as de-
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scriptive models, thus restricting their application to the status of ideal models.
There is nothing inherently wrong with the pursuit of ideal norms, unless it is used
as an unreasonable measure of human (and non-human) intelligence.
Framing and Registration
So far, we have seen how the classical cognitivist theory of problem solving begins
by assuming one of the hardest aspects is already dealt with, i.e. the framing of
the problem. However, framing is something that real-world agents undertake prior
to search, and determines what states or processes are salient to the task. In real-
world situations, framing brings a host of biasing preconceptions, specific to the
agent about what is salient to the problem, and thus how the problem space will
be represented. For example, consider how an expert mathematician may be more
adept at recognising the abstract structure inherent in a problem, or how a builder
approaches a construction task. The manner in which they frame the problem to be
solved will undoubtedly be different to the manner in which non-experts approach
the same tasks. However, the construction of an abstract task environment blurs
this distinction, and potentially closes off a fruitful investigation into the importance
of biasing inputs (e.g. affective signals) and prior learning.
These problems have long been identified as a class of related problems often
brought together in discussion of the notorious frame problem. Originating in the
fields of robotics and artificial intelligence, the frame problem is concerned with the
question of how it is possible for a machine to know which of a potentially infinite
number of possible actions is relevant at any particular time, without running an
infinitely long checking procedure that consults them all. It is obvious that humans
(and many non-human animals) have in some regards solved the frame problem,
though unfortunately our pragmatic ability to do so on a daily basis does not translate
into an understanding of how in fact we achieve this feat. This is a well-known
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problem, and is neatly described and discussed in (Dennett, 1984). In the next
chapter we will begin to look at a possible solution to it by casting it as a problem
of deciding between multiple action opportunities. By doing so, we will also see a
more natural solution to the problem of registration.
Recall that registration is the problem of how to reinterpret the results of the
problem solving task and connect the solution back to the physical world. Note that
this problem is only an issue for accounts that separate the aforementioned processes
from real-world interactions by making the agent’s interactions depend on an indirect
mental representation that encodes knowledge in an abstract format. This issue
emerged in chapter 1 when we considered the symbol grounding problem, but it was
argued there that one of the motivations for defending an embodied account was in
order to directly ground the content of mental representations in body-environment
interactions (at least for those accounts which make explanatory use of them).
Environmental Resources and Simplifying Behaviours
Finally, recall that one of the purposes of constructing an abstract task environment
was to separate relevant task behaviours from irrelevant ones (e.g. the movement of
a chess piece versus scratching your head when playing chess). Attempts to delineate
something like task-relevancy at the outset are often challenged by some embodied
theories who emphasise the importance of acknowledging the whole situation that the
agent is embedded in when interpreting observed behaviours (Robbins and Aydede,
2009). This is because the situation and local resources available can alter how the
agent will frame the problem. The setting and local resources activate what Kirsh
(2009) calls an ‘interpretive framework’, which is a way of conceptualising the task
that primes agents to approach their environment in activity-specific ways, biasing
what they see as problematic and what they see as functional. This draws our
attention to the famous notion of bounded rationality and Simon’s analogy of the
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scissors in which, “rational behaviour is shaped by a [pair of] scissors whose blades
are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the
actor.” (Simon, 1990, p. 7)
Simon’s proposal was in effect that without paying due attention to (a) the real
task environment, shaped by the physical structures in an agent’s world, and (b) the
capabilities afforded by the agent’s physiology, we would be unable to get a handle
on whether some action was in fact rational in some bounded sense. Figure 3.4
demonstrates, in an admittedly tongue in cheek manner, how a failure to acknowledge
these two sides of the scissors in cases of cross-species comparison can result in
inappropriate ascriptions of (ir)rationality.
Simon’s initial proposal of bounded rationality as satisficing, spurred a large
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research literature that aimed to uncover alternative mechanisms behind decision-
making behaviours—most notably the work of simple heuristics proposed by Gigeren-
zer and Todd (1999). Although this is an interesting literature in its own right, many
in the embodied cognition would argue that it is important to begin by looking at the
evolutionary environment, in order to uncover opportunities for so called epistemic
actions : interactions with the environment that simplify the task and offload some
of the cognitive demands. By uncovering these cases first, we can determine where
and when heuristics (or alternatively more knowledge-rich structures) are necessary.
As a way of demonstrating the efficacy of this strategy, Wilson and Golonka (2013)
use the famous case of the Outfielders Problem as an illustration.3 Approaching this
from a perspective that aims to uncover the abstract structure of the problem would
begin by describing how a baseball in flight follows a parabolic trajectory, affected
by numerous variables (e.g. the angle of the ball as it is struck by the bat, speed
and direction of the wind etc.). How would the traditional cognitivist describe the
problem for the outfielder?
On this picture, we would begin with perception gathering information about
the necessary variables such as initial direction, velocity, and angle, as well as other
relevant local factors such as wind speed. These variables can then serve as inputs
(representations) into some inner simulation of the actual world. Once computed,
the task is then to predict where one needs to run to, and how fast, in order to
successfully catch the ball. One of the problems with this picture is that at the
usual distances involved, the optical projection of the baseball is tiny, and usually
moving quite fast. If we consider that in ecologically-valid situations, cognition is
time-pressured, the cognitivist picture begins to seem even more far-fetched, and this
3For those unfamiliar with the Outfielder Problem, the example refers to the task faced by a
baseball outfielder who has to figure out where to move to in order to successfully catch the ball
that is hit by the batter (the flyball).
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is before we factor in the time that is required for the outfielder to actually run to
the predicted spot, and on the basis of highly uncertain perceptual information.
In contrast, the embodied view can appeal to a wider range of resources. Not only
does the embodied view have the brain, the body and the environment at its disposal,
but perhaps even more importantly, it has the relations between these things as well
(e.g. how our bodies interact with the environment). Wilson and Golonka (ibid.,
p. 3) propose that a task analysis for the observing cognitive scientist should begin
with an exhaustive list of resources available that could contribute to solving the
task, and importantly should be approached from the perspective of the subject
rather than the observer, beginning with perception and action, and postulating
more complex cognitive resources only once the capabilities of the other resources
have been exhausted. What does such a task analysis look like in the case of the
Outfielder Problem?
To identify the resources available to the outfielder, we first need to understand
the nature of the flyball event as a process that unfolds over time. This event pro-
duces kinematic information (i.e. information about the objects motion independent
of any underlying forces), which is available to an observer. If the observer were
simply to remain passive, trying to determine where the ball would land on the basis
of this information would be too computationally demanding. However, the em-
bodied view can appeal to further resources such as the body and the environment
and the interactions between them. Of particular interest here is the close coupling
between action and perception, and how certain movements of the outfielder change
the perceptual input of the ball in parabolic motion.
Fink, Foo, and Warren (2009) discuss two strategies for solving the Outfielder
problem that are known as Optical Acceleration Cancellation, and Linear Optical
Trajectory (LOT). OAC involves the outfielder running in a particular alignment
with the ball so as to cancel the vertical acceleration of its optical projection in the
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visual field, which results in the ball appearing to move with a constant velocity.
LOT requires the outfielder to move laterally, so as to keep the apparent trajectory
of the ball linear and appear to trace a straight line. Neither option requires the
outfielder to predict in advance where the ball will land. Instead in both cases,
the very movement of the outfielder is harnessed to bolster the otherwise limited
kinematic information. By using the wider resources of a body-environment relation,
the outfielder can solve the task in a far less computationally demanding manner,
simply by running in a particular way.
We will see another example that exploits this ecological approach in the final
chapter. For the time being it is sufficient to highlight (a) the limitations of the
cognitivist approach, and (b) the explanatory scope of accounts that adopt exclu-
sively knowledge-rich or knowledge-lean accounts.4 Although the outfielder prob-
lem eschews knowledge-rich explanations successfully, few would argue that a com-
plete account of human cognition can be accommodated by similarly knowledge-lean
explanations—many of which are likely to be domain-specific (e.g. heuristics). It
may be possible to argue that ‘experience’ could be recast as familiarity with rel-
evant ‘search heuristics’, but much of an agent’s success surely has to do with an
understanding of how to translate domain general knowledge to new tasks in the first
place. These concerns will be returned to in chapters 5 and 6.
4By knowledge-rich, I am referring simply to the idea that certain problems require the positing
of richly reconstructive mental representations that aim to accurately reflect the structure of the
world, and are subsequently used as the basis of inner cognitive processing that is detached (at
least during key stages of processing) from sensorimotor regions. By contrast, knowledge-lean
solutions would emphasise close coupling with the environment, and the problem-solving may make
use of sensorimotor regions in a constitutive manner. This does not need to imply an entirely
anti-representational stance, although some situations may lend themselves to such an explanation.




Some may worry that the criticisms in the sections above were directed at a straw-
man, or at least at a traditional account that is no longer seriously defended. In
this section, we will briefly outline some more recent empirical work from the field
of neuroeconomics, which demonstrates the continued adherence by some working in
the cognitive sciences to certain cognitivist assumptions.
As a movement in its own right, neuroeconomics has emerged relatively recently,
following the development of techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) in the early 1990s. However, as a combination of two pre-existing ap-
proaches (neuroscience and economics), its history extends further back into the
origins of these pre-existing disciplines. Although exploring the history of neuro-
science would be fruitful for understanding the motivation behind the merging of
these disciplines, it is perhaps more fruitful (for reasons that will be made clear) to
explore a brief history of economic theory.
As many historians of economics would acknowledge, the birth of the classical
period of economic theory began with the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth
of Nations in 1776. In addition to the many insights into the causes behind a nation’s
prosperity, Smith explored a number of phenomena that he believed were integral
to understanding choice behaviour—in effect providing psychological insights that
were first explored in his earlier work The Theory of Moral Sentiments (see Ashraf,
Camerer, and Loewenstein, 2005, for a discussion). This trend was continued by
later economists, often unperturbed by an inability to experimentally test these
psychological models.
In the 1930s, economists (e.g. Samuelson, 1938) attempted to develop more rigor-
ous mathematical models that explained choice behaviour by appealing to a number
of primitive assumptions about an agent’s preferences. Although this was a depar-
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ture from the earlier economics of Smith, the approach had a precursor in the form of
Daniel Bernoulli’s observations of people’s behaviour in games of chance. Bernoulli
(1738) noted that people’s behaviour regularly failed to maximise expected mone-
tary value. This was famously illustrated by the well-known St Petersburg Paradox,
which today enjoys the status of a well-confirmed empirical fact (Okasha, 2015). In
response, Bernoulli suggested that people are instead maximising expected utility,
the function of which is the logarithm of monetary value. The importance of these
observations should not be understated, for as Okasha (ibid.) notes, Bernoulli’s sug-
gestion, despite being influential, failed to provide any explanation of why an agent
should maximise utility.
Once Savage (1954) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) had developed
Bernoulli’s initial argument—demonstrating how an agent’s subjective utility func-
tion can be determined on the basis of observable preference relations between
lotteries—Bernoulli’s unexplained assumption was given little attention by economists.
Following the axiomatisation of expected utility theory, it was possible to demon-
strate, by means of a representation theorem, that any agent whose preferences
satisfied reasonable axioms (i.e. transitivity, continuity and independence) would
behave as if they were maximising some expected utility function (see Glimcher and
Fehr, 2014a; Okasha, 2015, for introductions). The question of why agents acted
like this appeared to be of little concern once a rigorous mathematical structure had
been provided. This effectively divorced economics from psychology, as economists
needed only to concern themselves with observable, and easily quantifiable, choice be-
haviour. Questions regarding the psychological processes underlying this behaviour
were extraneous, so long as assumptions regarding the consistency of certain axioms
were maintained.
These developments in neoclassical economics proved to be incredibly popular,
in spite of examples such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) that challenged the
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plausibility of axioms such as independence, and were subsequently backed up by
empirical observations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). However, the popularity
came at a price. As more and more counter-examples accumulated (e.g. Ellsberg’s
Paradox (Ellsberg, 1961)), economists were compelled to weaken the normative force
of their models by defending weaker axioms, or by setting restricted boundary condi-
tions on the descriptive validity of the models. This latter move was the choice made
by Simon with his proposal of bounded rationality that we discussed in the previous
section. Eventually, a group of psychologists (most notably Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky) who were studying the foundations of choice behaviour, presented a
range of phenomena, which diverged so drastically from the models of expected util-
ity theory, that the descriptive validity of the expected utility approach was radically
undermined (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
A particularly noteworthy effect that was observed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1981) is the framing effect, which shows the influence of context on value-based
choice. For example, subjects are observed to prefer riskier choices if they are pre-
sented in terms of a potential loss rather than a potential gain. This observation
was important for a number of reasons, but is particular noteworthy for the present
purposes because of a connection with later material regarding how neural systems
encode value (section 3.2.2). As these experiments tentatively suggest, agents may
not necessarily represent value in an objective or stable manner (e.g. by means of a
utility function) but may use some other method (e.g. heuristic). Alternatively, if
researchers wish to maintain the psychological reality of utility functions, given that
an agent’s utility function must have certain properties (see Okasha, 2015), there
must also be additional corresponding mechanisms that are postulated in order to
account for the observed divergences from rational behaviour.
Bringing us to the present, these alternatives provide researchers with competing
hypotheses to explore, and a number of ways of attempting to account for appar-
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ent violations. On the one hand, behavioural economists5 often argue that good
decisions aim to maximise expected utility over the short-term or the long-term
(Glimcher and Fehr, 2014b). Violations can be put down to inappropriate framings,
or mistaken assumptions regarding the task environment. Alternatively, behavioural
ecologists argue that organisms are instead aiming to maximise their fitness, rather
than some abstract utility function, and that the basic goal for any biological agent
is primarily survival and reproduction (Stephens, 2008). These definitions may align
in some cases, but sometimes they will diverge, and these latter cases can be incred-
ibly fruitful for gaining an understanding of the mechanisms behind decision-making
(Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2015). To help decide between these competing theories,
neuroeconomists propose that neuroscientific research should be undertaken in order
to gain a more tangible grasp on the inner mechanisms that underlie our decision-
making capacities.
The literature surrounding neuroeconomics is vast and continues to grow rapidly,
which means we must unfortunately restrict ourselves to a small number of cases.
Therefore, it is important to highlight at the outset that any criticisms should be
understood with a sufficiently narrow scope, rather than attempting to undermine
the general movement, or cast it in overly monolithic terms. In spite of this caveat,
it is often the case that neuroeconomics research aligns with the aforementioned
strand of economic theory that treats human choice behaviour as predominantly
aiming at the normative prescription to maximise expected utility (Glimcher and
Fehr, 2014b). Many defenders of neuroeconomics are happy to acknowledge that this
commitment to using economic methods for understanding neural behaviour means
5Glimcher and Fehr (2014a, p.xix) define behavioural economics as a discipline which seeks to
propose “models of limits on rational calculation, willpower, and self-interest, and seeks to codify
those limits formally and explore their empirical implications using both mathematical theory,
experimental data and analysis of field data.”
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working within well-known constraints of expected utility theory (e.g. measuring
utilities on an ordinal rather than a cardinal scale):
“To those coming from the natural sciences, it can come as a shock to
discover that economists shy away from assigning cardinal meaning to nu-
merical utilities. Economists look askance at those who would assign any
but the most qualitative of meanings to these utility numbers. A higher
number means no more and no less than that an option is preferred. How
much higher one number is than another is seen as essentially meaning-
less, largely thanks to Pareto. This is an absolutely central feature of
economic thought that must be understood by anyone who interacts with
economists.” (Caplin and Glimcher, 2014, p. 7)
However, one of the strengths of the neuroeconomic approach can be traced back
to the methodological approach of Samuelson (Samuelson, 1938), who in effect ar-
gued that rather than merely assuming as if subjects maximise utility with their
choice behaviour, economists should figure out how to test the hypothesis that cer-
tain choices are consistent with the approach. Just as Samuelson’s approach was
influential in axiomatising expected utility theory, so too neuroeconomists hope that
the same methodology can be applied to cases in neuroscience. One instance where
this is particularly notable is in the case of the Reward Prediction Error Hypothesis.
3.2.1 Reward Prediction Error Hypothesis
The reward prediction error hypothesis (RPE) explores the role that the neuro-
transmitter dopamine plays in encoding a teaching signal that guides reward-based
reinforcement learning (particularly in the case of midbrain dopaminergic neurons)
(Glimcher, 2011b). The general idea is that these dopaminergic neurons signal a pre-
diction error that can be used to update predictions that correspond to expectations
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regarding certain options that an agent desires. The relevance to neuroeconomics is
that these predictions are hypothesised to correspond to something like the lotteries
of subjective expected utility theory, while the errors correspond to the discrepancy
between the anticipated lottery and the actual prize (Caplin and Glimcher, 2014).
This is because, if there is a reward, there must be something the agent desires (i.e.
prizes); if there is a prediction, there must be subjective beliefs concerning expected
prizes (i.e. lotteries), and if there is an error, it must be possible that the actual prize
does not align with the agent’s belief (i.e. outcomes). Neuroeconomists who favour
the RPE hypothesis propose that the amount of dopamine that is released would be
proportional to the prediction error, and could also account for the subjective value
that an agent assigns to the expected lotteries (Glimcher and Fehr, 2014b). This
in turn affects the probability that a corresponding action will be chosen. Before
assessing the empirical validity of this scheme, it is important to highlight its close
links to economic theory.
Caplin and Dean (2008) have argued that any model that supports the RPE
hypothesis can be tested by developing a number of axioms (similar to the axioms
of expected utility theory), and then performing experiments that place subjects in
situations that mimic decisions under uncertainty. These axioms are summarised by
Caplin and Glimcher (2014) and connected with three elements of the RPE hypoth-
esis:
(Reward) Coherent prize ordering: Holding the probabilities of rewards fixed
and varying their magnitude in an order-preserving manner (e.g. more money
or more juice (for monkeys)) should not result in different ordering observed
at the level of neural activity.
(Prediction) Coherent lottery ordering: Fixing rewards and varying the prob-
abilities of obtaining them should result in coherent orderings across trials with
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different prizes but similar probabilities.
(Error) No-Surprise Equivalence: When prizes are perfectly anticipated (i.e. no
surprise), the dopaminergic response should be identical across all predicted
outcomes.
All of these axioms refer to predictions regarding the correlated dopaminergic re-
sponse, and have precise mathematical definitions given by Caplin and Dean (2008).
Subsequent experiments using fMRI have found that these axioms are maintained
in some regions of the brain (e.g. ventral striatum), violated in some (e.g. insula)
and are ambiguous in others (e.g. prefrontal cortex) (cf. Glimcher, 2011b; Glimcher
and Fehr, 2014b, for a review of the studies). Regardless of any subsequent criti-
cism, it should be noted that this approach (and its corresponding methodology) is
an incredible achievement, and upholds the scientific ideal of formulating rigorous
mathematical models that make empirically testable predictions that are potentially
falsifiable. Unfortunately, at present the RPE hypothesis itself rests on a number of
unstable conceptual and empirical foundations.
The first challenge is that the RPE hypothesis is controversial in neuroscience,
with many pointing to alternative influencing factors that are strongly implicated
as influencing dopaminergic neurons, and which are only weakly related to reward
prediction error (e.g. reward-neutral properties such as surprisal or salience (Knut-
son and Peterson, 2005), discovery of new actions (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006) and
modulatory roles in precision-weighting (Friston et al., 2014)). Also, within these
roles, dopamine release can function differently depending on the timing. If it is
released following some salient behaviour, it can play the role of updating the sub-
jective probability of future choices, but if it is released prior to behaviour it appears
to act as the gating mechanism that enables both cognitive and behavioural mecha-
nisms (e.g. updating plans in working memory or enabling motor control) (Landreth
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and Bickle, 2008, p. 423).
The second challenge is that the RPE hypothesis makes strong functional assump-
tions regarding the format of the value representations, which must have discoverable
neural correlates if the hypothesis is to be vindicated as anything more than a be-
havioural theory. For example, whereas the sorts of natural stimuli that are used as
prizes in the experiments (e.g. juice or money) can be easily quantified such that
more is obviously better, the history of economics demonstrates why it is unwise to
translate this into a similar quantifiable measure in the case of subjective beliefs.
The axiomatised RPE hypothesis sidesteps this issue to some extent by beginning
with weaker assumptions. However, it is still limited to the claim that the dopamin-
ergic response correlates with objective, quantifiable features in the external world,
rather than something that may be more salient to the organism and is measurable
on an entirely different scale (e.g. affective significance), which perhaps results in a
problem of underdetermination. This issue can be clearly seen by turning to another
example.
3.2.2 Common Currency and The Futile Search for True
Utility
In the previous section we noted that the responses of dopaminergic neurons are
implicated in a number of cases, some of which only weakly correspond to reward.
Although this undermines the RPE hypothesis, some may worry that it also under-
mines the search for an unambiguous neural signal that encodes subjective value,
which seems to be required to vindicate neuroeconomics’ search for the neural basis
of utility. However, we may wonder whether this search is even well-defined in the
first place.
Recall that in traditional decision theory, utility is taken to be a mathematical
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representation that is inferred from simple choices that meet certain consistency
axioms. This is quite different from identifying utility with either (a) an experienced
hedonic value or pleasurable feeling, or (b) an agent’s expected reward. Fumagalli
(2013) calls these latter two ‘experienced utility’ and ‘neural utility’ respectively, and
to contrast them with the decision theoretic notion, groups them together under the
label ‘true utility’. We will here focus on the notion of neural utility, given that it
is the notion that is advocated by many neuroeconomists, who often claim that it
should replace traditional notions of utility as a mathematical representation (e.g.
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005). They argue that the ““as if” approach
made good sense as long as the brain remained substantially a black box” (ibid.,
p. 10). However, developments in neuroscience mean the brain is now ripe to be
explored and understood by incorporating many of the constructs of economic theory
to modelling the behaviour of interacting neurons and neural populations.
As Fumagalli (2013, p. 329) defines it, neural utility relates to patterns of neural
activity in certain regions of the brain, where “desirability is realized as a concrete
object, a neural signal in the human brain, rather than as a purely theoretical con-
struction”. He cites a number of advocates of this idea, whose views reflect differing
degrees of support. For example, Park and Zak (2007, p. 50) claim that “the utility
calculations that people were assumed to do really happen in the brain”. Whereas
Glimcher (2011a, pp. 133-134) supports a slightly more nuanced view that states
when a subjects’ behaviour accords with the predictions of expected utility theory, it
is “because they neurally represent something having the properties of utility—a neu-
ral activation that encodes the desirability of an outcome in a continuous monotonic
fashion”.
In support of the latter claim, Levy and Glimcher (2012) present a meta-analysis
of neuroimaging studies in humans. These studies appear to demonstrate how the
neural encoding of subjective values, in a number of brain areas (most notably ven-
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tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)), reflects a
common value scale for comparison of options that is required by expected utility
theory. This is the so-called common currency hypothesis, and is motivated by a
belief that in order to make rational decisions agents must evaluate the costs and
benefits of available options using an independent ‘currency’ that is able to compare
otherwise incommensurable options. Montague and Berns, who have also worked on
the neuroeconomic notion of a common currency, define the term as follows:
A currency is an abstract way to represent the value of a good or service.
For our purposes in this paper, it possesses an important property: it
provides a common scale to value fundamentally incommensurable stim-
uli and behavioral acts. For example, suppose we want to understand the
relative value of 17 coconuts and 41 sips of water. There is no natural way
to combine coconuts and sips of water; however, each can be converted
to their valuation in some currency, and the values can be combined in
any number of ways. This kind of abstraction is so common in our every-
day world that its biological substrates go virtually unnoticed. Without
internal currencies in the nervous system, a creature would be unable to
assess the relative value of different events like drinking water, smelling
food, scanning for predators, sitting quietly in the sun, and so forth. To
decide on an appropriate behavior, the nervous system must estimate the
value of each of these potential actions, convert it to a common scale, and
use this scale to determine a course of action. This idea of a common
scale can also be used to value both predictors and rewards. (Montague
and Berns, 2002, p.276, emphasis added)
Neuroeconomists have set themselves a goal of determining which brain mecha-
nisms are responsible for the evaluation and deliberation of this common currency.
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We can critique this goal by way of several questions:
1. Does the brain encode a single abstract currency?
2. If so, where in the brain does this happen?
3. If not, how many currencies does the brain compute?
4. Are there significant differences between these currencies?
With regards to the first question, Levy and Glimcher (2012) may appear as if
they are arguing strongly in favour of an affirmative response, while also providing a
response to the second that supports Fumagalli’s (2013) portrayal of neuroeconomics’
search for true utility. For example, they claim on the basis of the aforementioned
meta-analysis that:
“Quite a few studies have now demonstrated that a subregion of the
vmPFC/OFC [...] represent subject-specific reward value in a common
neural currency, the expected subjective value of Neuroeconomic theory.”
(ibid., p. 1035)
If this were the case, it would seem to support a strict cognitivist reading of
the common currency hypothesis by which the vmPFC/OFC encode an abstract
representation of subject-specific value. However, it wouldn’t be an entirely fair
characterisation, and would also ignore a whole host of other evidence that seems to
weaken this claim substantially. First of all, as Levy and Glimcher (ibid.) themselves
note:
“[...] there is no evidence to support the claim that the neural common
currency of value arises only in this subregion of the vmPFC/OFC. Any
common currency observed in the brain must reflect the activation of
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multiple brain areas. [...] Indeed, the evidence reviewed here suggests
that portions of the striatum and perhaps the insula also participate in
this process.”
However, whereas they argue that these other regions are active, and contribute
to a distributed task of encoding a single common currency, there is still the as-
sumption that this distributed activity (representing an agent’s deliberative process)
is somehow integrated into an abstract representation that allows for commitment
to take place in some central executive region such as vmPFC/OFC. Others have
argued in favour of a similar approach. For example, Platt and Padoa-Schioppa
(2009) focus on not only the OFC, but also the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) and
the posterior cingulate cortex (CGp), and argue that value representations differ
significantly across these areas. In the case of the LIP (a region commonly associ-
ated with eye movement), this region has been heavily implicated in decision-making
tasks, but is often described as encoding a more reward-neutral signal (i.e neither
immediately rewarding or aversive stimuli) such as behavioural salience (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010; Freedman and Assad, 2011; Landreth and Bickle, 2008; Treue, 2003).
Sugrue, Corrado, and Newsome (2005, p. 367) describe this point clearly when they
state that activity in the LIP encodes “information that is pertinent to the selec-
tion of future shifts in gaze or attention.” With regards to the CGp, Platt and
Padoa-Schioppa (2009) claim that studies of this area—typically associated with
learning, and strongly connected with parietal cortex, an area implicated in planned
movement—support a number of distinct roles in decision-making, including risk-
evaluation, motivational significance and temporal discounting. Although they sum-
marise this under the label of ‘behaviourally salient value’, the key point is that this
region undoubtedly plays myriad roles in what appears to be a distributed set of
mechanisms underlying decision-making.
Why would the brain encode so many disparate currencies? One answer is that
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although the environment affords multiple simultaneous action opportunities, agents
also have individual needs (e.g. thirst, hunger or tiredness). For each of these needs,
certain outcomes may be more effective at satisfying the current desire of the agent
(e.g. water vs. fruit for quenching thirst). The brain may use multiple currencies to
rank outcomes and actions as a function of the initial need that motivated the decision
task, calling upon different regions of the brain as necessary. However, it seems to
leave unanswered how the brain deals with options that are incommensurable in
other respects, and possibly lead to radically different (but equally valid) solutions
to the same problem (e.g. what to do in the case of the thesis writing—also see
section 3.1.1). This seems to necessitate a return to Levy and Glimcher’s claim
that regions of the brain such as the OFC may in fact act as some sort of executive
region, co-ordinating the other decision-making systems; an executive which perhaps
fails from time to time to effectively integrate the competing information arising
from these distinct systems, leading to the sorts of irrational decisions that plague
rational choice theory. As they rightfully ask:
“[W]hat happens in the brain when we need to choose between a large
amount of water and a single apple? [...] What we need to do is to take
into consideration many different attributes of each option (like color,
size, taste, health benefits, our metabolic state, etc.), assess the value of
each of the attributes, and combine all of these attributes into one coher-
ent value representation that allows comparison with any other possible
option. What we need, at least in principle, is a single common currency
of valuation for comparing options of many different kinds.” (Levy and
Glimcher, 2012, p. 1027)
Whist we are sympathetic to the idea that more frontal regions of the brain play
some sort of co-ordinating role (see chapters 5 and 6), we resist the idea that the
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correct representational description of this region is the one described by Levy and
Glimcher, or indeed in any cognitivist style description that posits a disembodied,
abstract decision-making system that is ultimately responsible for integrating activity
from other ancillary decision-making systems. As we will see in the next section, we
do not believe it to be helpful to assume that commitment (in the decision-theoretic
sense) occurs only once all relevant sensory information has been integrated, as it
has the unwanted effect of separating decision-making from sensorimotor regions.
It would be easy to pass this off by claiming that most of the confusion arises in
part due to multiple, diverging uses of the term ‘decision’ in the cognitive sciences.
For example, there is a distinction in the cognitive sciences between economic deci-
sions on the one hand, and perceptual decisions on the other. The former involve
choosing among alternative, discrete options associated with different rewards, while
the latter require subjects to “choose” between competing percepts on the basis of
ambiguous or noisy sensory evidence, in order to categorise objects in the world, and
perhaps choose some relevant associated actions (Freedman and Assad, 2011). How-
ever, while this undoubtedly accounts for some of the variety in the decision-making
literature, it does not vindicate the common currency hypothesis entirely.
For a start, although we have said nothing about the notion of experienced utility
that Fumagalli (2013) introduces, it should be clear that the notion of value that
has been proposed by neuroeconomists is too narrowly defined to be able to success-
fully accommodate all of the interesting phenomenological and conceptual differences
between these notions. Therefore, as Fumagalli rightfully argues, we should resist
arguments that attempt to collapse the two into a single unitary concept such as
neural utility. However, what Fumagalli does not consider is whether we can ac-
count for the findings of neuroeconomics within an alternative framework. One that
is perhaps able to acknowledge these distinctions without appealing to detached ab-
stract representations, and at the same time retain the admirable goal of explaining
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how the brain is able to deal with the competing sources of information arising from
multiple decision-making systems. The remainder of this thesis turns to consider
this very possibility.
3.3 Embodied Decisions
“[...] studies on the neural mechanisms of decision making have repeat-
edly shown that correlates of decision processes are distributed through-
out the brain, notably including cortical and subcortical regions that are
strongly implicated in the sensorimotor control of movement. Neural cor-
relates of decision variables appear to be expressed by the same neurons
that encode the attributes of the potential motor responses used to re-
port the decision, which reside within sensorimotor circuits that guide
the online execution of movements.” (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010, p. 270)
The cognitivist view of problem solving and decision-making leads to a tendency
to think of sensorimotor control in terms of the transformation of input representa-
tions into output representations through a series of well-demarcated, encapsulated
processing stages. It also often leads to the assumption that key decision variables
are encoded in some central executive region, as an abstract value (Levy and Glim-
cher, 2012; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). Deliberation and commitment thus proceed in
sequence, and importantly are separate from sensorimotor regions. As an example
of the standard account, Cisek (2012) cites the goods-based model (Padoa-Schioppa,
2011), which suggests choice behaviour is governed by integrating all relevant fac-
tors (e.g. expected gains, possible risks etc.) into a single subjective value. This
value, which is associated with some corresponding action, is compared with the set
of alternative options, and the one with the highest expected value is selected. This
commitment occurs prior to movement onset.
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Cisek and Pastor-Bernier (2014) argue that this picture is hard to reconcile with a
growing body of neurophysiological data. They discuss three instances of this conflict,
which taken together represent a considerable challenge to the traditional account.
Firstly, the traditional account predicts that motor behaviour only begins once an
option has been selected. However, this is challenged by multiple studies (reviewed
by (Cisek, 2012)) that demonstrate how neurons in motor regions represent multiple
potential targets and actions prior to the agent selecting between them. Secondly,
additional studies (Cos, Be´langer, and Cisek, 2011) show that when humans were
required to freely choose between two reaching actions with equivalent reward values,
the subjects unsurprisingly favoured the one with a lower associated biomechanical
cost. However, the studies importantly ensured that the difference in biomechanical
cost only exists during the later stages of the movement, therefore requiring that
the brain represents information about future biomechanical costs before deciding
between them. Finally, the traditional account fails to account for the wide spread
existence of decision-related modulatory effects in sensorimotor regions (see below).
6 To accommodate this otherwise anomalous data they propose a notion of embodied
decisions. Embodied decisions have a number of properties that are quite different
to the kinds of decisions modelled by traditional decision theory.
3.3.1 Decision-Making as a Distributed Consensus
Cisek proposes the affordance competition hypothesis (ACH) as a model that aims to
explain both the cognitive and neural processes implicated in decision-making (Cisek,
2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). According to the ACH, decisions emerge from a
distributed, probabilistic competition between multiple representations of possible
actions in sensorimotor circuits. To expound this view, a number of components
6As we will see, this is something that PP is well-equipped to handle.
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Figure 3.5: A sketch of the Affordance Competition Hypothesis. Reprinted from (Cisek
and Kalaska, 2010, p. 278).
require clarification.
Cisek’s focus on the distributed manner of decision-making stands in contrast
to the earlier cognitivist framework, and also to other models that propose that
decision-making occurs downstream of the integration of multiple sources of infor-
mation, which yields a common representation of abstract value (Padoa-Schioppa,
2011). Instead, according to the ACH (see Figure 3.5), the sensorimotor system is
continuously processing sensory information in order to specify the parameters of
potential actions, which compete for control of behaviour as they progress through
a cortical hierarchy, while at the same time other regions of the brain provide bi-
asing inputs in order to select the best action (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). These
processes of specification and selection occur simultaneously and continuously, and
are not localisable to a specific region. Rather, the competition occurs by way of
mutual inhibition of neural representations, which specify the parameters of poten-
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tial actions, until one suppresses the others and a distributed consensus emerges. At
this point, movement onset commences, and Thura and Cisek (2014) propose that
the point when the competition between actions is resolved within the motor system
constitutes the voluntary commitment to an action choice. Note here that the com-
mitment is to an action choice, rather than a more abstract state of the world. This
will be important in later chapters.
Integral to this process is the role of continuously biasing influences (i.e. rule-
based inputs from prefrontal regions, reward predictions from basal ganglia, and a
range of further biasing variables from sub-cortical regions). Each of these biasing
inputs contribute their votes to the selection process. As the authors state:
“[...] the decision is not determined by any single central executive, but
simply depends upon which regions are the first to commit to a given
action strongly enough to pull the rest of the system into a ‘distributed
consensus’.” (Cisek and Pastor-Bernier, 2014, p. 4)
Again, this idea stands in stark contrast to the cognitivist picture, where the
perceptual system merely processes information in order to construct a perceptual
representation, which provides the evidence about the environment needed to make
decisions. Rather, here we have the beginnings of an account that explains how
the relevant options of a decision problem are being selected in parallel with the
specification of sensorimotor information:
“[...] although traditional psychological theories assume that selection
(decision making) occurs before specification (movement planning), we
consider the possibility that, at least during natural interactive behavior,
these processes operate simultaneously and in an integrated manner.”
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2010, p. 277)
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One of the specific claims made by Cisek and Pastor-Bernier is that as part of the
competitive process, the brain is simultaneously specifying and selecting among rep-
resentations of multiple action opportunities or affordances, which compete within
the sensorimotor system itself (Cisek and Pastor-Bernier, 2014). These representa-
tions serve as indications of the possible actions available in the agent’s environment,
rather than as objective, organism-independent properties of the world.
For example, Cisek and Kalaska discuss recordings taken from the dorsal pre-
motor cortex (PMd) in monkeys during a reaching task (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
In the experiment, monkeys were presented with two potential reaching actions by
way of spatial cues, where one would later be indicated (using a non-spatial cue) as
the correct choice. During a memory period, where the spatial cues were removed
and the future correct choice was uncertain, recorded activity in the PMd contin-
ued to specify both directions simultaneously, suggesting an anticipatory nature for
the neural activity. When the information specifying the correct choice was eventu-
ally presented, activity relating to the respective action was strengthened, and the
unwanted action was suppressed.
Importantly, this process occurs within the same system that is ultimately used
to prepare and execute the movement associated with the action representations.
Furthermore, Cisek and Kalaska state that the task design allowed for the monkeys
to exploit a different (cognitivist) strategy, where the target locations are stored in a
more general-purpose working memory buffer, distinct from motor representations,
and converted to a motor plan after a decision has been made. However, though
conceptually possible, the findings did not seem to support this latter view. Instead,
the study seems to point to a need for representations that encode predictive (or
anticipatory) action opportunities, rather than abstract representations that specify
the state of the world independently from an agent’s particular goals and capacities.
The ACH also makes key predictions that can be tested in future experiments.
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For example, it predicts that actions that are farther apart from one another will show
stronger mutual inhibition than those that are closer together. This is because action
representations are specified in terms of spatial parameters (ibid.), which means that
a decision between similar actions (with overlapping neural representations) can be
encoded using a weighted average. This weighted average could evolve over time,
initially tolerating some uncertainty between two future actions, whereas drastically
different options could not. A prediction made by the ACH is, therefore, that if one
records from neural cells related to a given option, while modulating the desirability
of a different option, the gain of that modulation will be strongest when the other
option is most dissimilar to the one coded by the recorded cell (Cisek and Pastor-
Bernier, 2014, p. 5). This opens up a doorway for so-called “weak” long-range
connections in the brain, which Park and Friston (2013) and others have argued may
play a fundamental role in the global integration of densely connected sub-regions
(see chapter 5).
The ACH thus differs from more traditional approaches to decision-making by
eschewing abstract representations that capture knowledge about the world inde-
pendent of an agent’s interactions with it. Instead, it is best seen as a functional
mixture of the myriad biasing inputs that contribute to the specification and selec-
tion process (to be explored in more detail in the following chapters). It thus lacks a
clear commitment to explicit perceptual, cognitive or motor representations, opting
instead for a blurring of these boundaries. The role of these action-oriented represen-
tations is not to accurately reconstruct an inner description of the world, but rather
to coordinate adaptive interaction.
3.3.2 Simultaneous Decisions
Traditional accounts of decision-making have focused on decisions pertaining to op-
tions that remain stable over time. This emphasis may have contributed to the
134
Figure 3.6: Monkeys were required to indicate which of two targets was expected to
receive the majority of tokens, and were free to indicate this at any time.
Reprinted from (Thura and Cisek, 2014, p. 1402).
postulation of stable, abstract representations in the brain. When deciding between
different courses of action in the world, however, sensory information rarely stays
fixed, action in the world can open up new possible options, and agents are free
to decide on the basis of incomplete information. One of the claims of embodied
decisions is that sensorimotor regions not only track the changing state of sensory
information in the world, but moreover facilitate efficient action selection by actively
contributing to the decision process. Moreover, the sensorimotor system remains
receptive to simultaneous action opportunities even once commitment has occurred,
in order to keep track of the unfolding consequences of action performance. To
further reinforce the claim that sensorimotor regions actively play a role in decision-
making, Thura and Cisek (2014) performed an experiment on monkeys, which aimed
to replicate this more dynamic approach to decision-making.
Their experiment required a monkey to indicate which of two possible targets was
expected to receive a majority of tokens, which moved successively from a central
region in 200ms steps. The monkey was trained to indicate their decision by moving
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a cursor to the respective target, and was free to do so at any point during the
trial. In a similar fashion to the previous experiment, neural activity in PMd and
also primary motor cortex (M1) was recorded, and approximately 280 ms before
the monkey initiates movement, activity in PMd that was tuned to the selected
target reached a consistent peak, while M1 activity tuned to the unselected target
was simultaneously suppressed. The authors argue that the activity recorded did
not support a model of integration of sensory information. Instead they claim that
PMd activity tracked the evolving sensory information, but also included a general
urgency signal which increased over time urging the monkey to act. In experiments
that indicate when the subject is able to respond, there would be no basis for such an
urgency signal. However, in ecologically-valid scenarios, opportunities may be lost
over time, and thus there will be no a priori value for the optimal time to initiate
action. Thura and Cisek (ibid.) argue that a growing urgency signal (also biased by
modulating inputs) would be preferable in these situations, and could further lead
to an optimal (context-dependent) trade-off between speed and accuracy.
In addition to a growing urgency signal, an ability to effectively decide between
simultaneously presented action opportunities requires that the agent is able to man-
age the diverse range of sensory inputs with limited neural resources. To account
for this, Cisek and Kalaska review a considerable number of studies on the pervasive
effect of attentional modulation, which support the idea that activity in the visual
system is strongly influenced by attentional modulation, even in familiar and stable
environments (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). This is usually recorded as an enhance-
ment of activity correlated with the attended regions of space, and a suppression of
activity from the unattended regions. For example, studies by Stefan Treue (2001;
2003) show the ubiquitous effects of attentional modulation in primate visual cor-
tex. This attentional modulation results in the enhancement of activity towards
behaviourally relevant stimuli, along with a corresponding suppression of those cells
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tuned to non-attended spatial features. Attending only to those features of the
world that are behaviourally salient is likely to be far removed from what is con-
sidered rational. However, echoing the sentiments of work in ecological rationality,
Treue acknowledges that it is nevertheless “an effective use of limited processing
resources.” (Treue, 2003, p. 428)
Despite the attractiveness of appealing to saliency and attention on ecological
grounds, without the inclusion of reciprocal communication between affective and
sensorimotor regions such an account would remain incomplete. This is because
adaptive choice behaviour requires an awareness of the changing demands of both
the external and internal environment, in response to the homeostatic demands of
the agent—in short what the agent cares about. Although they have pointed to the
possible mechanisms involved, at present this is one area that is left underdeveloped
by Cisek, Kalaska and Pastor-Bernier. In chapters 4 and 5, we will see how this
aspect of embodied decisions can be developed further, by exploring the unique
roles of attention and salience within predictive processing, and its emphasis on
interoceptive inference.
3.3.3 Dynamic Choice Behaviour
Continuing with the theme of a more dynamic approach to decision-making, Cisek
and Pastor-Bernier (2014) claim that the continual processing of noisy or uncertain
sensory information after commitment suggests that agents continue to deliberate
during the overt performance of a task. This means the agent constantly monitors the
overt performance of their actions through sensory feedback (e.g. proprioception).
As deliberation is supposed to occur prior to commitment, the existence of this
evidence, they argue, requires the revision of some commonly used formal models
in decision theory that are unable to account for this post-selection monitoring and
alteration.
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Figure 3.7: A schematic of three models that link decision and action systems. The mod-
ularity of the decision process, choice and action is for illustrative purposes
only. Reprinted from (Lepora and Pezzulo, 2015, p. 3).
Lepora and Pezzulo (2015) also acknowledge this requirement, and claim that ac-
tion performance should be considered a proper part of a dynamic model of decision-
making; rather than being understood as merely the output of the decision process.
As a proof of principle to support this claim, they develop a computational model,
which they call the embodied choice (EC) model. The most important point of the
EC model is the existence of bidirectional influences between action and decisions.
Lepora and Pezzulo compare the EC model against two alternative models based on
the well-known drift-diffusion model7 (Ratcliff, 1978).
7The drift-diffusion model aims to capture how a subject integrates (noisy) accumulating evi-
dence, for multiple distinct options, in a forced choice task. The model assumes that evidence is
integrated at various time steps, until some threshold is reached and a commitment is made to one
of the options.
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As is depicted in Figure 3.7 the first of these models (a) is represented by a sim-
ple serial process, where deliberation fully precedes a choice that commits the agent
to the preparation, and subsequent performance, of the chosen action—much in the
same way that the ‘classical sandwich model’ highlights (Hurley, 1998). A parallel
model (b) develops this by connecting the decision process to action preparation.
This speeds up the agent’s performance by anticipating what action will be most
likely given the incoming sensory evidence. As evidence in support of one option
increases, the agent can begin to make preparations for the respective action, before
fully committing to it. Though the latter model gains a speed increase, it does so
at the expense of accuracy. It could easily turn out that evidence that initially sup-
ports one option is overshadowed by later competing evidence, leading to inaccurate
or clumsy actions. To deal with this speed-versus-accuracy trade-off, Lepora and
Pezzulo develop the EC model (c), which, in addition to the parallel feed-forward
connection, has a feedback connection that allows action dynamics (e.g. current
trajectory and kinematics) to influence the decision-making process. Whereas the
previous models consider decisions to be independent of ongoing action (only allow-
ing for influence from prior experience), EC considers action as an integral part of
the decision-making process, with proprioceptive signals feeding into the ongoing de-
liberative process to provide information about the biomechanical costs of associated
actions.
Lepora and Pezzulo argue that the EC model accounts for this greater balancing
of speed and accuracy by incorporating two key mechanisms. Firstly, unlike the serial
model, the EC model enables what they term action preparation strategies, which
allow an agent to alleviate delays when enacting a choice. For example, rather than
waiting for a bound to be reached before commencing action, the parallel model and
the EC model allow the agent to trade-off accuracy for speed, by starting an action on
the basis of incomplete evidence. However, unlike the parallel model, the EC model
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allows for action performance to feedback into the decision process, and thus where
the action dynamics alter the value of certain prospects, they create what Lepora
and Pezzulo call commitment effects to the initially preferred choice. To highlight
this, Lepora and Pezzulo (2015, emphasis added, pp. 4-5) discuss an example of a
lion that has begun tracking a gazelle, deliberating over whether to switch and track
another:
“[...] if the lion waits until its decision is complete, it risks missing an
opportunity because one or both gazelles may run away. The lion faces
a decision problem that is not stable but dynamic. In dynamic, real-
world environments, costs and benefits cannot be completely specified in
advance but are defined by various situated factors such as the relative
distance between the lion and the gazelles, which change over time as
a function of the geometry of the environment (e.g. a gazelle jumping
over an obstacle can follow a new escape path) and the decision makers
actions (e.g. if the lion approaches one gazelle the other can escape).”
They continue:
“[...] action dynamics in all their aspects (i.e. both their covert planning
and their overt execution) have a backwards influence on the decision
process by changing the prospects (the value and costs of the action al-
ternatives). For example, when the lion starts tracking one of the gazelles,
undoing that action can be too costly and thus the overall benefit of con-
tinuing to track the same gazelle increases. This produces a commitment
effect to the initial choice that reflects both the situated nature of the
choice and the cognitive effort required for changing mind at later stages
of the decision.”
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A couple of comments are necessary. First of all, by being receptive to ongoing
action, the EC model can consider changing biomechanical costs that are salient
to the current decision. Although the serial and parallel models can incorporate
action costs as well, they must do so a priori, as there is no way for the ongoing
action to feedback into the deliberative process. Critics may argue that part of the
developmental process for any organism is learning about the body, and associated
biomechanical costs, which are not going to change that drastically, given the limited
number of states that the body can be in. Therefore, prior knowledge of biomechan-
ical costs can be incorporated through learning. This is surely correct, but is also
incomplete. As the gazelle example should highlight, biomechanial costs are also
partly dependant on the evolving state of the environment, and where other agents
are involved, are unable to be precisely evaluated in advance.
Second, commitment effects make it harder to change your mind once an action is
performed, because the later sensory information must outweigh the initial commit-
ment that arises from having started an action. Situated agents that are receptive to
subjective commitment effects may gain an important adaptive advantage, especially
if the agent is able to learn about them for future interactions (see chapter 6).
Finally, Lepora and Pezzulo restrict the discussion of commitment effects to met-
rics that are relevant to simply visually-guided decisions. For example, a change in
the trajectory of a mouse cursor, which represents the evolving choice of a subject
to one of two targets, indicates a change of mind that only occurs once sufficient
conflicting sensory evidence has accumulated. However, it is possible that commit-
ment effects may also contribute to the existence of apparently irrational behaviour
in more complex tasks (e.g. sunk-cost fallacy). We will pick up on this suggestion
in chapter 6.
As well as dovetailing nicely with the embodied decisions account, Lepora and
Pezzulo found their EC model to perform better in terms of speed and accuracy than
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the alternative models. Initially, the models were evaluated in two simulation studies
representing a two-alternative forced choice task (see ibid., for details), which on its
own stands as an interesting proof-of-principle. However, they also compared their
models with empirical evidence from human studies, and found that the EC model
was a good fit with human behaviour.
Taken together, the aforementioned properties of embodied decisions stand in
contrast to the cognitivist assumptions of traditional decision theory. To reiterate,
the cognitivist perspective of decision-making is strictly separated from evidence
accumulation in perceptual systems, and the control of action in motor systems.
However, embodied decisions view deliberation as a continuous competitive pro-
cess within sensorimotor circuits, modulated by relevant biases from cortical and
sub-cortical regions. It is hard to maintain the traditional functional separation of
perception, cognition and action if we are to appreciate this process fully.
A number of issues remain. Firstly, although there is mention of ‘continuously
biasing influences’ in the embodied decisions research, there is little explicit mention
of the role of affective signals in the aforementioned work. This is of vital importance;
an agent should have some way of determining which action opportunities it cares
about most.
Secondly, the work in embodied decisions (Klaes et al., 2011; Pastor-Bernier and
Cisek, 2011, see also) suggests that at least part of a prototypical cognitive process
(decision-making) is inextricably intertwined with sensorimotor control, suggesting
a blurring of the boundaries between perception, action and cognition. This view
stands in contrast to decision-theoretic accounts that model humans as making de-
cisions between different options by integrating the relevant factors into a single
variable, such as subjective utility (Levy and Glimcher, 2012). For example, we saw
in section 3.2 how some have argued that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) could integrate the relevant information and
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encode such an abstract value (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). This conflict may appear
to suggest that we should adopt one view or the other. However, as Cisek himself
notes, “we are capable of making decisions that have nothing to do with actions, and
in such situations the decision must be abstract.” (Cisek, 2012, p. 927) Therefore,
instead of a straightforward conflict, it may be that the contrast between embod-
ied decisions and neuroeconomics suggests a need for a two-systems approach, with
different domains for the two approaches, rather than a strict incompatibility.
Before addressing these issues directly, we will explore how predictive processing
shares many of the same motivations as embodied decisions. By doing so, we hope





In this chapter we turn to explore how the research from the last chapter on embodied
decisions connects with the PP framework. We will explore how an embodied account
of PP blurs the boundaries between perception, cognition, action and emotion, and
why this is relevant to understanding how PP connects up with embodied decision-
making. We start by looking at how perception and action are intertwined.
4.1 Active Inference
An embodied account of PP eschews the idea that perception is a passive accumu-
lation of sensory evidence with the purpose of reconstructing some detailed inner
model of the world (Burr and Jones, 2016; Clark, 2016a). Instead, according to
embodied PP, perception has the function of guiding actions that keep the organism
within homeostatic bounds and maintain a stable grip upon its environment (Friston
et al., 2010). We will unpack this claim more fully across this section and section
4.2.
Clark (2015) sees this version of the PP framework as a contemporary expres-
sion of many of the key motivations highlighted by the theory of interactive vision
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(Ballard, 1991; Churchland, Ramachandran, and Sejnowski, 1994). This theory, as
expressed by Churchland, Ramachandran, and Sejnowski (1994), took issue with an
idea they dubbed the ‘pure vision’ strategy. According to this idea, vision passively
reconstructs a rich inner representation (percept) from two-dimensional sensory data,
which can subsequently be used to perform many different tasks. This reconstruc-
tive process also occurs largely independently of other sensory modalities, previous
learning, goals, motor planning, and motor execution, and is reminiscent of the
classical-sandwich model mentioned earlier.
In contrast to this model is the ‘interactive vision’ picture, which has come to
be known simply as ‘active vision’. One of the motivations behind the active vision
theory is that a perfect internal recreation of the organism’s world is not just un-
necessary, but also computationally intractable and maladaptive (also see chapter 3,
section 3.1.1). They base this argument on several claims, which include the idea that
vision has its evolutionary rationale in motor control, and as such vision only needs
to partially represent the most salient information, where salience is determined by
an organism’s interests, goals and additional factors relating to the properties of a
stimulus. To defend this position, they argue that vision is inherently exploratory
and predictive, aided by learning from previous behaviour, and further governed by
simple facts regarding our embodiment (e.g. size and placement of our visual appa-
ratus, including the relations to effectors). This idea points to a neurophysiological
picture far removed from that assumed by cognitivism. The idea that the connection
between the motor system and the perceptual system is made only once the visual
scene has been fully reconstructed and interpreted by distinct cognitive processes is
simply false according to active vision.
More recent neurophysiological evidence corroborates this account. Cisek and
Kalaska (2010) comment on experiments that show how neural responses in simple
visual tasks are observed rapidly throughout the dorsal visual system, and engage
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motor areas such as the frontal eye fields in approximately 50ms. They state that
this is significantly earlier than other visual areas such as V2 and V4. What could
explain this shortcut to motor-related areas? One thought, which is sympathetic to
the active vision theory, is that these neural responses are not to be thought of as
simply visual, but action-oriented. That is, they specify visual information that has
the purpose of specifying potential action opportunities. Many of these motivations
are also present in embodied accounts of PP (e.g. emphasis on prior beliefs, and
vision as a predictive process). Clark emphasises the following role for PEM:
“[...] it is the guidance of world-engaging action, not the production of
‘accurate’ internal representations, that is the real purpose of the predic-
tion error minimizing routine itself.” (Clark, 2016b, p. 168)
This shift in emphasis requires a reinterpretation of the related notions of per-
ceptual inference and active inference. Recall, these terms refer to the two ways that
prediction-error can be minimised. Either the system can update the parameters
of the inner model, in order to generate new predictions about what is causing the
incoming sensory data (perceptual inference), or it can keep the generative model
fixed, and resample the world such that the incoming sensory data accords with the
predictions (active inference).
However, although both play an important role in PP, for Clark (ibid., p. 124),
the primary role of perceptual inference is to “prescribe action”, and as such, he
states, that our percepts, “are not action-neutral ‘hypotheses’ about the world so
much as ongoing attempts to parse the world in ways apt for the engagement of that
world.” This is a thoroughly action-oriented account, and acknowledges the earlier
motivation of the active vision theory, which deemed a perfect internal recreation of
the organism’s world computationally intractable and maladaptive. Importantly, it
is also this shift in emphasis that exposes a unity between Clark’s account of PP and
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the insights of the ACH (ibid., p. 181). Recall, one of the claims made by the ACH
was that neural representations were of action opportunities, rather than organism-
independent, objective properties of the world. In addition, Clark views ‘active
inference’ as a more-encompassing label for the combined mechanisms whereby the
perceptual and motor systems cooperate in a dynamic and reciprocal manner to
reduce prediction-error by exploiting the two strategies highlighted above. Active
inference is accomplished using a combination of perceptual and motor systems rather
than being confined to the latter that are traditionally associated with action.
There are two other consequences of this shift in emphasis. Firstly, this view
diverges from the one introduced in chapter 2 in which perception equates to per-
ceptual inference, and action to active inference. We have argued elsewhere that on
this basis it is misleading to simply equate perceptual inference with perception and
active inference with action (Burr and Jones, 2016). Although they are importantly
linked by their shared role in prediction-error minimisation, there is nevertheless a
distinction to be made at both the personal and sub-personal levels. Instead, we
take perception to be an active exploration of the environment, involving a continu-
ous (and simultaneous) unfolding of both perceptual inference and active inference.
Similarly, action involves both altering the environment by changing one’s bodily
state, and monitoring the ongoing changes. In this manner, perception and action,
understood at the personal level, involve a combination of both perceptual and active
inference at the level of underlying cognitive processing. This is not to reject the
important distinction outlined earlier between perceptual inference and active infer-
ence. After all it is presumably possible to construct an artificial system that engages
in purely passive perceptual inference. However, an important lesson from the theory
of active vision (and certain theories of embodied cognition) is that, for organisms
like ourselves, perception is never merely a process of passive perceptual inference—
perception always involves an active exploration of the environment. This is not
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because passive perception is impossible but because active perception allows us to
access more information by exploiting the reliable and predictable bodily relations
between motion and sensory input (i.e. sensorimotor contingencies). By intervening
on causal relations, an agent can learn, and indeed shape, the causal structure of
its environment, all the while testing the accuracy of its inner models. This point
connects directly with the second consequence.
The lessons of the active vision theory (Churchland, Ramachandran, and Se-
jnowski, 1994), research in sensorimotor theory (e.g. Noe, 2004), and now also PP,
is that perception and action are not separable in any meaningful sense at the level
of cognitive or neural mechanisms. By providing a common underlying imperative
to minimise prediction-error, PP goes further by arguing that at the level of cogni-
tive processes, perception and action rely on the same principles of perceptual and
active inference. As such any strict boundary between the processes is undermined.
Similar views have led some to argue for an anti-representational view of perception
(Chemero, 2011; Orlandi, 2014), because of the direct coupling of sensorimotor cir-
cuits. Some may worry that this causes a potential problem for PP accounts, which
explicitly rely on representational generative models. This topic deserves special
treatment in its own right, and although a lot of the material covered in this thesis
is of relevance, this topic is not the primary aim of the thesis.1 It will suffice to
state that it is possible to maintain the action-oriented nature of perception without
taking the radical step of eliminating representations altogether. Instead, as has
been argued previously, one can maintain that perception represents the world in
an action-oriented manner (Clark, 1997a; Mandik, 2005). As such, the seemingly
representational nature of PEM is no reason to discount the potential significance of
action-oriented perception.
1We have covered the topic in more detail in (Burr and Jones, 2016).
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Finally, as well as following in the tradition of active vision, this view is also
supported by recent neuroanatomical evidence that suggests a close relationship in
the functional anatomy of the perceptual and motor systems (Adams, Shipp, and
Friston, 2013; Shipp, Adams, and Friston, 2013). As we saw in chapter 2, research
by Adams, Shipp, and Friston (cf. 2013), Friston, Mattout, and Kilner (2011), and
Shipp, Adams, and Friston (2013) collectively supports one of the core claims of
PP, which states that action is accounted for by a downwards cascade of predictive
signals through the motor cortex to elicit motor activity, in much the same way
as predictions descend through perceptual hierarchies. By demonstrating a deep
continuity in the functional profiles of sensory and motor systems, this work also
supports a dissolution of the boundary between perception and action as realised at
the level of cognitive and neural mechanisms.
A deeper point can be teased out of this work. Any of the lower-level predic-
tions will be constrained (and importantly contextualised) by higher-level models
that function as multimodal predictions of the sensory evidence arising from both
exteroceptive and proprioceptive causes. Although we can describe a particular
anatomical region as visual or motor cortex, understanding the region’s functional
profile requires an appreciation of the current larger-scale dynamics of the brain as a
whole, and specifically the networks that a particular region is effectively connected
to (more on this in chapter 5). In the case of PP this means an appreciation of how
the higher-level predictions contextualise the dynamics of the lower-level regions,
but also an appreciation of how the lower level dynamics in turn bias and select
the higher-level predictions. Understanding this reciprocal relation between incom-




In PP, choices are made between competing higher-level predictions about expected
sensory states. The formal basis for this perspective is based on the free-energy prin-
ciple (Friston, 2010).2 Friston et al. (2014) extend this account to decision-making
in terms of active inference. Friston describes choices as ‘beliefs about alternative
policies’. A policy is defined as a control sequence, which is a trajectory of sensory ex-
pectations associated with a sequence of descending proprioceptive predictions that
determines which action is selected next.3 For example, there will be a sequence of
sensory expectations associated with the movement made to open a cupboard and
grasp a mug. This sequence can also be decomposed hierarchically, with different
sequences expected at the corresponding spatiotemporal scale (also see chapter 6).
Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston (2015) have provided a formal argument for how these
policies can be acquired (and optimised) through experientially-based reinforcement
learning. Policies are selected under the prior belief that they minimise the predic-
tion error between attainable and desired outcomes, and on the basis of a belief in
their expected precision. This line of thought bears a close resemblance to work in
optimal control theory, which explores how optimal movement brings about valuable
states for an organism.
Within this literature, Daniel Wolpert (2012) has demonstrated the close ties
2The relationship between PEM and the free-energy principle is introduced and explored in
Chapter 2 of (Hohwy, 2013). For present purposes, it is not necessary to explore the connection
in any formal detail. It will suffice to follow the claims of Hohwy that under some simplifying
assumptions free-energy minimisation can be recast as PEM, and as such the free-energy principle
is a more general and more encompassing framework.
3In the case of dynamical systems a trajectory is defined as a path through successive positions
in state space (i.e. the space defined by the set of all possible states for the system) (Chemero,
2011).
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between optimal control and decision-making, and argues that choice behaviour may
be viewed as a problem of maximising the utility of performing some behaviour, where
the consequence of this behaviour is associated with an option. This requires the
agent to model, among other things, a cost function associated with the behavioural
sequence, in order to accommodate the potential cost of performing some behaviour
(e.g. expended energy, task uncertainty). This cost function is then minimised in
order to select the optimal control sequence. Optimal control theory assumes that
movement is caused by the minimisation of this cost function (Ko¨rding and Wolpert,
2006). One key difference between the views expressed by Wolpert and PP, however,
is the latter’s rejection of the separate representation of cost functions.
In PP, cost functions are absorbed into the generative model, becoming inter-
twined with the expectations of some policy (control sequence). As these expecta-
tions will have been shaped by learning, it is argued that there is already a prior
belief about a policy’s value or cost implicit in the existence of a generative model—a
value based on previous error-based learning and captured by the extent to which it
successfully minimises prediction error through action (Friston et al., 2014). Some
may worry that this view eliminates too much, and that the need for encoding some
measure of the value associated with an outcome is necessary to explain why certain
behaviours are preferred over others. Moreover, it seems necessary for agents to rep-
resent value independently of beliefs. For example I can believe that it is more busy
on the roads during rush hour, but unless I value my safety whilst cycling I may not
deem it sensible to wear a helmet. How can we respond to such a worry?
It is important to reiterate that an implicit notion of the cost (or value) of some
policy is not absent, but merely subsumed within the generative models, and thus as-
sociated with the sensory consequences of some policy and its expected precision. In
other words, there is no additional cost function encoded over and above the already
existing prior beliefs that are necessary for controlling action. One of the motivations
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for absorbing the cost functions into the generative model is an acknowledgement
that in ecologically-valid scenarios agents must also optimise the behavioural rou-
tines that are associated with the desired option, and not just the outcome itself (e.g.
smooth trajectories of motion rather than jerky motion). For example, even if A is
strictly preferred to B, the sequence of behaviours that bring about A may require
a large amount of energy to perform, and this trajectory or sequence of behaviours
may itself be what determines the real cost to the agent. An integral part of the
learning process for any agent is learning how to most efficiently bring about some
desired state, dependent on states of the environment and their internal states.
As these policies are decomposable into sub-routines (e.g. getting dressed re-
quires a number of steps, and each of these steps can be done clumsily or carefully),
representing the behaviour with a single cost function overlooks the separable control
sequences that are likely governed by distinct neural control mechanisms (more on
this in chapter 6). To act in an optimal manner, especially in the pursuit of long-
term distal goals, requires the careful co-ordination of numerous motor trajectories,
and as Friston (2011c, p. 488) notes, “we know from the physics of flow that motion
cannot be specified by a single value function.”
This is not to deny the possibility of representing the coarse-grained behaviour
of the whole agent at some higher-level as implicitly minimising a cost function.
However, it seems that in terms of understanding the complex dynamics of choice
behaviour and sensorimotor control, such representations are likely to be only instru-
mentally valuable for an observer, and quite likely to mislead entirely. By positing
a separate cost function, which is represented independently of the policies being
considered, the value of a goal-state becomes separated from the actions required to
bring it about. This means positing additional mechanisms, which can a) encode
a representation of an abstract cost function that is associated with some exter-
nal goal-state, and b) integrate the cost function with the policy in real-time when
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deliberating over some choice. Although there is nothing implausible about this
requirement a priori, it stands in contrast to the findings outlined in the previous
chapter.
For example, Lepora and Pezzulo (2015) argued in favour of viewing the ongo-
ing perception of bodily dynamics (e.g. through proprioception), during the overt
performance of some choice behaviour, as an integral part of the decision process.
This has the added benefit of allowing the agent to adjust the implicit value of the
available policies on the fly to meet the changing demands of the environment. Un-
til certain actions are performed, it is not possible to consider the myriad ways in
which the environment will present or restrict action opportunities that an agent
may have anticipated. An agent who is unable to accommodate these changes in a
fluid manner will likely be at a disadvantage in an uncertain and constantly changing
environment. Therefore, as Clark acknowledges:
“By re-conceiving cost functions as implicit in bodies of expectations
concerning trajectories of motion, PP-style solutions sidestep the need
to solve difficult (often intractable) optimality equations during online
processing and—courtesy of the complex generative model—fluidly ac-
commodate signalling delays, sensory noise, and the many-one mapping
between goals and motor programs. Alternatives requiring the distinct
and explicit computation of costs and values thus arguably make unre-
alistic demands on online processing, fail to exploit the helpful charac-
teristics of the physical system, and lack biologically plausible means of
implementation.” (Clark, 2015, references suppressed, p.11)
This connects with a second point, regarding the earlier assumption made by con-
trol theory, that movement is caused by some value representation. Friston (2011c,
p. 488) rightfully states that “value is an attribute of states that are caused by
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movement: it is a consequence, not a cause.” However, it is often assumed that an
agent must have a representation of this value separate from its beliefs, in order to
ground the basic capacity for desire. When combined with a relevant belief, desire
provides the jointly sufficient conditions for motivating action according to Hume’s
belief-desire thesis. Unfortunately it is not easy to determine what Friston’s stance
is on this thesis. Take the following quote:
“I can believe I am being drenched by rain and yet place a high cost
on this state of affairs. However, if I believe that I will seek shelter
when it rains, then I will behave optimally, provided I act to fulfil these
beliefs. Note that these prior beliefs are not about states of the world
but transitions among states (i.e., a policy).” (Friston, Samothrakis, and
Montague, 2012, p.524, emphasis added)
Initially it appears as though Friston is rejecting the requirement that desires
play any sort of motivational role. Not only does he eschew explicit cost functions,
in favour of prior beliefs about policies, but he seems to argue that the desire to avoid
getting wet from rain can be accounted for by a string of beliefs regarding transitions
among inner control states, which are connected to each other in a manner that will
bring about optimal behaviour. However, note the inclusion of the proviso in the
quote that optimality requires the agent to “act to fulfil these beliefs”. This seems
obvious to the point of triviality, but its inclusion may be problematic for Friston
as it seems to leave unspecified what the motivation is for the agent to act in the
first place. Philosophers will be keen to highlight this problem by reiterating Hume’s
belief-desire law—this motivation could only come about from the jointly sufficient
conditions of both the possession of a belief and the desire to bring about the state
represented by the belief. One possible way of understanding Friston’s point on
this, comes from separate work where he spells out the reasons why the free-energy
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principle implies embodied cognition. Here, it is worth quoting a passage at length:
“The free-energy formulation starts with the premise that biological agents
must actively resist a natural tendency to disorder. It appeals to the idea
that agents are essentially inference machines that model their senso-
rium to make predictions, which action then fulfils [...] The free-energy
formulation generalises the concept of agents as inference machines and
considers each agent as a statistical model of its environmental niche
(econiche). In brief, the free-energy principle takes the existence of agents
as its starting point and concludes that each phenotype or agent embod-
ies an optimal model of its econiche. [...] the statistical model entailed
by each agent includes a model of itself as part of that environment. This
model rests upon prior expectations about how environmental states un-
fold over time. Crucially, for an agent to exist, its model must include
the prior expectation that its form and internal (embodied) states are
contained within some invariant set. [...] Therefore, if the agent (model)
exists, it must a priori expect to occupy an invariant set of bounded states
(cf., homeostasis). Heuristically, if I am a model of my environment and
my environment includes me, then I model myself as existing. But I will
only exist iff (sic) I am a veridical model of my environment [...] This
tautology is at the heart of the free-energy principle and celebrates the
circular causality that underpins much of embodied cognition.” (Friston,
2011a, pp. 89-90)
Though we have seen some of these assumptions (derived from systems ap-
proaches in biology) earlier in Chapter 2 (also see Figure 2.7), this quotation needs
unpacking.
We can draw out a couple of notable points of discussion, which I will label as
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follows:
The Autopoiesis Assumption: biological systems are self-producing (autopoietic)
systems that occupy a limited range of states.
The Econiche Assumption: autopoietic systems must embody a model of their
environment, which must also necessarily be a model of the physical states of
the agent (i.e. its body).
The Circular Causality Assumption: any agent that meets these criteria must
necessarily exist in order to be able to model itself as existing, which in turn
contributes to its ongoing existence.
The first of these points will be familiar from work in the enactivist approach
to embodied cognition. This approach seeks to understand the continuity between
life and mind by exploring how the latter is brought about (i.e. enacted) through
the interactive processes of life as an autonomous, self-organising process. Stemming
from its development in biology (Maturana and Varela, 1980), and later discussed
in philosophy of mind (Thompson, 2007), the theory of autopoiesis is concerned
with the dynamic, self-producing processes that sustain life. The neurobiologists
Maturana and Varela coined the term autopoiesis to stand in as a label for the
processes of circular-organisation (see chapter 1), which they believed constitute the
basis of life. Autopoiesis, they argued, was necessary to account for the apparent
unity that is perceived in living systems in their expression of autonomy, in spite of
the continuous perturbations from the external environment that threaten disorder.
The key example of an autopoietic system pointed to by Maturana and Varela is a
biological cell.
They present a cell as a set of chemical interactions, bounded by a semi-permeable
cell membrane. The membrane maintains a favourable inner environment of chemical
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concentrations (i.e. a limited set of states) by constantly and selectively allowing
transportation of chemicals from the extra-cellular environment into the cell, and
disposing waste products from the inner processes of the cells interactions. However,
the cell membrane is also maintained by the processes that it serves to bound. In
this sense, the membrane and the reactions can be treated as an operationally closed
set. Although this provides a boundary between the cell and the membrane, the two
are closely coupled by virtue of the ongoing processes. By passing waste products to
the extra-cellular environment, the cell is acting on its environment, which in turn
impacts the cell by altering its chemical concentrations. The cell is an autopoietic
system that is coupled with its environment. With this example in mind, Maturana
and Varela (1980) outline a number of salient properties of autopoietic systems:
Autonomy: an autopoietic system is organised as a network of processes, which
themselves produce the components that interact to sustain and realise the
network of processes that realised them in the first place (e.g. the cell mem-
brane). Thus, an autopoietic system is a homeostatic system which has its
own autonomous organisation as the fundamental variable which it aims to
keep constant (or within a narrow range of parameters).
Unity: by aiming to keep their organisation as invariant as possible, autopoietic
systems maintain an identity (or unity) through the specification of their own
boundaries in the processes of self-production (e.g. the cell as separate from
the extra-cellular environment).
Perturbation: an autopoietic system is not characterised functionally by way of
inputs or outputs, but can nevertheless be perturbed by independent external
events. These perturbations must be compensated for by internal structural
changes (e.g. flushing waste products), in order to maintain homeostasis.
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Together these properties help us understand the motivation for the three as-
sumptions. By treating biological agents as inference machines, autopoietic systems
can be formally cast as (actively) modelling their environment in anticipation of
external perturbations that threaten the autonomous, self-regulating processes that
define them. By successfully resisting the tendency to disorder, any self-maintaining
system can be treated as actively inferring its environment in order to adaptively
respond to external perturbations. Doing this requires an organism to make struc-
tural alterations to its inner environment in order to maintain homeostasis, and thus
brings the states of an organism’s body within the remit of the environmental model.
The formal basis for this assumption comes from work in cybernetics, and more
specifically the good regulator theorem of Conant and Ashby (1970). This proved
that under broad assumptions any successfully self-regulating system embodies a
model of its environment.4 In so far as the free-energy principle treats the brain
as a self-regulating (self-organising) system (Friston, 2010, cf.), it follows that the
brain must also embody a model of its environment, which is taken to include the
physical states of the organism that it controls. This is because adaptive responses for
organisms such as ourselves require structural changes that involve motor control (e.g.
reaching to grasp food for energy intake; running to avoid predators). This active,
dynamic element to adaptive behaviour means that an organism’s expectations must
equally be dynamic (hence the focus on policies rather than stable goal states),
requiring the agent to model itself as in a constant source of fluctuation. Finally, if
an agent finds itself in this situation, then it must necessarily have resisted previous
external perturbations and successfully maintained homeostasis long enough to be in
a situation where it embodies a model of its environment. As Friston (2011a, p. 90)
4Importantly, this does not mean that the system trades in inner representations as commonly
understood in philosophy of mind, but is a far weaker notion of modelling. See (Burr and Jones,
2016) for discussion.
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states “I will only exist iff (sic) I am a veridical model of my environment.”
Friston’s conception raises a whole host of tricky epistemic questions. We have
already seen one of these issues in chapter 2, when we explored the motivation behind
the selection of a specific partition of states. We stated above that insofar as the
free-energy principle treats the brain as a self-organising system, it follows that the
brain must also embody a model of its environment. This is true, but overlooks the
fact that the same can be said for the entire organism as well. We must therefore
appeal to additional factors (as we shall do over the course of this thesis) if we wish
to argue that either the brain or the body is the model that we should be interested
in.
A further worry is that the embodied model Friston posits requires an observer’s
perspective for its content, which raises the problem of how the agent itself has epis-
temic access to the representational content of the aforementioned models. Many
enactivists would argue that this motivates the need for an anti-representational
interpretation (e.g Chemero, 2011; Hutto and Myin, 2013) devoid of any content-
ful interpretations entirely; a position which resists the desire to ascribe contentful
states to the agent (e.g. propositional attitudes). This requires careful philosophical
analysis to evaluate, but as previously stated, we will not discuss this possibility in
any further depth.
Finally, it seems as though this account assumes a proximal explanation, and
omits the sort of ultimate explanations pursued by evolutionary biologists. It is com-
mon to keep what are sometimes referred to as ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions separate
in the cognitive science, with the former often appealing to mechanistic explana-
tions to provide answers for how some phenomenon is produced, whereas the latter
attempt to elucidate the adaptive significance of cognition and behaviour. It may
be that by eschewing the use of cost functions in PP, defenders are restricting their
claims only to ‘how’ questions, and make no claims regarding ‘why’ questions. This
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seems unsatisfactory, given that if we are to take the replacement of cost functions
with expectations over policies seriously, then we appear to be forced to accept that
natural selection must have operated on these policies’ underlying mechanisms and
selected them because of some evolutionary advantage—thus committing ourselves
to an answer to the ‘why’ question regardless.
Regretfully we have no firm answers to these problems in Friston’s account,
though we will point towards a tentative proposal in Chapter 6. For the time being, it
appears that PP is committed to the claim that cost functions are implicit in bodies
of expectations concerning policies, rather than explicit, detachable representations.
Whether this represents an improvement depends on your perspective:
“In one sense, active inference replaces a hard optimal control problem
with a hard inference problem. Having said this, the nice thing about
active inference is that these problems can be solved in a simple and
neurobiologically plausible fashion: by effectively equipping predictive
coding schemes with classical reflex arcs. Perhaps the most definitive
argument in favor of active inference, as a normative model of motor
control, is that prior beliefs about behavior emerge naturally as top-
down or empirical priors during hierarchical perceptual inference. This
contrasts with optimal control, which, at the end of the day, still has
to explain how cost functions themselves are optimized. In short, active
inference eliminates the homunculus implicit in cost functions.” (Friston,
2011c, p. 492)
If the promise of a more integrated and unified framework does not appeal to
the reader, Clark (2015) also notes that many working roboticists have turned away
from the explicit encoding of value/cost functions for pragmatic reasons, arguing
that they are too inflexible and biologically unrealistic due to their computational
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demands. Instead, they favour approaches that likewise exploit the complex dynam-
ics of embodied agents (e.g. the approach of Lepora and Pezzulo (2015)), which
are computationally less demanding. These approaches acknowledge that the phys-
iological constraints of an agent provide implicit means of understanding the value
associated with dynamic action performance, without the need for additional ab-
stract neural representations (see section 6.3.1).
In addition, as we saw in the previous chapter, there are a number of debates
in decision theory about whether the brain does in fact calculate value, with some
arguing in favour of some abstract form of a neural ‘common currency’ (Levy and
Glimcher, 2012). As Vlaev et al. (2011) argues, these views are beset with difficul-
ties both from behavioural studies that explore contradictory, empirically-observed
context effects (e.g. preference reversals, prospect relativity and various memory
effects), as well as competing neurophysiological studies, which favour alternative
approaches (see section 4.3.1). By eliminating the explicit encoding of value from its
models, PP avoids these worries.
In these first two areas, the development of the active inference framework has
much to offer, and we can begin to see the extent of the unifying scope of PP. How-
ever, we also seem to encounter the same problem faced by the embodied decisions
research: how exactly does an agent select between the large number of simultaneous
action opportunities available to it, especially if it has no direct access to an explicit
representation of value? To answer this question, and provide the final response to
the above challenge, requires bringing the body more closely within the remit of PP.
4.3 Embodied Emotions
“[...] in order to have anything like a complete theory of human rational-
ity, we have to understand what role emotion plays in it.” (Simon, 1983,
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p. 29)
Within the ecological psychology tradition, the environment is considered as pro-
viding the agent with a number of possible action opportunities (or affordances),
rather than merely as a series of causes that push the agent around in myriad ways.
But how does an agent determine which of the myriad action opportunities are
salient, or to adopt the terminology of Withagen et al. (2012), how do affordances
become invitations? Recasting this question in terms of how an agent decides be-
tween the simultaneous action opportunities present in its environment, allows us to
demonstrate how PP is able to extend the notion of policies discussed in the previ-
ous section to accommodate a number of additional areas of research. In this section
we will explore how PP connects with research in the decision-making literature
by exploring the key role of emotion. We then turn to see how an understanding of
neuromodulation (chapter 5) can further bolster this picture and strengthen the con-
nection between PP and embodied decisions. However, even after discussing these
topics, the picture will remain incomplete, and will require us to look further into
the physiological constraints of the agent’s body, as well as additional constraints
that come from an agent’s environmental niche (chapter 6).
The above quote by Herbert Simon highlights the limitations of any revisions to
decision-theoretic models that fail to include some important role for emotions. In a
recent review of the psychological research on emotions and decision-making, Lerner
et al. (2015, pp. 800-801) begin with the previous quote from Herbert Simon, and
subsequently claim that “many psychological scientists now assume that emotions
are, for better or worse, the dominant driver of most meaningful decisions in life”. If
their statement is true, then it appears as if Simon’s advice was heeded. However, in
spite of the clear review that they offer, the statement by Lerner et al. is ambiguous,
and perhaps even a little misleading. First of all, although emotions undoubtedly
play a role in influencing decision-making, as we will see shortly, it is far from a trivial
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claim to suggest that they are the “dominant driver of most meaningful decisions in
life”, rather than being a necessary contributor in a collection of additional biasing
factors. As we will see shortly, this is because it is not always easy to separate
emotion from cognition or perception, and, secondly, it is not always clear what
constitutes an emotional episode in the first place.
Although the full details are beyond the scope of this thesis, a few points should
be made regarding the nature of emotions as considered within the psychological
and philosophical literature. Let’s begin by offering a tentative definition of some
key terms: ‘core affect’ and ‘emotions’. Here, I shall follow James Russell and Lisa
Feldman Barrett (Russell and Barrett, 1999, 2009) in differentiating the terms as
follows:
Core Affect: a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible as a simple
primitive non-reflective feeling most evident in mood and emotion. Core affect
is experienced constantly as a single feeling, but the nature and intensity varies
over time according to two scales. These scales are known as degree of valence
(e.g. pleasure versus displeasure) and degree of arousal (e.g. feeling energetic
versus enervated). It can be caused by external factors or internal factors, some
of which may be beyond the ability for an agent to perceive. For example, in
cases of object-free disorders such as depression, core affect can be free float-
ing. Alternatively, core affect can be a component of object-directed emotions
and moods. For example, feeling good about oneself is decomposable into the
affective feeling of ‘good’, and the intentional (or cognitive) component that
directs the affective state at oneself. An agent is always in a state of core-affect,
but does not need to be conscious of it (the state must be accessible though).
Furthermore, the state can extend for long periods of times (as in moods), or
shorter periods (as in emotional episodes).
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Emotion: a “prototypical emotional episode” or occurrence of an emotion is a com-
plex structure often associated with an intentional object that can be real or
imagined (e.g. anger towards a person, or fear of the bogeyman). The com-
ponents of this structure include: (a) core affect, (b) an appropriate overt
behaviour (e.g. smiling when happy, frowning when angry), (c) directed at-
tention towards the eliciting stimulus (e.g. shifting gaze or mental attention)
with corresponding cognitive appraisal of the stimulus, and attribution of the
emergence of the episode to the emotion itself, (d) a consciously accesible ex-
perience of the emotion as involving oneself, and (e) the relevant physiological
changes consistent with the emotion. Due to the intentionality of an emotion,
the cognitive appraisal is often considered a key element of an emotion, and
as such allows for constructivists to argue for the influence of sociocultural
practices on emotions.
Two points are worth highlighting in these definitions. First, there is the multi-
dimensional nature of emotional episodes, including components such as: changes in
neurophysiological states, cognitive appraisal, behavioural response, intentionality
and consciously accessible experience or feeling (i.e core affect). Second, there is the
emphasis on core affect as a separable aspect of an emotional episode, dissociable
from the cognitive appraisal. With regards to the first point, it is important to note
that each of these components may be accepted or dismissed by a particular theory of
emotions, and some theories may include multiple factors. Theories that emphasise
several (so called hybrid theories) are commonplace, though within this collection of
theories, some may choose to emphasise one component as the defining feature of an
emotional episode.
In the case of the well-known ‘somatic feeling theory’ of James (1890) and Lange
(1885), what characterised an emotional state was the experience of various felt
changes in the body. As such, their theory emphasised both the feeling (or experien-
165
tial aspect) as well as changes in neurophysiology. To motivate this idea, James asks
his readers to consider an emotional state, and then to subtract away the phenomenal
qualities that are associated with feelings of bodily changes. In his own words:
“If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our con-
sciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we
find we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emo-
tion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual
perception is all that remains.” (James, 1884, p.193, quoted in Prinz,
2004)
James argues that although this runs counter to the common-sense notion that
emotions cause bodily changes, we should nevertheless think of emotions as being
caused by the perceptual experience of bodily (or somatic) changes (i.e. you’re happy
because you smile, you don’t smile because you’re happy). Here ‘somatic’ is used to
refer to any part of the body, including the respiratory system, circulatory system,
digestive system and musculoskeletal system.5
One limitation of this theory is that by claiming all emotions are associated with
perceptual experiences of bodily feelings, we are led to the prediction that patients
with spinal cord injuries should therefore experience a subdued range of emotions,
being unable to perceive many physiological changes. However, early results investi-
gating this claim came to drastically different conclusions regarding the intensity of
felt emotions in spinal cord injured patients (Chwalisz, Diener, and Gallagher, 1988;
Hohmann, 1966). How should we construe the veracity of the somatic feeling theory
in light of these challenges?
5The extent of bodily changes that are included within the set of registrable effects on emotions
is not always agreed upon. James and Lange differed on what they included, and a recent extension
of their work by (Damasio, 1994) extends the set further. See (Prinz, 2004) for a review.
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A particularly notable response can be found in a more recent extension of the
theory by Antonio Damasio (1994). Important to note, Damasio claims, is that
although nearly every part of the body can send signals to the brain via the peripheral
nervous system, which enter the brain at the level of the spinal cord or brain stem,
this is not the only mode of influence that the body has over the brain. Additionally,
chemical substances arising from bodily activity (notably the endocrine system) are
also able to affect the brain via the circulatory system. Moreover, both of these
channels provide a medium for the endogenous dynamics of the brain to reciprocally
interact with the body. This raises two points. First, spinal cord injuries may
diminish emotional episodes, but would not eradicate them altogether due to the
possibility of continued influence from the endocrine system. Secondly, the somatic
theory of feeling should not be taken as ruling out the impact of endogenous brain
dynamics on the generation and co-ordination of emotional episodes.
For Damasio, and unlike James and Lange, this means that emotional responses
can occur in the absence of bodily changes if brain centres ordinarily associated with
a corresponding brain centre are active. In short, the brain runs what Damasio terms
“as-if” loops, whereby the brain triggers somatic markers, which are neural repre-
sentations of the bodily changes. These somatic markers can be used in the online
processing of affective information, but can also be used offline (e.g. recalling some
previous event). Importantly, these somatic markers are not only able to influence
other neural processes, but Damasio argues are integral to our very ability to decide
effectively.6
What has subsequently been termed the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) has
6Colombetti (2008, p. 52) points out that Damasio was not the first to make this claim. Pre-
cursors can be found in James’ somatic theory, and also in the work of de Sousa who argued that
emotions assist ‘pure reason’ by retrieving relevant information—this is one way that Nature could
help an agent to deal with the frame problem.
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been incredibly influential in understanding the role of emotions in decision-making.
The SMH proposes that these somatic markers, act as biasing signals in key emo-
tional processes in the brain, with particular emphasis on areas of prefrontal cortex
(Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, 2000). Due to the affective nature of these mark-
ers (e.g. their valence and arousal), they act as signals for whether certain options
are valuable for the agent, or whether some action is salient. Most of the empir-
ical support for the SMH is based on performance in what is known as the Iowa
Gambling Task, which was constructed to measure the performance of a subject’s
decision-making abilities. However, as with previous work, the conclusions drawn
from these studies have not gone unchallenged. Some have argued that the very con-
ceptual foundations of the SMH and Iowa Gambling Task have been poorly specified
(Colombetti, 2008), and it is also unclear how the somatic feeling theory connects
agents to meaningful interactions with the objects in the world that cause feelings
in the first place.
Building on earlier work by Magda Arnold, Richard Lazarus (1991) sought to
explain these meaningful aspects of emotions by appealing to what he termed their
core relational theme. Core relational themes were built up of multiple molecular
appraisals, and represent the defining characteristic of an emotional episode. For
example, anger is defined as “a demeaning offense against me and mine”, and is
constructed from several molecular appraisals that are representations of organism-
environment relations that bear on a subject’s well-being (e.g. goal relevance, goal
congruence and the agent’s coping potential). Other emotions have different mixtures
of molecular appraisals, and thus different molar core relational themes. Unlike early
somatic feeling theories, appraisal theories such as the one defended by Lazarus,
extend emotional episodes to include a key role for cognition, and thus provide a
representational role to emotions that extend beyond the body out into the world
in meaningful ways. As such, appraisal theories emphasise cognition over other
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components as the defining feature of emotional episodes. What defines an emotional
episode, and differentiates it from others, is the cognitive appraisal of its intentional
object (i.e. the object in the world, whether real or imagined) characterised by way
of its core relational theme—or in other words, the associated thoughts and concepts
that are consciously accessible to the agent.
This brings us to one final noteworthy development offered by Jesse Prinz (2004),
known as the the embodied appraisal theory of emotions. Prinz argues, in line with
the somatic feeling theory that emotions are perceptions of certain kinds of neuro-
physiological states, but extends this notion such that what is important about these
kinds of states is that they reliably track salient conditions in the environment. For
example, ‘fear’ is the perception of certain neurophysiological states that are reliably
linked with dangers. To provide the necessary theory of content for his proposal,
Prinz extends the idea of Lazarus’s core relational themes, so that rather than de-
scribing the structure of an emotion, they instead pick out the content of these emo-
tions. Under Prinz’s theory, emotions become appraisals of organism-environment
relations (e.g. a bodily state represents some intentional object due to its reliable
connection with it), harnessed through perception of relevant bodily states. At first
glance, this would seem to suggest that Prinz’s theory offers a compelling companion
for the active inference view discussed above, with its emphasis on sensorimotor dy-
namics. However, Prinz (ibid., p. 194) rejects the idea that emotions are essentially
related to actions, opting for a separation of emotions from motivating tendencies
and opting instead for the weaker notion of emotions as “action enabling”. This is
consistent with his representational account of emotions, but means that the con-
tent of emotions is distanced from the more action-oriented forms of representation
defended by sensorimotor approaches.7 As such, Prinz distances himself from action-
7Whether this means that Prinz’s theory is incompatible with sensorimotor theories is another
matter that will not be discussed here.
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oriented theories of emotions (e.g. Nico Frijda’s view of emotions as action-readiness
patterns (Frijda, 1987, 2010)), as well as some recent work in cognitive neuroscience.
Reviewing a large body of neuroscientific data, Pessoa (2013) has recently out-
lined the many ways that cognitive and emotional processing interact and are inte-
grated in the brain. One key area that his work focuses on is the amygdala, a group
of nuclei in the limbic system that has long been associated with emotional processes.
Pessoa argues that the amygdala’s function goes beyond emotional processing, and
is involved in shaping selective information processing. He describes the amygdala
as a core structure in a system involved in “What is it?” and “What’s to be done?”
processing (Pessoa, 2010), which contributes to the specification and selection of
salient action opportunities for the organism—in line with the affordance competi-
tion hypothesis. The processing of this affectively-laden information is constrained
by a sort of neural bandwidth, and thus is not independent of attentional processes.
Pessoa advocates replacing the cognitivist strategies of functional decomposition and
localisation, in favour of a network architecture whereby emotion and cognition will
fail to map cleanly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain (see chapter 5). This
also leads to a dissolution of the boundaries between emotion and perception, a view
defended by proponents of a predictive processing approach. To see why this is the
case, let’s turn to see how PP accounts for affectively-laden information processing.
4.3.1 Interoceptive Inference
In PP, the predictions generated by the inner models of the brain do not merely
attempt to anticipate the flow of sensory input from the outside world, but also
the flow of interoceptive inputs (i.e. pertaining to endogenously produced stimuli,
e.g. bodily organs), which further constrain the set of viable actions in important
ways. For example, deciding to quench one’s thirst or sate one’s hunger is often
more important than allowing oneself to be distracted by other action opportunities.
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Figure 4.1: A proposed model highlighting a) the role of the AIC in interoceptive in-
ference generating descending predictions sent to the autonomic system via
smooth muscles to provide a point of reference for autonomic reflexes and b)
the role of top-down predictions from regions such as the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) and prefrontal cortex (PFC) integrating ascending prediction
errors from exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive causes. Reprinted
from (Gu et al., 2013, p. 3382)
Being receptive to the current state of your body, therefore, is fundamental to making
adaptive decisions, as it allows us to determine which options have the greatest value
relative to our needs.
Anil Seth (2015, p. 9) has argued that on this basis, PP may apply more nat-
urally to interoception than to exteroception. He states that unexpected sensory
states that pertain to interoception are more likely to be bad news for an organism
(e.g. an unexpected level of blood oxygenation or blood sugar) than external states.
Tracking this type of sensory information requires incorporating interoceptive infor-
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mation into the PP framework, and thus integrating affective information within
the generative models harboured by the brain. Seth (2013) has argued that active
inference should thus be extended to include interoceptive inference, and that key
areas such as the anterior insular cortex (AIC) are well-suited to play a central role
as both a comparator that registers top-down predictions against error signals, and
as a source of anticipatory visceromotor control (i.e. the regulation of internal bodily
states).
Here, Seth is developing on a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging data by Gu
et al. (2013), which he states is compatible with the active inference framework. He
argues that the study provides initial evidence for the claim that descending predic-
tions generated by the AIC are sent to the autonomic system via smooth muscles
to activate autonomic reflexes in a similar manner as earlier described in the case of
proprioception. This is important because the goal of interoceptive inference, as with
active inference in general, is not simply the perceptual awareness of internal states.
If we were to approach interoceptive inference as a case of perceptual inference, this
would lead us to the strange conclusion that minimising interoceptive prediction
error should be done by simply changing our models to fit the world. However,
monitoring important signals such as those originating from our own bodies require
adaptive responses as pertinent boundaries are reached (e.g. forage for food when
blood-sugar levels are low). As Seth (2015) states: “interoceptive inference can be
thought of as predictive control, in the same manner as active inference.” Therefore,
interoceptive inference can be brought within the PEM schema, and as depicted in
Figure 4.1, these interoceptive predictions can then influence higher-level multimodal
predictions generated in regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the
prefrontal cortex (PFC).
This is immensely important for integrating decision-making within the PP frame-
work, as it allows for a consistent understanding of the role that affective information
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(and possibly emotions) play in guiding our actions. By integrating interoceptive sig-
nals within the hierarchical generative models, the downwards predictions that are
responsible for generating both perceptual content and motor behaviour also have
affective significance.
“These models instantiate predictions of temporal sequences of matched
exteroceptive and interoceptive inputs, which flow down through the hi-
erarchy. The resulting cascade of prediction errors can then be resolved
either through autonomic control, in order to metabolize bodily fat stores
(active inference), or through allostatic actions involving the external en-
vironment (i.e., finding and eating sugary things).” (ibid., p. 10)
This connection has not gone unnoticed by a number of researchers (Lerner et al.,
2015; Phelps, Lempert, and Sokol-Hessner, 2014, e.g.). Some of these studies (e.g.
Phelps, Lempert, and Sokol-Hessner, 2014) echo the sentiments of the earlier embod-
ied decisions work, but in line with Pessoa (2013), they go further in demonstrating
how specific biasing inputs, such as affective information, play a fundamental modu-
latory role in the competitive process of action selection. This provides an important
extension to the embodied decisions research, which was initially left underdeveloped.
It shows how affective signals are able to provide a basis for determining the salience
of potential actions when integrated within the hierarchical generative models of PP
(Barrett and Bar, 2009; Lindquist et al., 2012; Ouden, Kok, and De Lange, 2012).
The inclusion of core affect (see above) provides a way for an agent to know if
some action is salient (i.e. good or bad for it), while the contextualising appraisals
from top-down influences situate this within a wider web of agent-specific knowledge
about bodily-environmental relations. Importantly, this evaluation need not be con-
sidered as a separate step in a computational process. Barrett and Bar (2009) argue
that activity in OFC is reflective of ongoing integration of sensory information from
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exteroceptive cues with interoceptive information from the body. They claim that
this supports the view that perceptual states are “intrinsically infused with affective
value”, such that the affective significance (or salience) of an object (or action op-
portunity) is intertwined with its perception. Affective information is thus brought
within the same scheme that we saw accounting for the rapid visual comprehension
in earlier chapters (Bar, 2011b), and provides further evidence against the cognitivist
picture.
One worry here is that different sources of sensory information have often been
treated as conveying distinct kinds of signals to the agent. For example, perceptual
content is often seen as carrying indicative content, whereas affective content has an
imperative, or motivating aspect to it. By reducing all types of sensory information
to prediction errors, PP may lose the ability to distinguish between these types of
content.
A response to this problem comes from Ouden, Kok, and De Lange (2012), who
review the neurophysiological evidence relevant to an understanding of prediction
errors, and argue that there is support for multiple kinds of prediction errors (PEs)
in the brain: perceptual PEs, cognitive PEs and motivational PEs. The first two
types are referred to as unsigned PEs. These do not reflect the valence of any sensory
input, but simply the surprise of its occurrence. The final kind of PEs, however, are
known as signed PEs, for they reflect whether an outcome was better or worse than
expected. They state:
“Signed PEs play a central role in many computational models of re-
inforcement learning. These models describe how an agent learns the
value of actions and stimuli in a complex environment, and signed PEs
that contain information about the direction in which the prediction was
wrong, serve as a teaching signal that allows for updating of the value of
the current action or stimulus.” (ibid., p. 4)
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Having access to multiple kinds of PEs, including those with affective significance,
may provide the brain with the means to implicitly compare and evaluate which
policy is most desirable based on prior learning. This is important for ecological
considerations as not all errors are created equal. To illustrate this, we can turn to
Hammerstein and Stevens (2012, p. 9) who describe what is sometimes referred to
as the “smoke detector principle”:
“Natural selection will likely favor the avoidance of even small errors if
they incur high costs in terms of fitness. In contrast, seemingly large
errors (e.g., a male mating with a member of the wrong species) may not
face strong selective pressure if they have little impact on fitness.”
In short, a false alarm from your smoke detector may be an annoyance, but it
is preferable to a smoke detector not triggering in the case of a real emergency.
One way to minimise instances of the latter kind is to integrate different sources of
information, and in some sense hedge your bets. Therefore, if value is determined
through the comparison of multiple PEs, this would allow the agent to determine
which of the myriad possible action opportunities is most salient given its current
needs, and at the same time minimise risk of selecting inappropriate actions based
on the response to a single PE. The comparison could take the form of a distributed
competition, in line with the proposal offered by Cisek (2012), with no need for an
abstract encoding of value that is generated after the reconstruction of perceptual
information.
This connects with a related topic in the decision-making literature, which centres
on the question of whether, and how, the brain calculates value? Vlaev et al. (2011)
review a range of theories and models and provide the following positions to help
capture these commitments:
1. Value-first position: the brain computes the value of different options and
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simply picks the one with the highest value.
2. Context-dependent value: the brain computes values, but the choice is heavily
context-dependent on the set of available options.
3. Comparison with value computation: the brain computes how much it values
options, but only in relation to other values.
4. Comparison-only: choice depends on comparisons without any computation of
value.
Micro-debates exist within each of these positions. For example, is value repre-
sented on some ordinal, interval or ratio scale, and what objects are represented? Re-
gardless of how these debates turn out, it should be clear that the value-first position
is incompatible with both PP and the embodied decisions account. This is because
value-first positions maintain that the value of an option is stable, and explicitly
represented in some region of the brain such as OFC or vmPFC (Padoa-Schioppa,
2011). We have already seen that the embodied decisions account is opposed to such
a view, due to conflicting neurophysiological evidence. In addition, we have seen
how PP eschews the explicit representation of value/cost functions altogether. How-
ever, it is unclear which of the alternative positions would best describe an embodied
account of PP.
Adopting the suggestion offered by Ouden, Kok, and De Lange (2012) of multiple
PEs seems to frame PP as either an example of the ‘context-dependent value’ view
or the ‘comparison with value computation’ view, depending on which additional
mechanisms are posited to co-ordinate or integrate the options based on the type of
PE considered. For example, although PP eschews talk of explicit cost functions,
there is nevertheless a non-trivial sense in which the brain is comparing the expected
values of the predictions that stand in place of the cost functions. Given the un-
certainty regarding the precise implementational details of an exact architecture for
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PP (see Clark (2016b, pp. 298-299) for a list of possible schemas) this could be a
possibility. It is also one area where a synthesis between the work on embodied
decisions and PP could be mutually beneficial, as the former is presently developing
novel computational methods that may help specify architectural details, whereas
the latter provides a more developed account of the importance of interoceptive in-
formation within a wider framework that unifies perception, cognition, action and
now emotion. However, there is another approach, which makes use of the precision-
weighting mechanisms discussed in chapter 2 that may frame PP as an example of




Effective Decisions in the
Interactive Brain
In the previous chapter we argued that adopting an embodied approach to decision-
making means blurring the boundaries between perception, cognition, action and
emotion. This need not result in the conclusion that the brain is an undifferentiated,
homogeneous mass of cells. There is a wide space of conceptual possibilities between
this extreme, and the other extreme of a massively modular architecture. A promising
approach to understanding the complex dynamics of the brain, and its interactions
with the body, comes from recent network-theoretic approaches. In this chapter we
will explore how the modulatory effects of precision-weighting in PP dovetail with
recent work on the interactive brain, and how this leads to a novel approach for
understanding decision-making. We argue that effective decision-making emerges
from both the brain’s ability to flexibly and rapidly alter its effective connectivity to
meet the shifting demands of the environment, but also requires longer-term learning
(over developmental and evolutionary timescales), and the subsequent redeployment
of prior knowledge. PP has the conceptual and theoretical tools to explain this
ability, but doing so requires revisiting some of the standard assumptions in cognitive
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psychology, and extending our explanatory scope out into the body and the world.
We begin in section 5.1 by revisiting the account of precision-weighting offered by
PP, with an emphasis on its connection to neuromodulation. This will connect to a
discussion in section 5.2, concerning Anderson’s (2014) proposal for Neural Reuse and
the Interactive Brain, and its consequences (outlined in section 5.4) for traditional
cognitive psychology. We will conclude in section 5.5 by discussing what this means
for our account of the mechanisms that underlie decision-making.
5.1 Balancing Expectations
Consider the case of learning to play an instrument (e.g. a guitar). During the
earliest stages of learning it is likely that you will have low dexterity, and will be
slow to move between certain chords due to an unfamiliarity with the positions
and movements of your fingers on the strings. In these early stages, it is common
to look carefully at your finger placements, while your brain adjusts to the large
proprioceptive error signals that are generated by unfamiliar finger-placements and
unfamiliar tensions in your muscles. In addition, as you play a chord for the first
time and notice the auditory signal, you may carefully and deliberately pluck each
string in sequence, in order to ensure you are not inadvertently muting a string due
to clumsy finger placement. As you progress into an intermediate stage, becoming
more adept with your finger-placement and the feel of the guitar, you will be able
to shift your attention from the feeling of the guitar and your fingers, towards the
nuances of the sound being generated. This will allow you to uncover more creative
ways to play, and perhaps you will accidentally discover new augmented chords by
mistakenly placing a finger on an incorrect string. The focus of your attention in
these intermediate stages will have drastically shifted away from the slow, deliberate
attention directed towards your body when you first picked up the guitar.
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Perhaps you continue to practice and become an expert musician. If so, you may
be lucky enough to experience what is known as ‘flow’. This psychological state is
experienced not only by musicians, but also expert athletes and other practitioners of
skilled disciplines, and is commonly described as a loss of reflective self-consciousness,
and a heightened immersion in the present activity. This is considerably different
from the state experienced by the beginner, and one characteristic stands out: the
shifting focus of attentional awareness.
In chapter 2 we discussed how attention in PP is identified with the shifting
precision expectations that adjust the weight of error-signals (e.g. salience of auditory
information in a noisy room). Error-signals arise when predictions are unable to
account for particular sensory signals, and thus it stands to reason that part of
becoming an expert in some task requires becoming more adept at predicting future
states (e.g. a beginner will have little to no idea of what sound will be generated by
plucking certain strings when holding an F Major chord, whereas an expert may be
so familiar that a slightly out-of-tune string may stand out). This could in turn lead
to a more creative use of precision-weighting mechanisms as the brain becomes expert
at predicting sensory signals due to an increased familiarity with the situation.1 The
situation is not too dissimilar from a phenomena that is well-studied in newborn
infants known as ‘motor-babling’.
Motor-babbling is the execution of seemingly random movements, which allows
the infant to learn about the physiological characteristics of their body through sens-
ing the reafferent information generated by their own movements (Kilner et al., 2016).
1A related story is given by (Hobson and Friston, 2012; Hobson and Friston, 2014) in the case of
dreaming, where exteroceptive error signals are reduced as the organism falls asleep. In the absence
of error-signals, the predictions generated by the brain have no anchor to the stable structure of the
external world, which Hobson and Friston claim could be a cause of the particular characteristics
of dreaming.
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The perceptual information that is generated by the self-produced changes, creates
bidirectional associative information (Hebbian learning) between the pattern of neu-
ral activity responsible for producing the movement and the activity representing
the reafferent information. Initially, this motor babbling will appear uncontrolled,
but as the infant learns to associate certain movements with a sense of agency (e.g.
this motion was produced by an internal cause, not by an external cause), further
opportunities for self-directed actions arise. Just as the musician must familiarise
herself with an instrument, an infant must become familiar with the characteristics
of its body, in order to effectively interact with the environment, and in turn make
adaptive decisions. This happens through repeated interactions, spread out over
time. Accommodating this flexible learning in PP requires carefully balancing top-
down expectations (representing prior beliefs), with the unexpected sensory signals
from the world, in order to determine whether the inaccuracies result from inap-
propriate top-down expectations and thus represent a learning opportunity where
the world can drive the updating of the brain’s inner models. As learning happens
over extended timescales, and is responsive to interacting nested structures in the
environment, the hierarchical commitments of PP are yet again vital.
We have already seen why the hierarchical organisation of the brain is conducive
to the idea that the hierarchical generative models are organised over increasing
spatiotemporal scales. This structure is important to allow more complex agents
such as ourselves to be receptive to similarly nested structures that exist in the
world. From this perspective, we could approach the hierarchical-organisation of the
brain’s models in a synchronic manner, potentially reflecting on the representational
content at different layers. However, this should be carried out with caution, as it
overlooks an obvious but important point. Like the world, the brain is constantly in
flux, flexibly altering its patterns of effective connectivity over short timescales, and
more slowly adjusting its structural connectivity and morphology over developmental
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and evolutionary timescales.2 This is not to deny the need for some robustness and
stability in the brain’s inner models—too little robustness or stability is equally
maladaptive, as it prevents an organism from relying on the deployment of prior
knowledge to its own advantage—but an uncertain and changing world is not always
a congenial environment for an entirely inflexible system. Finding the right balance
between utilising prior knowledge and seeking new opportunities to learn, seems to
be key in making effective decisions. In the next section we will look at some of the
mechanisms that support this picture.
5.1.1 Neuromodulation and Effective Connectivity
PP is considered by many to be a functional-level description, and therefore can be
considered independent of implementational details (Hohwy, 2015; Spratling, 2013).
However, some have nevertheless proposed specific mechanisms for certain compo-
nents. Here we focus on precision-weighting.
A number of claims have been made regarding the mechanisms that support the
2A brief note on terminology: we can distinguish between three types of neural connectivity,
which are known as structural, effective and functional. Structural connectivity is the most common,
and refers to the gross anatomical connections that exist between neural cells allowing them to
interact and communicate (perhaps in conjunction with extra-synaptic mechanisms). Functional
and effective connectivity refer to the activity that is estimated by neuroimaging techniques such
as fMRI or EEG and does not necessarily identify a complete chain of anatomical connections.
Functional connectivity is defined as the temporal correlation between two regions given some
task, but does not provide any information concerning the directionality or causality between the
regions. However, effective connectivity uses models of neural interactions to infer directionality.
It is commonly understood as the influence that one neural system exerts over another, possibly
through the use of extra-synaptic mechanisms (Friston, 2011b). Effective connectivity can be
achieved without the need for extensive rewiring or physiological changes, and is thus a suitable
candidate for transient-assembly of distributed systems.
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precision-weighting story in PP.
Firstly, it has been claimed that the mechanisms behind precision-weighting in-
volve altering the post-synaptic gain on prediction-error units through key neuro-
modulators such as dopamine (Friston et al., 2014). They may also provide a way to
reconcile the competing effects of signal suppression and signal enhancement (Clark,
2016b). Some have even gone as far as singling out specific types of neural cells
(i.e. pyramidal cells) on the basis of salient characteristics that suggest key roles in
neuromodulation (Phillips, Clark, and Silverstein, 2015).3
Secondly, as well as providing a way of balancing the influence between top-down
and bottom-up signals, it has been argued that the mechanisms behind precision-
weighting could provide a means of altering the brain’s effective connectivity (cf.
Clark, 2013b). The potential for these neuromodulatory mechanisms to exert wider
influence by changing the brain’s effective connectivity is of crucial importance for
an embodied PP account of decision-making.
As we saw in chapter 3, recent work in decision theory has argued in favour
of a distributed systems approach for encoding decision related measures of value.
Therefore, the brain needs to have a way of integrating these disparate sources,
without having to integrate their signals into one central region that can deliberate
over a unified, abstract representation. Neuromodulators seem to be an effective
means for achieving this. Dayan (2012, p. 241) provides a comprehensive review
of the relevant properties that neuromodulators have in terms of organisation and
effects (a selection of these are presented):
1. Neuromodulatory systems can report selective information.
3Others have argued that these types of cells could form the basis of cortical microcircuits (i.e
a local neural population that represents something like a basic wiring diagram), which play a
fundamental role in predictive coding (Bastos et al., 2012).
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2. Reporting can take place over multiple timescales (including very quick timescales).
3. Different receptor types can respond selectively to separate characteristics of
the signal, and can be localised on anatomically different pathways.
4. Interactions among different neuromodulators are very widespread.
5. Neuromodulatory signals can be turned to different uses.
6. Neuromodulators can influence the course of activity by regulating which of a
number of gross pathways determine the activity of neurons.
7. Neuromodulators affect plasticity over many time scales.
8. Neuromodulators are involved in the regulation of energy utilisation in the
brain and body.
9. Individual differences in neuromodulatory receptors or transporters have ob-
servable effects on decision-making behaviour.
1, 6 and 7 provide indirect support for the claim that precision-weighting in PP
acts as a gating mechanism, modulating the influence that error signals have on
higher-levels. As Dayan (ibid., p. 251) states:
“Neuromodulators both broadcast and narrowcast key information about
the current character of the organism and its environment, and exert
dramatic effects on processing by changing the dynamical properties of
neurons.”
Furthermore, 2, 3 and 7 corroborate the claims regarding hierarchical organisation
in the brain. The remaining points will be discussed in later sections.
In addition to these claims, Ouden et al. (2010) found evidence that striatal pre-
diction errors play a modulatory role on the large-scale coupling between distinct
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visuomotor regions, and Cocchi et al. (2013) explored the context-dependent, tran-
sient changes in patterns of cooperation and competition between control systems,
which result from higher-level cognitive control. If correct, this may allow PP, with
its emphasis on bi-directional influences, to accommodate the ubiquitous effects of
attentional modulation that Cisek and Pastor-Bernier discussed (chapter 3), but
which remained underdeveloped in their account.
Furthermore, Feldman and Friston (2010) explore the neuromodulatory role of the
cholinergic system as one possible source of precision-weighting, and more recently,
Friston et al. (2012) investigated the neuromodulatory role of the dopaminergic sys-
tem, with a specific focus on decision-making and reinforcement learning. They argue
that dopamine controls the precision of incoming sensory inputs by balancing the re-
spective weight of top-down and bottom-up signals during active inference. This
balancing means, crucially, that the predictions that drive action, also determine the
context in which the movements are made. It also provides further support for the
blurring of perception and action in PP, and the important role that neuromodulation
plays in uncovering this relationship.
Given the above, it is clear that the influence that neuromodulation has on the
functional attributes of local regions should not be downplayed. However, the effect
of neuromodulation adds both an astonishing depth to the possible dynamic func-
tions that local networks can perform, but at the same time renders the pursuit of
a simple wiring diagram (or connectome) for the brain as a somewhat naive pursuit
on its own (Anderson, 2014). One concern is that the effects of certain neurotrans-
mitters can propagate widely through extra-synaptic channels, influencing regions
that are distant from the initial point of release (Agnati et al., 2010; Park and
Friston, 2013). Although this means that neuromodulatory mechanisms provide a
way for the brain to influence distal regions, and thus assemble distributed systems
that can flexibly adapt to shifting task-demands, it also means that determining
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which population a particular system is communicating with becomes particularly
challenging. Postsynaptic cells are not able to distinguish between various types
of presynaptic activation of inhibition, despite the potentially different effects that
may be induced by the transmitted information (Dayan, 2012). This is why a rela-
tively fixed anatomical structure makes sense, as different receptor sites (responsive
to different neuromodulators) can be restricted to certain regions of the brain.
However, although it complicates matters, this need not preclude the possibility
of functional diversity in local regions. Consider the following example from Price
and Friston (2005, p. 268) regarding the structure-function mapping for the finger:
“At one level, the forefinger can be attributed multiple and diverse func-
tions including ‘piano playing,’ ‘typing,’ ‘scratching,’ ‘pinching,’ ‘feed-
ing.’ At a second level, these functions could be classified so as to distin-
guish them from those the forefinger cannot perform—such as ‘digestion,’
‘thinking,’ or ‘walking.’ [...] At a third level of description, however, the
forefinger can only do one thing—‘bend’ and ‘straighten.’ Its role in
other tasks is therefore entirely dependent on what the other fingers and
thumbs are doing and what environmental context they are in.”
In an analogous manner, the anatomical and physiological structure of the brain
constrains neural communication, whilst neuromodulation alters which functions cer-
tain populations can participate in. We will return to this point shortly.
Strong evidence exists that neuromodulators are able to rapidly alter effective
connectivity, to allow the brain to flexibly and transiently recruit networks of dis-
tributed systems in response to changing task demands from the environment. In
the case of decision-making, this becomes increasingly important when we consider
that the utility of certain actions will necessarily be tied to the current state of the
organism (e.g. food is more valuable to a hungry animal than water is). The brain
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needs to be able to adjust the weighting of certain key regions involved in decision-
making in response not only to incoming interoceptive information, but also with
information corresponding to higher-level knowledge (e.g. area x has a high-chance
of encountering a predator based on prior experience). Some have argued that these
transiently assembled networks are the general rule for the brain (Anderson, 2014).
Acknowledging this requires revisiting some of the cognitivist assumptions that have
dominated the cognitive sciences, and subsequently moving towards an embodied
account of cognition and behaviour.
5.2 The Interactive Brain
“[...] exactly what sort of metaphysical stance would lead one to suppose
that something as versatile as a knife blade has anything like a “funda-
mental function”? It has some fundamental physical characteristics that
make it useful in a variety of circumstances. Knowing what those char-
acteristics are is surely useful, but to search for the functional essence
of a knife is to be in the grip of a deep philosophical, ontological error.”
(ibid., p. xix)
It may appear as though the above quote is setting up a straw-man. Surely no
one would disagree that a knife has a number of different functions that are de-
pendent partly on the usage and intentions of its wielder, and partly constrained
by the physical characteristics of the object itself (e.g. used for cutting or as a
makeshift screwdriver)? Perhaps not for a knife, but the crucial point in Michael
Anderson’s recent book After Phrenology is that this error has been made repeat-
edly in the cognitive sciences. As a result of failing to rid itself of several implicit
assumptions regarding the functional architecture of the mind, the cognitive sciences
have continued to emphasise functional decomposition and localisation as guiding
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methodological principles. He argues that these assumptions are impediments to
the progress of the cognitive sciences, and need to be reconsidered. In their place,
Anderson defends a theory he calls ‘neural reuse’. This theory treats the brain as
a dynamical system, which has evolved for the purpose of controlling an organism’s
interactions in its environment.
This theory echoes the view outlined in the previous section, whereby the brain
responds to the task demands on the agent by fluidly altering its effective connectivity
in the short-term, and adjusting its structural connectivity in the longer-term.
5.2.1 Neural Reuse
That nature finds new uses for old tricks should be beyond dispute, and the brain is
certainly no exception. The structures of the brain, Anderson (2014) argues, evolved
within certain efficiency constraints, and where possible redeployed existing capaci-
ties, rather than developing new structures de novo. Though initially established for
one purpose, the theory of neural reuse states that existing circuits can be exapted
(reused) to acquire new uses, often without loss of their original function and with-
out the need for unusual circumstances such as injury. As we will see, this leads to
a number of challenges for traditional cognitive psychology, which understands the
functional architecture of the brain as composed of interacting modules, and attempts
to individuate these components through the processes of functional decomposition
and localisation.
Functional decomposition has a long history in philosophy of mind, but contem-
porary approaches in the cognitive sciences are largely dominated by the relatively
more recent assumptions of faculty psychology—the view that the mind is com-
posed of interacting modules (or faculties) that are recruited to perform certain
tasks (Fodor, 1983). Each module plays a specific functional role, and the task of
the cognitive sciences is to determine what this role is and which states of the brain
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are responsible for implementing it. For example, one may start by identifying some
phenomenon of interest (e.g. some overt behaviour), determine which states of the
brain correlate with the behaviour through the use of neuroimaging (or perhaps le-
sion studies if concerned with the loss of some behaviour), and then attempt to map
a hypothesised function onto these structures in line with any additional theoretical
constraints. These constraints may be based on the assumption that cognition is
adaptive in some manner, as assumed by rational analyses (Anderson, 1991) and
evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1995), or on considerations
of whether the functional architecture is neurally-plausible (Eliasmith, 2013).
Both Poldrack (2010) and Anderson (2014) worry that cognitive psychology (and
to a lesser extent cognitive neuroscience) has been dominated by a limited taxonomy
of cognitive and mental functions; a taxonomy that they claim has been inherited
from faculty psychology, and is a hindrance to uncovering the real functional organ-
isation of the brain. To rectify this, Anderson starts from the premise that brains
initially evolved for the purpose of controlling action in our earlier environments, and
that we should expect to see traces of the repurposing of these pre-existing neural
structures in our phylogenetic history. More recent capacities (e.g. abstract reason-
ing or mathematics) would have had to find their neural niche within the constraints
imposed by this control architecture. His view parts ways with the evolutionary
psychologist in the expectation of what these traces will look like:
“[...] whenever possible neural, behavioral, and environmental resources
should have been reused and redeployed in support of any newly emerg-
ing cognitive capacities. Functionally autonomous and dedicated neural
modules just do not seem to make good design sense given the impor-
tance of efficient use of available resources and of ongoing interactions in
shaping function.” (Anderson, 2014, p. 7)
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Anderson’s approach acknowledges the fact, well established in neuroscience, that
regions of the brain are functionally differentiated. However, he notes that functional
differentiation is a conceptually distinct claim from that of functional specialisation.
This latter view states that each region of the brain expresses a specialised function,
which implements a single cognitive operation. However, Anderson’s principle of
neural reuse, as we will see shortly, is committed to functional differentiation with-
out functional specialisation—we can differentiate one region from another, but not
attribute to it a single cognitive operation.
So what are the specific claims made by this principle, and what is the evidence
for each of them? Given the limitations of individual neuroimaging studies, and
the murky window into the mind that they provide, researchers have turned to
interpreting these studies collectively, using computational methods to analyse and
determine patterns in the wealth of data collected in recent decades. Anderson points
to three studies, which in turn support a number of predictions of neural reuse. Each
of the studies involves some type of meta-analysis, performed using a database such
as BrainMap.org. This database publishes functional and structural neuroimaging
experiments, with coordinate-based results, which allow users to perform statistical
analyses over a wide-range of experimental studies, rather than being limited to
one. Arguably, this provides a more robust conclusion—subject to the application of
appropriate statistical techniques—than the report of a single neuroimaging study.
The predictions that Anderson focuses on are:
1. Individual brain regions should support numerous cognitive functions across
diverse tasks (e.g. classification or working memory).
2. Functional differences should be reflected less in what neural regions are im-
plicated, and more in the different patterns of interaction between similar ele-
ments.
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3. Newly evolved cognitive functions or behaviours (e.g. language) should be
supported by a greater number of structures.
In support of the first claim, Anderson and Pessoa (2011) performed a meta-
analysis of the functional diversity of 78 anatomical regions of the brain by deter-
mining whether (and how often) each was active in 1,138 experimental tasks across
11 task categories (e.g. emotion, reasoning, working memory etc.). As Figure 5.1
shows, different regions of the brain display a greater functional diversity than oth-
ers, with subcortical regions having the lowest overall average functional diversity.
To demonstrate this, the authors used a measure of diversity variability (DV) that






Here Cati refers to the proportion of activations in each task category, mean
refers to the average proportion, which is always 0.091 with 11 categories, and k
equals the number of categories. Diversity was normalised so that the values range
from 0 (all activations in one category) to 1 (activations spread equally across all 11
categories).4 The overwhelming finding from their study is that functional diversity
appears to be a genuine feature of local brain organisation, with the overall average
diversity of cortical regions placed at 0.71 and subcortical regions at 0.63.
Anderson and Penner-Wilger (2012) performed a similar kind of meta-analysis in
support of the second claim, but this time were interested in measuring the functional
connectivity of key regions of the brain, based on an analysis of functional coacti-
vation. A functional coactivation analysis determines how often multiple, spatially
separated regions of the brain coactivate under certain task conditions (i.e their func-
4See (Anderson and Pessoa, 2011) for further details, including an index of the regions and task
categories explored.
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Figure 5.1: Task diversity of brain regions (grey indicates no information). The nor-
malised values range from 0 (all activations in one category) to 1 (activations
spread equally across all 11 categories). Reprinted from (Anderson, 2014,
p. 11).
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Figure 5.2: Functional connectivity graphs for left precentral gyrus under three different
taks: (a) semantic, (b) emotion, (c) attention. Reprinted from (Anderson
and Penner-Wilger, 2012, p. 45).
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tional connectivity). Anderson and Penner-Wilger (ibid.) claim that if the regions
are simultaneously active more often than on their own, during some task, then this
indicates that there is a functional connection between the regions.
Developing on the first prediction, they found that as well as a particular re-
gion being active across diverse tasks, the functional connectivity of this region with
neighbouring regions was also likely to be varied across tasks. For example, Figure
5.2 depicts a number of graphs showing the functional connectivity of Left Precentral
Gyrus under semantic, emotional and attentional conditions. As the graphs demon-
strate, the edges which are most active in each task (thick lines) are connected to
different nodes (representing other neighbouring regions). As we will see shortly, this
means that trying to map a function onto a particular structure of the brain becomes
increasingly difficult. Not only do regions of the brain have a highly diverse func-
tional profile, but what functional role a region is currently performing is determined
less by an intrinsic property of the region, and rather by which local network it is
functionally connected to. In short, the function of a region cannot be determined
solely on the basis of a localised analysis, as it neglects the constitutive role that
neighbouring regions play in determining its functional role.
Regarding the final claim, Anderson (2014) argues that newly evolved behaviours
should be supported by a larger number of structures, on the assumption that the
later a function emerges in evolution or development, the more potentially useful
existing elements there will be to exploit. Taking language as a prototypical instance
of a recently developed function, Anderson (2008) explored a wide-range of fMRI
studies and found that language functions are on average more widely scattered in the
cortex than both attention and visual perception tasks. Given this, it is unsurprising
that distributed regions of the cerebral cortex implicated in the semantic processing
of language (collectively known as the ‘semantic system’) have proven so difficult to
map, and why the semantic selectivity of these regions is still unknown (cf. Huth
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et al., 2016). However, this need not lead us to deny the relative specialisation of
some regions. Those regions at the most peripheral parts of the nervous system are
likely to have a more limited range of possible states due to the decreased number
of connections to neighbouring regions.
Given these studies, what is the positive proposal of Anderson’s framework? To
begin, he argues that a fundamental property of the brain is its ability to self-
organise, by locating and assembling the appropriate coalition of neural circuits that
will allow the organism to deal most effectively with the changing demands of an
uncertain environment. Where a local neural circuit can be redeployed to fulfil a
particular role, Anderson argues, a number of mechanisms exist to search for, and in
turn recruit, a relevant subsystem of the brain. These mechanisms exist to change
the effective connectivity of the networks in the brain by transiently assembling the
set of local circuits that have the appropriate functional biases (i.e. the possible
functional roles instantiated by the local network when effectively connected to one
or more of its possible neighbours) to collectively respond to the task at hand.
To highlight the importance of these local, effectively connected neural networks
Anderson utilises the acronym TALoNS, which stands for Transiently Assembled
Local Neural Subsystems. He states:
“TALoNS are the temporary, reproducibly-assembled functional parts
(large and small-scale networks and other elements) of the brain. TALoNS
have intrinsic causal properties or dispositions determined by their inter-
nal structure and effective connectivity, but their functional selectivity
emerges from the way these dispositions are constrained by the other
functional structures with which they interact.” (Anderson, in press,
p.10)
TALoNS, and the underlying mechanisms that form them, provide us with im-
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portant clues for understanding what the brain is responding to in the environment,
and why an embodied perspective is most suited for the task. Before we turn to these
latter points, it is worth exploring some proposals for the underlying mechanisms.
5.2.2 TALoNS: Some Proposed Mechanisms
Increasing popular awareness of large-scale projects such as the Human Connectome
Project5 has led to a misconception that understanding the brain is simply a matter
of determining its ‘wiring diagram’ (i.e. obtaining a map of the structural and func-
tional details of all the neural connections in the human brain). This would require
a translation of how neurons decode, transform and re-encode signals, by investigat-
ing the spiking patterns of different regions (Eliasmith and Anderson, 2003). It is
assumed that once achieved we will understand how the brain works. But will we?
As a tentative proposal for the mechanisms that are responsible for the brain’s
ability to recruit the relevant TALoNS, Anderson (2014) points to several “extracon-
nectomic contributors”. Each of these possible contributors, should their empirical
validity be cemented, would likely fulfil an integral cognitive role in the processing
of information in Anderson’s framework, and indeed in PP, which also makes regular
reference to their importance in precision-weighting. Importantly, their dynamic na-
ture challenges the cognitivist assumption that the mechanisms underlying cognition
must be encapsulated not only between perception and action, but also within the
boundaries of the brain.
Volume Transmission
Volume transmission (VT) is a type of signal diffusion that takes place within the
brain’s extracellular fluid. It refers to the diffusion of neurotransmitters that cause
5http://www.humanconnectomeproject.org/
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activation of extrasynaptic receptors, which are remote from the initial point of
release from the neurotransmitter system (Agnati et al., 2010). As such VT is inter-
twined with other bodily systems such as the endocrine system, and enteric nervous
system.
VT is contrasted with wired transmission (WT), where the communication chan-
nel has well-delimited physical boundaries (i.e. axons, synapses and gap junctions).
Furthermore, unlike the relatively rapid and precise signalling of synaptic transmis-
sion, volume transmission is considerably slower, and is thus more suited to modula-
tory or tuning functions. As such, it may provide a separate mechanism, operating at
a different spatio-temproal scale to WT, which could play the necessary modulatory
role required to transiently assemble local neural subsystems. As PP makes reference
to a multi-level, hierarchically-organised architecture that is structured according to
a spatiotemporal scale, further work on the dynamic integration of these mechanisms
is important.
Due to the difficulty of modelling a brain the size of a human’s, Bargmann (2012)
studied detailed neural circuits in crustaceans, C. elegans, and Drosophila, revealing
the ability of neuromodulators, in combination with sensory context, to reconfig-
ure information processing by changing the composition and effective connectivity of
functional circuits. Bargmann argues that these studies support the claim that infor-
mation flow through local neural circuits is partially determined by neuromodulatory
states—an important component of volume transmission.6
6Agnati et al. (2010) provides a more detailed overview of some of the mechanisms believed to
be involved in these processes.
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Neuron-Glia Interactions
Another important mechanism involved in VT is neuron-glia interaction. Glial cells
(or neuroglia) are non-neuronal cells, which have long been considered to play an
ancillary role in supporting neurons. For example, they surround neurons to provide
structural support, and play a role in supplying nutrients and oxygen to neurons.
However, the role of these purportedly “housekeeping cells” is being questioned. Re-
ferring to glial cells as the “other brain”, Fields (2009) argues that they may play
an important role in VT, as well as possibly holding the key to answering some dif-
ficult questions surrounding the medical treatment of neurological disorders such as
dementia and schizophrenia. As all glial communication is extrasynaptic and chem-
ical in nature, Anderson (2014, p. 78) argues that it provides, “[...] an independent,
complementary [chemical] network for information flow in the brain. Glia are also
thought to regulate the formation of synapses, modulate learning mechanisms such
as long-term potentiation, and regulate synaptic transmission because they both
manage the clearance of neurotransmitters from the synaptic cleft and also release
their own neuromodulatory substances. None of this crucial interaction is captured
by connectomics.”
Weak Endogenous Electrical Field
Though not explicitly identified by Anderson, we can also add a further potential
candidate to the list—the weak endogenous electrical field. Qiu, Shivacharan, and
Zhang (2015) observed a group of neural waves that share the same speed as standard
synaptic transmission (∼0.1 m/s), and which persisted after the relevant synapses
and gap junctions were blocked. The authors argue that the only remaining expla-
nation is an endogenous electrical field effect. As it is traditionally assumed that
the brain’s endogenous electrical fields are too weak to propagate wave transmission,
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their study seems to challenge this notion, instead supporting the claim that neural
signals can propagate by means other than synaptic transmission, gap junctions,
or diffusion (i.e. a non-synaptic governing mechanism). The implication of such a
finding is, they claim, that such directed electrical fields can be used to interact with
other cognitive processes, which may help regulate a variety of processes in the brain.
As with the previous two elements, this work demonstrates a need for going beyond
the connectome.
It is important to emphasise that each of these elements is only partially under-
stood at present, and their joint contribution to the global dynamics of the brain
even less so. However, in spite of this, that they are contributing to the dynamic
interactions of the brain (i.e. as search mechanisms or neuromodulators) is fairly
well supported. Furthermore, acknowledging that VT operates at a different spatio-
temporal scale to WT is important in recognising the multi-level, recurrent nature
of neural processing.7 Given that Anderson wishes to argue that the brain evolved
primarily to control the situated action of an organism, this multi-level, reccurent
nature of the brain will be fundamental, given that actions also unfold in the world
across a range of spatio-temporal scales (see chapter 6).
However, each of these elements only provides a potential mechanism that may or
may not function as a vehicle itself, or as part of a larger vehicle of communication in
the brain. Some, including Anderson, have recently argued that trying to determine
the answer to these sorts of problems requires moving away from viewing the brain’s
architecture as composed of interacting modules or regions, and instead viewing it
from a network perspective (Pessoa, 2014; Sporns, 2011).
7Unlike in standard usage, where it means ‘occurring repeatedly’, in neuroanatomy, the term
‘recurrent’ refers to the direction of a nerve’s signal ‘turning back in an opposite direction’.
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5.3 From Regions to Networks: Pluripotency and
Degeneracy
The shift in emphasis—from regions to networks—may not seem particularly radical
at first. Some may argue that a similar shift in emphasis has already occurred in the
move from classical computational theories of cognition to connectionist networks.
The latter emphasised parallel processing of information, and took the vehicles of
computation to be distributed across a network. However, these similarities are
insufficient to draw a parallel with the notion of TALoNS discussed in the previous
section. The reason for this is that TALoNS are transiently assembled, and indicative
of potentially one among many of the possible functions that a local neural region
can instantiate when functionally connected to the relevant neural partners.
Recall that neural reuse is committed to the view that the function of a region
is determined by its functional and effective connectivity to neighbouring regions—
until then the region is merely disposed to perform one of potentially many functions.
If local neural circuits support a number of tasks across different domains, they must
also retain a more complex response profile (i.e. a probabilistic representation spec-
ifying the parameters for the range of conditions under which a neuron (or neural
ensemble) responds). This is incompatible with a strict specialisation view defended
by nativism or modularity. However, incompatibility with a position does not nec-
essarily entail the adoption of the diametrically opposed perspective, which in this
instance would be something like the brain as an undifferentiated, homogeneous mass
of tissue.
Instead, neural reuse is compatible with the idea that during ontogenetic develop-
ment local regions will come to possess a range of distinctive response profiles. Their
profiles could be determined by local cortical biases (e.g proximity to peripheral re-
gions with highly constrained response profiles), as well as factors such as learning
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and experience, which are themselves shaped by internal factors (e.g. interaction and
recurrent co-activation with other regions) and external factors (e.g. socio-cultural
constraints). Though it may be valid to construe this as a form of specialisation,
Anderson (2014) argues it is a form that is far removed from the sort offered by tradi-
tional cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind, whereby certain regions come to
specialise in tasks such as “face perception”, or detect organism-independent proper-
ties of the world. The primary issue here is to determine how we should attempt to
map cognitive (or psychological) functions onto neural structures such as TALoNS.
If a region possesses multiple, dispositional functions, then isolating a single region
as the object of interest is unlikely to provide any useful constraints for a function
to structure mapping because of its functional diversity. We can refer to this feature
of a region’s functional capacity with the label ‘pluripotency’.
Pluripotency refers to a structure-function mapping relation where a particular
structure performs multiple functions—a one-to-many relation (Price and Friston,
2005). Determining the functions that a structure realises is typically investigated
by neuropsychology, occasionally using transient lesion techniques such as transmag-
netic stimulation (TMS)8. However, this structure-function mapping relation can be
reversed, and investigated using functional neuroimaging techniques that determine
which structures are sufficient for a given function. Such techniques often uncover
an alternative one-to-many relation between a function and structures. We can call
this relation ‘degeneracy’.
Degeneracy refers to the capacity for different regions to carry out the same func-
tion (e.g. when a brain area is damaged or disabled (Price and Friston, 2002)). The
fact that both of these properties are evident in the brain presents a methodological
8TMS is a noninvasive procedure that uses magnetic fields to stimulate neurons in the brain.
During stimulation, normal ongoing brain activity is disrupted by the magnetic current, and as
such TMS creates a transient period of brain disruption known as a ‘virtual lesion’.
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Figure 5.3: A schematic of the possible structure-function mappings in the brain. Be-
cause the brain exhibits both degeneracy and pluripotency (Price and Friston,
2002; Price and Friston, 2005), the mapping is many to many. This requires
a drastic reinterpretation of cognitive frameworks, moving from regional spe-
cialisation to functional differentiation, where the basic units of study are
networks. Abbreviations: A1, . . . , A4: areas 1 to 4; amyg: amygdala; F1,
. . . , F4: functions 1 to 4. Reprinted from (Pessoa, 2013, p. 194).
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challenge to classical cognitive psychology, as well as the pursuit of a well-defined
taxonomy of cognitive states. This is because, taken together, pluripotency and de-
generacy represent a possible many-to-many relation between structures in the brain
and cognitive functions, as shown in Figure 5.3.
One may argue that the possibility of any function-structure mapping function
depends on first determining an appropriate level of description. For example, given
an abstract enough level of description, one may claim that an anatomical region
such as the amygdala can be associated with emotional processing, rather than a
particular emotional response (e.g. fear or arousal). Of course, for this to be useful,
the level of abstractness is going to have to be relatively constrained to rule out
simply labelling a region with the function ‘cognitive processing’. Instead of trying
to deal with these tricky conceptual worries, Pessoa (2014) argues that traditional
anatomical regions are simply the wrong unit of description to explain how the brain’s
structures are linked to functions.
Returning to the notion of functional connectivity introduced in section 5.2.1,
when the functional connectivity between two regions is high, the degree to which we
can isolate them from one another becomes increasingly challenging. The regions be-
come increasingly coupled such that they stop acting as isolated components. When
this happens, we are forced to consider the interacting regions as a single system,
which is non-decomposable. At the other end of the continuum is something like
a module, which is fully decomposable and operates according to its own intrinsic
properties. In between is a continuum of possible organisations that collectively rep-
resents a possibility space for the brain’s architectural organisation (ibid.). Where
particular regions of the brain fall on this continuum is partly an empirical question,
which requires further investigation.
Anderson (2014) provides compelling reasons to believe that the majority of the
brain is going to be organised in a non-decomposable manner due to the transient
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flexibility of neural regions, and the ubiquity of neural reuse throughout the brain. If
transiently-assembled, non-decomposable systems, exhibiting both pluripotency and
degeneracy are indeed as ubiquitous as the above accounts suggest, then we seem
to require an alternative way of individuating structures in the brain. Anderson
(2014), Pessoa (2014), and Sporns (2011), have suggested that we move away from
localisable brain regions as the object of interest in function to structure mappings,
and instead take networks to be the relevant objects of interest. Each network is
anchored in some set of regions, but is not localisable to any particular region with
a distinct functional profile. Furthermore, multiple networks may overlap, such that
a single region is employed to fulfil different roles given the network it is currently a
part of—echoing the findings of Anderson discussed in section 5.2.1.
The network approach is indicative of a recent trend in the natural and social sci-
ences, which reflects a shift in how we understand the behaviour of complex systems.
To understand these systems, as was ilustrated in the case of Rayleigh-Be´nard con-
vection in chapter 1, we need to have knowledge of how the lower-level components
interact, as well as the emergent properties that may result from these interactions.
Knowledge of the properties of the components is insufficient on its own.
Complex systems display characteristic, ordered patterns of collective behaviour
(hence the use of the terms collective variable or order parameter). By adopting
a network approach, scientists can gain important insight into the means by which
the lower-level components of a system self-organise into ordered patterns. This is
because unlike the consideration of individual components in isolation, a network ap-
proach is by definition interested in the webs of connectivity that structure the com-
ponents of the network under investigation. Developments in computational mod-
elling and statistical techniques (e.g. graph theory), have empowered researchers to
discover new forms of connectivity in the nested, hierarchical-structure of networks,
and uncover new methods of understanding the emergence of more structured be-
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haviours. As Sporns (2011, p. 2) states:
“In multiscale systems, levels do not operate in isolation—instead, pat-
terns at each level critically depend on processes unfolding on both lower
and higher levels. The brain is a case in point. We cannot fully un-
derstand brain function unless we approach the brain on multiple scales,
by identifying the networks that bind cells into coherent populations,
organize cell groups into functional brain regions, integrate regions into
systems, and link brain and body in a complete organism.”
As the tentative mechanism proposals by Anderson and others intimates, the
multiple networks of the brain are deeply interconnected, but not strictly isolated
to the brain. Rather, these networks depend intimately on their dynamic coupling
to the body, and the ongoing interaction that the organism as a whole has with the
environment through continual cycles of action and perception. By contributing to
the behaviour of the organism, these brain-body networks partially structure the
incoming sensory information (any action leads to new perceptions whether external
or internal), and in turn modulate the internal dynamics of the system. In this sense,
the brain-body system can be seen as dynamic and self-organising.
Unfortunately, advocates of the network approach are careful to point out that
the challenges posed by the many-to-many mapping between regions and functions
do not simply disappear when we move to a network perspective (Pessoa, 2014). So
what do they propose instead?
5.4 Towards a New Taxonomy
“[...] the project [of revising the taxonomy of the cognitive sciences]
is manifestly not aimed at the wholesale expression of the theorems of
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psychology in the low-level language of neuroscience. No one in this con-
versation cares to reduce pain to c-fiber firing, or cognitive processes to
electrochemical ones [...] the identification of a set of brain-friendly psy-
chological primitives could make the possibility of psychoneural reduction
more plausible, but whether and how such reduction might occur—and
whether and how such categories would facilitate it—is a largely orthog-
onal debate.” (Anderson, 2015, p. 70)
One of the aims for a truly naturalistic science of mind and behaviour is the
pursuit of the brain’s native taxonomy—a description of the architecture by which
it interprets and acts in the world. For those who dismiss calls for the autonomy
of psychology from more fundamental disciplines such as neuroscience (e.g. Fodor,
1983), this taxonomy should ideally be applicable to researchers across the cognitive
sciences. However, calls for revision are often met with resistance, often on the
mistaken assumption that it involves some sort of eliminative reduction of cognitive
psychology to neuroscience. The above quote should remove any worries that this
is what is being argued for, though we follow Anderson in acknowledging that this
is a question that deserves a proper treatment in its own right. Nevertheless, given
the claims in the previous two sections, it is unlikely that the current taxonomy of
cognitive psychology will escape unscathed.
Exposing anomalous data is often helpful in challenging orthodoxy. For instance,
there is evidence that the visual word form area responds not only when words are
viewed, but also when they are a) heard and read in Braille, and b) responds to other
kinds of visual objects as well (Price and Friston, 2005). This provides initial reasons
for casting aspersions on the empirical adequacy of traditional cognitive psychology.
However, even when combined with the earlier theory of neural reuse, it is unlikely to
be sufficient for replacing the orthodox picture. What is needed is a positive proposal
to supplant the current framework.
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5.4.1 NRP Factors
Anderson’s positive proposal begins with a concern about the prospects of cognitive
psychology. What is measured in neuroimaging studies (especially non-invasive hu-
man studies) is often a mixed-signal, consisting of the activity of neural ensembles.
When this is combined with the ubiquitous functional diversity of neural regions out-
lined in the earlier studies, it leads to a serious challenge for cognitive neuroscience
and psychology. To highlight why this is problematic, consider the problem of trying
to determine the variety of sources that contribute to an audio recording from a busy
public space (e.g. a train station). If you were to listen to a single-track recording
of the many mixed signals present in the environment, you may be able to discern
some characteristics of the individual sources, but there would also be a significant
amount of ambiguity that would prevent you from decomposing the signal into its
well-delineated parts. For example, think of the ambiguity that may result from a
recording taken during rain or wind. Additionally, think of what the measure of
something more abstract like the value of an economic good represents. Even the
value of something relatively simple (e.g. a pen) can be considered a product of
multiple interacting factors such as economic supply and demand, perceived worth
(i.e. a Mont Blanc pen versus a Bic Biro), and the value of the materials used in
production. These challenges are analogous to the sorts of problems faced in inter-
preting the measurements taken from neuroimaging studies. In the current context,
it is akin to asking what are the relevant psychological factors that contributed to
the recorded signal?
Although the field of neuroscience has developed a number of impressive technolo-
gies and algorithms for disentangling these mixed-signals (i.e. independent compo-
nent analysis), Anderson (2014, p. 129) points out that this does not guarantee that
the physically unmixed signals are not in fact psychological mixtures. Put simply,
there is no guarantee that the taxonomic categories picked out by cognitive neuro-
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science and psychology are neatly realised in the functional traits of these signals.
Anderson’s claim is that psychological states such as emotions or concepts, and pro-
cesses such as attention or reasoning, involve mixtures of the same domain-general
ingredients. To uncover these ingredients, his proposal is to move to a multidimen-
sional perspective, which weights the functional characteristics of neural networks in
a probabilistic manner, according to a set of neuroscientifically relevant psychologi-
cal (NRP) factors. This will alter the previous question subtly, such that the neu-
roscientifically relevant psychological factors (or ingredients), which contribute to a
particular recorded neural pattern, must be given in terms of probabilistic weightings.
To illustrate what is meant by this proposal, consider the charts in Figure 5.4.
These charts depict a number of machine learning classifiers (or categories), which
resulted from training a network on a large set of fMRI results. The classifiers were
trained to predict the outcomes of subjects’ responses across 8 different tasks (e.g.
risk taking, working memory, reading aloud) on the basis of the neuroimaging data.
The classifiers were then simplified into a reduced set of dimensions, according to
their predictive accuracy, and the resulting weightings shown in Figure 5.4 were
taken to represent the degree to which the various dimensions exemplify the original
tasks (cf. Poldrack, Halchenko, and Hanson, 2009, for further details). Anderson
believes that these sort of dimensions could provide the relevant candidates for a set
of primitive NRP factors, but at present require more comprehensive analysis. His
colloquial reference to these dimensions (or NRP factors) as constituting a region’s
“personality” or “functional fingerprint” suggests that the right way to think of them
is akin to how we may describe a friend’s personality. For example, he suggests, you
may know someone whom you would describe as considered, loyal and introverted,
but not very funny or motivated. So too should we consider an agent’s behaviour as
partly two-y or six-y, but not very five-y. But what does it mean to be five-y?
As Figure 5.5 demonstrates, these dimensions are not as simple as the labels by
209
Figure 5.4: Reprinted from (Poldrack, Halchenko, and Hanson, 2009, p. 1369).
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Figure 5.5: Reprinted from (Poldrack, Halchenko, and Hanson, 2009, p. 1370).
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which we refer to a friend’s personality. Each dimension represents a different set
of physical realisers in the brain, and a further weighted set of cognitive processes.
For example, dimension 5 relates most strongly to memory, vision, action execution,
decision-making and numeric processing, but only to a limited number of brain re-
gions. By contrast, dimension 2 seems largely related to language in general, and is
widely distributed throughout the brain. This fits with the research on the semantic
system discussed earlier (Huth et al., 2016), and would be expected given the evolu-
tionary picture that neural reuse is committed to, whereby more recently emerging
capacities or behaviours should be supported by a greater number of structures.
That we are yet to identify what these NRP factors are precisely may present
a concern for some. However, Anderson (2014, p. 134) claims that these findings,
although challenging given the difficulty involved in understanding what the dimen-
sions means, are nevertheless “very, very promising”. They are promising because
they point towards a new taxonomy for the cognitive sciences—a taxonomy that is
naturalistic insofar as it is grounded in a neuroscientifically informed framework, and
one which may help to unify the cognitive sciences. However, it is promising only
inasmuch as it rejects the pursuit of neural specialisation. Relative specialisation can
emerge if the loading on one factor significantly outweighs that of the other possible
loadings, but specialisation considered by itself should not be a guiding methodolog-
ical principle. As Anderson states:
“I am suggesting that we adopt a framework according to which indi-
vidual regions of the brain exhibit not functional specialisation (the im-
plementation of a single mental operation) but rather relative functional
differentiation—the development of regional functional biases. [...] In
interpreting these factors we need to be open to relational, interactive
properties of situations.” (ibid., emphasis added, p.151)
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It is worth highlighting two aspects of the above quotation: a) the dispositional
element involved in the use of the phrase ‘functional biases’, and b) the appeal
to situational factors. The development of regional functional biases reiterates the
claims made earlier regarding the notion of TALoNS. As many regions will exhibit
pluripotency, trying to characterise their functional profile will necessarily require a
dispositional perspective, such that all we can reasonably provide is a description of
their functional biases (i.e those dimensions a region is most likely to implement).
Secondly, we should recall that these TALoNs are formed in order to shape an
organism’s behaviour in light of the relevant task demands, and to help determine
its interactions with some aspect of the environment. The separate treatment of
these aspects belies the fact that they are intertwined. The functional bias of a brain
region is dispositional only inasmuch as the situation remains unspecified. When a
situation demands the assembly of a group of neural circuits in response to a task
demand, the token instance of any particular circuit will of course be set (albeit
transiently).
With these final components of Anderson’s framework in place, we begin to see
why the principle of neural reuse is problematic for the cognitivist, and better suited
to an embodied framework. Firstly, some of the cognitivist’s commitments to claims
such as modularity (Fodor, 1983) are simply incompatible with the principle of neural
reuse. However, even if the cognitivist managed to defend these claims, it still seems
as though an embodied perspective has a greater explanatory grip on the evidence
that Anderson outlines. For example, consider the acquisition and development of
certain functional biases that are shaped over ontogenetic timescales. In addition to
more immediate changes in the current environment, the transient assembly of local
networks must also be receptive to bodily-dependent adaptations, which themselves
result from interactions with the environment. Consider again the case of learning to
play the guitar. As you become more skilled, you are not merely acquiring theoretical
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knowledge about the instrument (e.g. chord structures), your body also adapts to
the interaction. For example, the muscles in your palm and forearm that control your
fingers strengthen, and callouses appear on your fingertips to dampen the feeling of
pressing on the strings. Responding to these bodily developments is as important
a consideration for your brain as any other stimuli. Moreover, they are a necessary
part of what it means to become a more skilled musician, enabling more advanced
interactions with the instrument. With regards to the brain, learning-dependent
neural plasticity may afford it the ability to develop simple control loops for moving
swiftly between chord sequences, which in turn demand less cognitive control than
was initially required in the earliest stages of learning. By reshaping the cognitive
architecture in such a manner—perhaps offloading some of the task demands onto
the environment—the brain adapts to the situation and opens up new possibilities
for learning (e.g. more creative interactions with the musical instrument). Anderson
(2014) explores this idea in length, and argues that embodied cognition is best suited
to explain the initially early empirical findings from areas such as mathematical
cognition and linguistics.
What is important for the present discussion is the fact that these findings are
more easily accommodated by an embodied framework. This could be acknowledged
by adopting the principles defended by Clark (2008) (e.g. nontrivial causal spread,
or the principle of ecological assembly, see chapter 1), or by pointing to the need
for an action-oriented, embodied encoding scheme (e.g. moderate embodied theo-
rists (Barsalou, 1999; Hommel et al., 2001)). Alternatively, because of the close
connection with dynamical systems theory, and rejection of more traditional prin-
ciples in cognitive psychology, the principle of neural reuse may lend support to
theories of embodied cognition that adopt the replacement theme from chapter 1.9
9As was mentioned earlier in the thesis, we will not evaluate which of these options (or combi-
nation of options) is the most likely, given the empirical considerations.
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Depending on the scope of their anti-representational commitments, in the case of
decision-making and the neural encoding of value, these theories may align with the
comparison-only position from the previous chapter. Not only is this a live option
for embodied cognition in general, but due to the present uncertainty regarding the
exact implementational details of the PP architecture, this must for the time being
also remain a live possibility in the case of PP. In spite of this, and while we wait
for further developments in computational modelling (Pezzulo et al., 2011), there are
still many interesting questions to explore.
5.5 Effective Decisions
“Until recently it has been widely assumed in the cognitive and neuro-
sciences that, from a functional point of view, neurons can be adequately
conceived of as simply adding up all of their excitatory and inhibtory
inputs and transmitting an axonal spike if that integrated value exceeds
a threshold.” (Phillips, Clark, and Silverstein, 2015, p. 2)
The assumption alluded to in the above quotation has undoubtedly contributed
to the defence of computational models in decision-making that rest on a model of
deliberation and commitment (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). Recall that in these types
of models the brain accumulates sensory information in order to build a reconstruc-
tive model of the world, before deciding (perhaps by maximising expected utility) on
one of the options, and then encoding this choice into a motor program, which com-
mits the organism to the performance of some overt behavioural routine. As we hope
to have shown over the last two chapters, increasing evidence from cognitive neuro-
science and neurobiology supports an alternative picture whereby the co-ordination
of multiple decision-making systems (some overlapping with sensorimotor regions) is
achieved by widely distributed processes of contextual modulation, and transiently
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assembled networks.
If the accounts defended in this chapter are true, we argue that a number of
claims—all of which can be elucidated and accommodated by an embodied version
of PP—follow:
1. Decision-making is facilitated by distributed, competing systems in the brain
that overlap with sensorimotor regions.
2. The distributed systems are transiently assembled into functional networks in
order to respond to the shifting demands of the situated organism.
3. If we wish to understand how these systems contribute to effective decision-
making, we need to acknowledge the explanatory importance of additional
constraints that go beyond the brain.
We acknowledge that the truth of these claims rest on the empirical adequacy
of much of the research outlined in the previous chapters. However, as is to be
expected there is of course room to manoeuvre regarding specific details. More
interesting than discussing these specifics is the requirement that we look beyond
the brain for explanatory considerations pertaining to the mechanisms that underlie
effective decision-making.
We have already acknowledged that an evolutionary approach constrains certain
theoretical and conceptual commitments (e.g. cognitive processes are constrained
by phenotypic attributes), but are there further components that are key to under-
standing an evolutionary approach to effective decision-making?
In an edited collection by Hammerstein and Stevens (2012), contributors focused
on four key components for an evolutionary approach to decision-making:
1. Understanding the origins of decision-making mechanisms
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2. Exploring why these mechanisms are robust
3. Accounting for variation between and within individuals
4. Investigating the pressures of social life on decision making
Although we can’t hope to provide comprehensive arguments and reviews for each
of these claims, we can discuss their relation to the research in this thesis.
Starting with (1), we can acknowledge the limitation of only highlighting the
mechanisms in an adult human brain. Among other limitations, this would only
provide an answer to the ‘how’ questions, without addressing the ultimate ‘why’
questions. Badcock, Ploeger, and Allen (2016) raises a similar worry in response to
Anderson’s neural reuse hypothesis, and argues (contrary to Anderson) that evolu-
tionary psychology, with its focus on massive modularity, has the potential to be
highly complementary to neural reuse. He claims that evolutionary psychology is
appropriately situated to address the ‘why’ question due to its focus on the adaptive
significance of cognition and behaviour—albeit often framed in the language of in-
tentional psychology. By contrast, Anderson’s account can help to show how these
adaptive structures are physically realised. Even if a collaboration such as this re-
quires careful conceptual consideration, in order to account for the aforementioned
worries regarding taxonomic classification, it is likely that the division of labour could
be beneficial.
(2) places an interesting emphasis on PP’s account of precision-weighting and
the careful balance between learning and action. Given the underlying imperative to
minimise prediction error that drives much of the PP machinery, not only does this
component emphasise a need to explain how the PP mechanisms contribute to an
organism’s fitness over various timescales, but also how they allow for the creativity
and risk-seeking behaviours that seem to be so ubiquitous in biological organisms.
We will explore a tentative solution to this in the next chapter.
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Initially, it may appear as though (3) is of little concern for PP due to its status
as a functional-level account. However, this would be to downplay the explanatory
scope of the framework, and its claim to offering a unified account of cognition and
behaviour, thanks in large part to the support from the free-energy principle (Friston,
2010, 2013). Further integration with both comparative psychology and behavioural
ecology for cross-species comparison, as well as psychopathology for intra-species
comparisons could be enormously beneficial for the framework (see (Barrett, 2015)
for some initial examples pertaining to the former, and see (Bruineberg and Rietveld,
2014; Seth, 2014) for examples pertaining to the latter).
As is the case with (2), further exploration of the themes raised by (4) will
undoubtedly expose numerous instances of how our embodied interactions with the
world (here understood in a more inclusive sociocultural sense) have been importantly
shaped by our evolution (here understood in a more inclusive sense that extends to
the evolution of our sociocultural niche), and how this effects the sorts of decisions we
routinely make. Of particular interest is whether the idea of a temporarily assembled
network of local systems, which makes sense of the nested hierarchies found in the
brain, can extend outwards to the nested hierarchies found in social structures. Does
this idea gain any traction when transposed to the case of social organisation, where
the context of a situation (e.g. party versus meeting) modulates the behaviours of
the individuals that comprise the situation? As with (2) we will explore a tentative




Let’s recap on what has been discussed so far. In chapters 1 and 2 we introduced
embodied cognition and PP, in order to provide the necessary terminology for later
chapters. In chapter 3 we argued that decision-making should be approached from
the perspective of embodied cognition, using the idea of dynamically specifying, and
selecting between, multiple action opportunities that are represented probabilistically
in the brain. In chapter 4 we showed why an embodied account of PP was well-
equipped to handle this notion of decision-making, and why it was opposed to a
neurocentric conception of the mind. In the previous chapter we turned to explore
some of the additional mechanisms that are required for understanding how the
predictive, interactive brain flexibly adapts to changes in the environment, in order
to support adaptive choice behaviour.
As promising as the PP framework appears, it has not yet been able to offer a
truly scalable learning system that could successfully and efficiently learn to interact
with the complex, real-world environments that characterise our world. Nevertheless,
advocates of embodied PP can remain optimistic—given how the framework offers
a neuro-computationally plausible account of cognitive processing—but should also
acknowledge the theoretical and conceptual challenges that remain.
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One challenge is particular pressing. Research on embodied decision-making has
focused primarily on exploring the neural mechanisms in simple, visually-guided mo-
tor tasks, such as grasping an object or pressing a button—so called habitual deci-
sions. Though this may be sufficient for explaining a wide variety of simple behaviors
across a number of different species, humans (and some non-human animals) appear
to possess far more complex decision-making capacities. Therefore, it is possible
that the embodied decisions approach will be unable to account for the rich, and
seemingly heterogeneous practices that traditional decision theory tends to concern
itself with.
For example, when you decide to buy a house, or choose where to go on holiday,
it is not immediately obvious how a notion of embodied decisions could be of any use.
Buying a house or going on holiday are both activities that require long-term plan-
ning, and the prolonged maintenance of a desired goal-state in order to coordinate
and constrain relevant behaviours (e.g. acquiring a mortgage and communicating
with solicitors). It is not immediately clear how the predictive brain handles the
representation of distal goal-states by making solely embodied decisions of the kind
hitherto discussed. For example, what arrays of motor commands would be in com-
petition within the sensorimotor system during long-term decision processes of this
kind? Before turning to a speculative proposal in response to this, it is worth drawing
a few distinctions and addressing some philosophical concerns.
6.1 Deliberative and Habitual Decision-Making
“Behavioral and neuroscientific data on reward-based decision making
increasingly point to a fundamental distinction between habitual and
goal-directed [deliberative] action selection. Habits, in this context, are
actions arising from direct situation-response associations. Goal-directed
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[deliberative] action, in contrast, involves prospective planning: selec-
tion among actions based on a forecast of their potential outcomes.”
(Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012, p. 485)
Within the decision-making literature, a distinction is often made between de-
liberative and habitual forms of decision-making, with competing model-based and
model-free accounts put forward that try to capture the associated phenomena (Daw
et al., 2011; Doll, Simon, and Daw, 2012; Lee, Shimojo, and O’Doherty, 2014).1 In
the case of deliberative accounts, model-based methods deploy structured, internal
models of the respective domains, in order to decide between the various options
based on their expected values. These accounts are increasingly studied in neuroeco-
nomics (Glimcher and Fehr, 2014b), and are considered flexible enough to apply to
a wide-range of circumstances, due to the abstract nature of the models utilised. In
contrast, habitual decisions rely on previously-learned “cached” or “heuristic” strate-
gies, rather than building a representation of the options to deliberate over (they are
frequently used in reinforcement learning). Although less flexible than model-based
accounts, the benefit of model-free methods, as Clark acknowledges, is that they “im-
plement “policies” that associate actions directly with rewards, and that typically
exploit simple cues and regularities while nonetheless delivering fluent, often rapid,
responses” (Clark, 2013b, p. 5). In the case of deliberative versus habitual decision-
making, more focus has been given to the latter. Most evidence in support of the
former is limited to localisation claims, based on analysis of lesion studies implicating
regions such as prefrontal cortex in the well-known work of Antonio Damasio (1994).
Given the discussion of Anderson’s work in the previous chapter, we have reason to
1In the quote at the start of this section Botvinick opts for the term ‘goal-directed’ in place of
‘deliberative’. As will be discussed, we favour the latter due to the fact that we see the distinction
as a matter of degree, and therefore acknowledge that some forms of habitual decision-making may
nevertheless be goal-directed.
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doubt some aspects of these studies (i.e. the taxonomic classifications).
A particularly pressing matter pertains to the notion of goal-directedness, which
is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ‘deliberative’ (Botvinick and Tous-
saint, 2012). We believe that habitual decisions are also in some sense goal-directed,
but before addressing this point, it is useful to focus on an intuitive example in order
to raise a related philosophical issue.
Consider the decision of whether to go for a run. The initially distal goal-state
of running is satisfied once you begin your workout. However, there is a more fine-
grained series of causal events that exists between the time when you purportedly
“decide” to ‘go for a run’ and the satisfaction condition of ‘having gone for a run’.
We wish to argue that the decision to ‘go for a run’ should be equated with the
full series of fine-grained causal events—beginning with the mental representation of
the goal-state considered, and ending with the overt performance of the necessary
behaviour.2 As such, the decision of whether to ‘go for a run’ is temporally extended
over time, and as we will see, is partially constituted by events that extend beyond
the brain and body.3 This analysis fits with the characterisation given by Lepora and
Pezzulo (2015) for their embodied choice model. When comparing this model with
two alternative models (based on the drift-diffusion paradigm), they argued that by
incorporating ongoing action into the deliberative process, the natural deadline for
the termination condition of a decision was the completion of the relevant situated
2For simplicity we put no requirements on how far you travel, or how fast you run in order
for the statement, “I went for a run” to obtain. This vagueness is likely to be a characteristic of
many behaviours, and we believe that a certain flexibility is necessary to account for differences in
an individual’s own satisfaction conditions (e.g. less than 1km may not suffice for a professional
long-distance runner.
3Obviously some decisions will be extended over shorter or longer period of times dependent
on the framing of the decision (e.g. deciding between two sandwiches at a shop versus deciding on
a new career path).
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action. This stands in contrast to traditional models that view the termination condi-
tion for some decision (i.e. the commitment) to be some threshold—perhaps reached
on the basis of accumulating evidence encoded in some neural region—and action to
be the mere means for reporting the decision outcome. However, our evaluation of
embodied decisions should make it clear that we favour a view of decision-making
whereby deliberation and commitment are not construed in such cognitivist terms.
Defending this statement requires a number of claims to be explored.
The first is that goal-states do not exist independently of the agent who is rep-
resenting them; that is, they have no mind-independent objectivity (Gallese and
Metzinger, 2003). Only goal representations have a physical existence, realised by
particular patterns of neural activity.4 Secondly, although we speak of goal represen-
tations, as we use the term, they differ from traditional notions of representation in
a number of ways: a) they have no truth-conditions, only conditions for satisfaction
that are directed towards the deployment of certain actions that minimise prediction
error through active inference, b) they are strictly grounded in facts about the agent’s
embodiment, and although possibly multimodal at some high-level of abstraction,
are not amodal in the sense used by the cognitivist (Burr and Jones, 2016).
The motivation behind (a) follows from the truth of the first claim, defended
by Gallese and Metzinger (2003, p. 371), that “no such things as goals exist in the
objective order of things”, therefore, “a goal representation cannot be true or false.”
However, in PP, goal representations (in the form of higher-level predictions) are re-
quired by active inference, and thus have satisfaction (or fulfilment) conditions based
on the imperative to minimise sensory prediction error. This leads to consideration
of (b), and to the question of whether the existence of goal representations, such as
the one posited in the running example, require more than can be provided by an
4We believe this to hold also in the case of intersubjective goal-states, where multiple agents
are pursuing “shared goals”. However, we do not consider this point any further at present.
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embodied account of PP.
For example, the distal goal-state to ‘go for a run’ appears to be abstract (i.e.
possibly encoded in something like a language of thought), despite being decompos-
able into more fine-grained sub-events (e.g. put on trainers; warm-up muscles; fill
water bottle; lock door on leaving house; spend 20 minutes attempting to get your
GPS watch to detect your location). Furthermore, each of these multi-functional
events can be considered independent of the specific goal-state—I may fill my water-
bottle because I am thirsty and require a drink; I will lock my door whenever I leave
my house (irrespective of whether I am going for a run). This fact regarding the
multi-functionality of sub-events doesn’t appear to change even when the series of
sub-events is so frequently performed that I rarely deviate from the order of per-
formance. Alternatively, another decision (e.g. whether to buy a house) may be
performed so infrequently, and contain such a diversity in terms of sub-events, that
I will have very little idea of the string of events in advance.
With the aforementioned in mind, we can pose several questions: 1) does a
complete account of decision-making require use of both habitual and deliberative
strategies, 2) if so how does the brain choose between them, and 3) does an affirmative
answer to the first question require augmenting an embodied account of PP with more
traditional cognitivist principles? In this chapter we will argue that the difference
between habitual and deliberative strategies is a matter of degree, but still requires
the positing of an arbitration mechanism. We will also argue that an embodied
account of PP is sufficient to accommodate a complete account of decision-making.
In fact, the particular solution to the issue of goal representations we defend is unique
to the embodied account.
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6.1.1 Combining Approaches
To begin, we will consider the first possibility that the agent is able to make use
of both habitual and deliberative strategies, and that this corresponds to the use of
model-free and model-based approaches respectively.
On the one hand, model-free approaches seem incompatible with PP due to its
strict adherence to the existence of hierarchical generative models throughout the
cortical hierarchy (Hohwy, 2016). Yet on the other, we have seen how these methods
can implement policies that associate actions directly with rewards (chapter 4). In
addition, model-based strategies are compatible with PP’s adherence to generative
models, but may require proponents of embodied PP to develop alternative computa-
tional methods to account for the seemingly abstract nature of goal representations.
To try to resolve the first conflict, Clark (2013b, 2016b) has appealed to precision-
weighting mechanisms (chapters 2 and 5) to provide a way for the agent to switch
flexibly between these two strategies on the basis of expected precision and accuracy.
Commenting on the model-free strategy, he claims:
“[...] the use (when ecologically apt) of simple cues and quick-and-dirty
heuristics is not just compatible with prediction-based probabilistic pro-
cessing: it may also be actively controlled by it.” (Clark, 2013b, p. 8)
Here, Clark appeals to work in reinforcement learning (e.g. Daw, Niv, and Dayan,
2005; Gla¨scher et al., 2010), which shows how model-free strategies can be devel-
oped that embody implicit values associated with certain action sequences (policies)
through trial and error. This can be achieved without the need to retain an ex-
plicit value or construct a detailed representation, as the policies will have been
reinforced over developmental learning because of the high probability of leading to
(or being-correlated with) rewarding states. These “cached” policies can then be
redeployed at a later stage by the agent if they are estimated to be more reliable
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than the alternatives. In this manner, policies related to habitual decisions can be
subsumed within the generative models of the brain, by virtue of higher-level pre-
dictions that assign a high probability to the policy on the basis of PEM (Pezzulo
et al., 2016). Such work bears close resemblance to work by neo-empiricists, such
as Prinz and Barsalou (2000), who argue that context-sensitivity in cognition re-
quires a collaboration between dynamic approaches (akin to model-free methods)
and representational approaches that are grounded in an agent’s embodiment (akin
to model-based methods).
This allows PP to make use of model-free and model-based methods respectively,
but doing so requires positing a mechanism that is able to switch flexibly between
them as required by the environmental demands. Clark’s (2016) solution to this is to
again appeal to precision-weighting mechanisms as a way of modulating the effective
connectivity of the brain’s networks in response to the myriad biasing inputs that
collectively determine an agent’s needs (e.g. affective information, sensory informa-
tion, prior knowledge). In addition to appealing to precision-weighting mechanisms,
he also acknowledges (in line with earlier work5) a recent argument by Pezzulo,
Rigoli, and Chersi (2013) regarding the development of a neural control mechanism
that switches between the separate systems. A number of studies, including the
aforementioned work by Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Chersi, have argued that the brain
decides between these heuristic (model-free) strategies and more deliberative forms
of model-based reasoning by employing some form of arbitration mechanism (neural
5Clark (1997a, p. 136) argued that in addition to neural structures that respond to external
stimuli, we need to acknowledge the existence of so called “neural control structures”, which are
“any neural circuits, structures, or processes whose primary role is to modulate the activity of
other neural circuits, structures, or processes—that is to say, any items or processes whose role is
to control the inner economy rather than to track external states of affairs or to directly control
bodily activity.”
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Figure 6.1: Left: simplified view of online active inference. Right: Offline “optimising”
loops coordinate with online control of action and overlap with relevant sen-
sorimotor circuits, but are also detachable from overt motor control. Figure
reprinted from (Pezzulo, 2012).
controller), which predicts the respective reliability of various policies (Daw, Niv, and
Dayan, 2005; Dayan, 2012; Lee, Shimojo, and O’Doherty, 2014). These positions ac-
knowledge the importance of combining both habitual and deliberative mechanisms
for determining instrumental choice behaviour—neither is sufficient on its own.
The stronger claim that instrumental behaviour depends on both mechanisms,
leads to the claim that deliberative forms of reasoning entail another kind of cost to
the agent—mental effort and delay. Pezzulo et al. (2016) argue that different types of
policies can be distinguished according to whether they are associated with extrinsic
value (i.e. the expected physical reward for completing the action) or epistemic value
(i.e the additional information gain or resolution of uncertainty). For simplicity
we will refer to these types of policies as extrinsic policies and epistemic policies
respectively.
Pezzulo (2008, 2011) has argued at length that the importance of deliberative
forms of reasoning is best seen in their ability to allow agents to plan for future
actions by emulating potential actions utilising sensorimotor representations that
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have been optimised through successive interactions with the world. He argues that
the former anticipatory capacity depends on habitual forms of choice behaviour, and
may have evolved as successive elaborations on earlier sensorimotor circuits. As more
deliberative forms of reasoning emerged, organisms gained the ability to internally
optimise extrinsic policies by simulating their sensorimotor consequences before per-
forming the overt behaviour. This idea is compatible with the PP framework, and is
depicted schematically in Figure 6.1.6
Policies that can be used for optimising offline action plans are also important
for understanding choice behavior in exploration-exploitation dilemmas, where the
agent faces a decision between exploiting some previously learned strategy, or risking
exploration and increased uncertainty. As Pezzulo et al. (2016, p. 324) state:
“[...] epistemic value is key in so-called “costly” choices, when an accurate
estimation of the context is necessary to secure a reward and a wrong
choice implies a “cost” such as long delay in reward consumption.”
In cases like this, there may be a payoff for considering actions with high epistemic
value in order to ascertain whether there are other options that have not yet been
considered. Such cases represent a sort of best-guess for the agent, based on prior
knowledge of how similar situations have played out in the past. However, sometimes
the situation will be too complicated to deliberate over in this manner. This idea
has important connections to understanding choice behaviour in ecologically-valid
situations, where seemingly irrational behaviour may be explained by appealing to
6Although tangential to this thesis, such a view is closely connected with work on the origins
of mental imagery and its connection to motor control (cf. Jeannerod, 2006), where it is argued
that the ability to simulate motor behaviour offline may be a pre-requisite for mental imagery. This
is because true mental activity should be produced endogenously, and not as a direct response to
perceptual stimuli (Grush, 2004).
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the proper complexity of the task environment, and acknowledging the cost of more
deliberative forms of reasoning (Fawcett et al., 2014).
It seems, therefore, that there is a strong case to be made for the interaction of
both habitual and deliberative mechanisms in the predictive brain. We do not wish
to reject this idea in its entirety, nor disagree with the empirical findings, but we do
wish to propose an alternative conceptual interpretation focused on the underlying
physical substrates that give rise to the distinction in the first place. Moreover, we
wish to argue that the distinction between habitual and deliberative forms of decision-
making is a difference in degree, rather than a difference in kind. The motivation for
this echoes the earlier motivation for both the account of embodied decisions defended
by Cisek, and the neural reuse hypothesis defended by Anderson. That is, the brain
is a product of evolution, and is thus subject to descent with modification and natural
selection. We will argue that accepting this requires a greater consideration of the
scope for habitual decision-making when properly situated in the world, and that
more deliberative forms of decision-making (where required) will be embodied in
nature.
Cisek and Pastor-Bernier (2014, p. 10) seem to acknowledge this when they state
that “phylogenetic continuity motivates us to consider how abstract decisions such
as economic choice evolved within a system originally adapted for realtime embodied
choices, and how the architectures subserving these abilities may be related.” And
yet, this very statement is preceded by the following:
“Obviously, humans are capable of making decisions that have nothing to
do with action, and understanding such abilities is of great scientific and
clinical interest. In fact, it is quite possible that the distinction between
different kinds of decisions, such as abstract versus embodied decisions, is
paralleled by a distinction between different neural structures and circuits
that subserve these scenarios.” (ibid.)
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The remainder of this chapter is aimed at reconsidering the distinction expressed
above, by attempting to weaken the strict separation between a) the types of em-
bodied decisions explored in this thesis hitherto, and b) the abstract (disembodied)
economic decisions that are alluded to in the above quote.
6.2 Hierarchical Cognitive Control
To understand how the brain could have evolved more sophisticated mechanisms for
choice behaviour we need to understand how the more complex goal-directed choices,
characteristic of so-called deliberative decisions, can be decomposed. Developing on
the earlier proposal of choice behaviour in PP and active inference, Pezzulo (2012)
and Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston (2015) have begun to explore the role of associative
learning in active inference, and how predictive mechanisms initially concerned with
online control could be detached for offline cognitive control of more abstract, long-
term consequences of behaviour. Pezzulo claims:
“As the sensorimotor control system of early organisms evolved (to face
increasingly harder individual and social problems), it gradually began
predicting increasingly long-term and abstract consequences of behaviour.”
(Pezzulo, 2012, p. 1)
This idea is related to recent developments in computational neuroscience (Klaes
et al., 2011; Pezzulo et al., 2014), which have begun to explore how hierarchical
models of cognitive control can be understood as successive elaborations of earlier
sensorimotor control mechanisms. Cognitive control is the ability to internally guide
behaviour in concert with goals, plans and wider contextual knowledge. It requires
the simultaneous management of multiple, hierarchically nested goal representations,
across different spatiotemporal scales, in order to constrain action selection. As such
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we can refer to it as hierarchical cognitive control, in order to acknowledge the nested
structure of goal representations.
This definition of hierarchical cognitive control draws our attention to several
components:
1. The hierarchical organisation of goal-directed choice and behaviour.
2. The simultaneous co-ordination of multiple goal representations (across differ-
ent spatiotemporal scales).
3. The constraining nature of this process.
This is important for the development of PP and embodied decisions, as long-
term planning, unlike the continuous, situated interaction inherent in many of the
earlier examples, requires the agent to maintain a commitment to an extended goal-
state, which may not afford an immediate action opportunity (e.g deciding to buy a
house). Let’s see how this could be achieved within the embodied PP framework.
To begin, Botvinick (2008) discusses how the hierarchical structure of more ab-
stract goal-states can be understood as a successive elaboration of lower-level action
representations. For example, think of the process of making a cup of coffee, and
the number of successive steps that are required. The process can be decomposed
into separable control sequences (policies) (e.g. go to kitchen, get objects from
cupboard, heat up water, prepare coffee), and each of these sequences in turn will
unfold into further nested sequences of actions (e.g. getting objects from the cup-
board will involve opening and reaching actions, and possibly relocating occluding
objects). Though we can see the decision to make a coffee as a successive decom-
position, this presumes we have first learned the molecular structure involved in the
necessary actions—including very fine-grained movements (e.g. gripping objects).
Rather than a successive unpacking, the process of learning over both evolutionary
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and developmental timescales requires a successive elaboration on previously learned
molecular control sequences, which progressively tunes the relevant sensorimotor cir-
cuits to become associated with some represented goal-state (e.g. grasping for a
desired object).
Related to this work, Pezzulo (2011) has argued that more complex cognitive
architectures (assumed to be required for long-term planning) could have emerged
as developments on control mechanisms for earlier situated action, and importantly
retain the embodied aspects of the earlier systems (contra the classical sandwich
model), given that they rely on the emulation of the same underlying sensorimotor
circuits. Though admittedly speculative at this early stage, he argues that the ca-
pacity for cognitive control (i.e. the ability to internally guide behaviour in concert
with goals, plans and wider contextual knowledge) is an elaboration on the earlier
anticipatory architecture of sensorimotor control apparent in many living organisms.
In short, as agents began to face more complex problems, they faced increasing evo-
lutionary pressure to predict longer-term consequences of their actions, and at some
point began mentally simulating these consequences in covert loops, without the
need for activating overt behaviour (Grush, 2004; Jeannerod, 2006) (see figure 6.1).
This raises the possibility that scaling up the notion of embodied decisions may be
possible, and the PP framework may have significant explanatory interest to those
developing computational models of decision-making. It also leads to the possibil-
ity that the distinction between habitual and deliberative strategies are a matter
of degree, rather than distinct modes. Even though many goal-representations will
have distal satisfaction conditions, they will nevertheless be grounded in the senso-
rimotor mechanisms that gave rise to them in the first place, and in some cases (as
demonstrated by the embodied decisions work) still play a fundamental role in choice
behaviour.
It could be argued that this ‘evolutionary continuity’ perspective commits its
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advocates to holding the related view that the main adaptive problem for cognition
is not the reduction of uncertainty between some abstract representation of how the
world is, but the the identification of adaptive actions. Moore (2012, p. 1) takes
this line, claiming that it accords with the idea that every organism has what he
calls “sunk capital” in preferred ways to interact with the world, based upon its
evolved neural architecture and physiological traits. He argues, “[the organism’s]
challenge is to use that capital to operate adaptively. Modelling the world in any
disinterested manner is a luxury; quickly identifying adaptive ways to go on is a
necessity.” This brings us to the first proposal for how PP can scale-up the notion of
embodied decisions to accommodate more deliberative forms of decision-making. We
should begin by attempting to see how a deliberative choice is in fact decomposable
into a successive series of hierarchically nested actions, and then try to identify the
local networks that are responsible for learning the associations, and deploying the
sensorimotor commands in the first place. This would be the preferred approach for
some in the enactivist tradition, such as Barrett (2011, p. 16), who claims “[a]s clunky
and unparsimonious as it may seem, it is possible that long chains of associations are
exactly the way in which many skills are learned, and complex behaviors are brought
about.” It is also an approach that views cognition as a wholly action-oriented
adaptation.
6.2.1 Action-Oriented Hierarchies
A growing number of researchers in the cognitive sciences have begun exploring
what Engel et al. (2013) call the ‘Pragmatic Turn’ (cf. Engel, Friston, and Kragic,
2016, for a collection of recent papers). This is the view that the brain is primarily
action-oriented, and its purpose is to coordinate and regulate the organism’s ongoing
interactions with changes in its environment. The ACH can be seen as an example
of this approach, as it is committed to the idea that our diverse repertoire of choice
233
behaviours is supported by a dynamic process of distributed probabilistic competi-
tion between representations of action opportunities. Recall, this process coordinates
multiple neural regions in order to process separate streams of sensorimotor infor-
mation in line with higher-level goals, which are in turn biased (and determined) by
interoceptive information communicating the current and future needs of the agent.
As Anderson (2014) has convincingly argued, the brain, having been established
by natural selection and descent with modification, is able to support this flexibility
due to a functional architecture that is characterised by interactivity and functional
differentiation (also see Bickhard, 2015, for another view committed to interactivity
in neural architecture). PP unifies this work in a neurocomputationally plausible
framework that has the conceptual and theoretical tools to be able to explain how the
brain is able to support these processes by using key neuromodulatory mechanisms.
A potential challenge to this action-oriented, pragmatic turn is to point to the
empirical evidence in support of sensory mappings (e.g. in visual cortex), which seem
to represent objective properties of the world, independent of any particular action.
Putting aside the earlier claims made by those in the active vision framework, which
already count against this challenge, we can acknowledge that the transductions at
the sensory peripheries exist and are vital for adaptive functions. However, we can
acknowledge this without the need to make the stronger claim that the mappings or
encodings therefore represent the objects that caused them. Instead, we can see the
encodings as more closely integrated with the global functioning of the brain, and
as setting up indications of what the organism could do on the basis of higher-level
beliefs (priors).
We have already seen evidence in favour of this view from Hosoya, Baccus, and
Meister (2005), who demonstrated how the receptive fields of retinal ganglion cells
dynamically alter when the organism moves to a new environment (chapter 2). It
was argued that these changes, when understood from the perspective of PP, are
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Figure 6.2: Homunculus representing the mapping between somatosensory cortex and
body parts.
Image reprinted from Wikimedia Commons under Creative Commons Licence 3.0:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortical_homunculus#/media/File:
1421_Sensory_Homunculus.jpg [Accessed: 12/09/16, Author: OpenStax College]
adaptive because they contribute to the efficient coding of the shifting statistical
information coming from the environment. An action-oriented account would argue
that this makes sense when one considers how different environments will potentially
require different actions, and thus different sensorimotor dynamics. Although this
work undermines the serial, encapsulated nature of cognitivism, a re-interpretation
of neural encodings—influenced by global network dynamics—is not sufficient on
its own to support the view that the brain is primarily action-oriented. However,
in addition to this work, Graziano (2016) reviews a large body of empirical data
originating with a study reported in (Graziano et al., 2002) that points to another
unexpected finding regarding the functional organisation of the brain—this time in
motor cortex.
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Figure 6.3: Example of an ethological action map in macaque motor cortex representing
organism-relevant behaviours. Figure reprinted from (Graziano, 2016).
Motor cortex has traditionally been understood as containing a somatotopic rep-
resentation of the body (in primary somatosensory cortex), and is often depicted by
way of a homunculus (see figure 6.2). However, this map is not as neatly delineated
as the homunculus depiction would suggest, and in fact the map contains substantial
overlaps between regions and corresponding bodily parts. Graziano’s proposal is to
reinterpret the functional organisation of this region in terms of what he calls an
‘ethological action map’. Simply put, motor cortex is composed of zones which are
related to a different “ethologically relevant type of action”. In the case of macaques7,
7Graziano is keen to point out that although the map depicts motor cortex in macaques, the
empirical findings for ethological action maps are significantly more robust, involving different
species and multiple methods. He states, “The action map has now been studied in rats, mice,
prosimians, monkeys, humans, squirrels, and cats, using a great range of methods including electrical
and optogenetic stimulation, chemical manipulation, lesions, single neuron recording, functional
imaging, anatomical tract tracing, behavioral analysis, and computational modeling.” (Graziano,
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figure 6.3 depicts examples of some ethologically relevant actions. Using cortical stim-
ulation to target different zones (also see previous footnote), Graziano and his col-
leagues found that the activation of a particular region (over behaviourally-relevant
timescales) was akin to pressing a button that reliably activates the entire network to
collaboratively produce a particular action. This produced a coordinated behaviour
that is both species-typical, and which likely evolved to serve some adaptive function.
Echoing the sentiments of previous network approaches, Graziano therefore dismisses
the idea that there is a one-to-one mapping between a cortical region and a muscle
or body part. Instead he argues that we should adopt a more global systems-level
approach, and acknowledge the multi-functional role that ethnologically-relevant ac-
tion representations can play within a more interactive brain. This work also appears
to strongly complement the frequent appeal to policies (control sequences) in PP.
Both of the above findings from retinal cells and motor cortex seem obviously
well-suited to their respective proposals, given their anatomical connections and
location. However, what about more distal regions such as prefrontal cortex; how is
a region such as this considered action-oriented? One emerging area of interest comes
from the study of mixed-selectivity neurons. Using single-cell recordings, Rigotti et
al. (2013) demonstrate that neurons in prefrontal cortex (PFC) demonstrate mixed-
selectivity : that is they respond non-linearly to a wide variety of inputs, and thus have
high-dimensional receptive fields. These findings also challenge the traditional idea
that the brain can be understood using simple methods of functional decomposition.
Rigotti et al. (ibid.) propose that this high-dimensionality is key to the acquisition
of more advanced cognitive capacities (e.g. cognitive control). A densely populated
set of mixed-selectivity neurons, provides the brain with a way to flexibly adapt
to changes in the environment, without the need for extensive rewiring. Rather,
2016, p. 121)
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dense hubs could play a fundamental role in the co-ordination of distributed neural
activity. However, high-dimensionality in mixed-selectivity neurons does not need
to be interpreted as indicative of abstract, amodal representations a la cognitivism.
Rather, it is perfectly consistent to refer to these regions as multimodal, serving
the co-ordination of widely distributed regions that are themselves action-oriented.
From an evolutionary perspective, the existence of these regions also makes sense
when we consider the flexibility that they bestow upon an agent in responding to a
changing environment, which is efficiently achieved using limited neural real-estate.
Novel computational methods are being developed that explicitly make use of such
mixed-selectivity neurons to demonstrate how networks composed of them enable far
greater complexity than traditional methods, with limited neural resources (Enel et
al., 2016). Additionally, the existence of these types of neurons helps us understand
the wide-spread effects of lesions in prefrontal cortex, given the myriad roles they
serve in co-ordinating disparate regions of the brain.
Taken together, the aforementioned research appears to indicate the need for a
hierarchical, action-oriented perspective on the brain’s function (see Engel, Friston,
and Kragic, 2016, for a range of additional arguments and evidence); one which an
embodied account of PP is well-equipped to handle. And yet, in spite of this, the
picture remains incomplete.
Consider the earlier example of deciding to go for a run, and the subsequent
formation of a goal-representation that is posited to co-ordinate the subsequent series
of actions that lead to the fulfilment of this goal. Recall, that this goal-representation
was underspecified, and could be satisfied in a number of ways. If we restrict ourselves
to appealing solely to neural mechanisms, it seems unlikely that we will be able to
explain how any particular set of actions is selected, except in the most restricted
of cases. This point is made by Basso (2013), who asks how PP accommodates
long-term planning. He states:
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“[...] the future goal state created in the beginning is accurate only in
some particular circumstances (i.e., when both the task and algorithm
are well-defined). In most cases, people are used to facing underspeci-
fied tasks in which a future goal state cannot be employed to derive the
intermediate states” Basso (ibid., p.1, emphasis added)
PPs proposal that the brain selects policies that drive action based on predicted
success (i.e. expected probability and precision) is more intuitive in habitual cases
of choice behaviour, where the associated control sequences are simple actions such
as grabbing (e.g. ethologically relevant types of action). But in more deliberative
forms (e.g. whether to go for a run), as we saw earlier, there are vastly more ways in
which the goal representation can be satisfied. Echoing the above quotation, we can
refer to this as the underspecification challenge. Appealing to expected probability
and precision-weighting mechanisms is an important first step, as it helps us under-
stand why certain policies are favoured over others—they have a higher posterior
probability of minimising prediction error. However, this answer is incomplete, and
so we now turn to look beyond the brain for additional constraints.
6.3 Constraining and Coordinating Decisions
The previous sections lend support to the more moderate forms of embodied cogni-
tion discussed in chapter 1, which argue that neural encodings represent sensorimotor
activity, rather than some organism-independent reality. However, many forms of
embodied cognition (e.g. enactive, embedded, and extended cognition) go further in
acknowledging the key role that organism-environment interactions play in shaping
or constituting cognition. In this section we explore how an action-oriented view
of hierarchical cognitive control, can be bolstered by appealing to wider influences
and constraints placed on the organism. We will explore four types of constraints:
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physiological constraints, temporal constraints, affective constraints, and sociocul-
tural constraints. It should be noted that each of these sections reflect somewhat
speculative sketches for the development of an embodied account of PP, and fur-
ther work is required to fully defend the claims that are made. Nevertheless, the
following sections provide further reason to support the claim that decision-making
is an embodied process, and PP offers a suitable framework to further investigate
and develop the following ideas. They also provide additional responses to help us
overcome the underspecification challenge, which will be revisited in section 6.4.
6.3.1 Physiological Constraints
The body undoubtedly plays a fundamental role in shaping cognition. It can provide
a grounding relation for conceptual content as in cases of moderate embodied cog-
nition (e.g Barsalou, 2008), or, as we will see in this section, it can provide a more
reliable basis for active inference. This latter claim can be decomposed into two
focal points concerning the explanatory role that the body plays in understanding
decision-making: sensorimotor constraints and efficiency constraints. We will begin
by looking at the first.
We have already seen how, in PP, predictions arise from generative models in the
brain. These models are encoded as probability density functions, which are struc-
tured according to an increasing level of spatiotemporal scale. The predictions at the
lowest levels correspond to the activity of sensory receptors encoding input at small
and fast spatiotemporal scales, whereas the higher-level models provide more general
contextual information concerning larger and slower structures in the environment.
The theoretical and empirical support for this picture has already been documented
in work by Friston et al. (2010), who argue that the formal similarities of their hierar-
chical models to the hierarchical structure of the motor system lends them biological
plausibility (Kanai et al., 2015), as well as offering a wide explanatory scope (Friston,
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2010). Additionally, Hohwy (2013) has argued that the hierarchical structure leads
to a highly restricted set of possible parameters that exist at the lowest-levels of the
control hierarchy, because of the limited ways that certain parts of the body could
be configured. These parameters further restrict the set of possible actions, and may
allow for automated or simple reflexive patterns in specific circumstances.
For example, consider the case of a fine-grained goal representation such as ‘grasp
the apple’. The object being grasped may be replaced with any number of appro-
priately sized objects, although only some of these objects will have any significance
for the agent. However, the behaviour of grasping, will be highly restricted, based
on the physiological characteristics of the organism (e.g. size of hands). As such,
the policies that are associated with this action will rarely deviate from a set of
highly-restricted control parameters, unless the agent undergoes some physiological
change (e.g. loss of a hand, or muscular atrophy). In this manner, we can see how
those goal-representations associated with habitual decisions, perhaps involving etho-
logically relevant types of behaviours, are less susceptible to the underspecification
challenge (see above).
Far from being a hindrance to an agent, these restricted features can have adap-
tive value, allowing the agent to more easily detect and learn about the relevant
features that emerge in the course of interacting with the world. This will in turn
help to optimise the selection of possible actions in decision-making, as the specifica-
tion of the relevant parameters can be reliably constrained by relevant factors of their
embodiment. For instance, as the eyes saccade from left to right, the visual scene
will shift from right to left in a predictable manner, relative to the speed and direc-
tion of saccadic motion. An active perceiver can exploit regular relations between
sensory input and motion of this kind in order to detect objective structural and
causal features of the environment. As we first saw in chapter 1, these predictable
relationships between bodily movement and sensory input are known as sensorimotor
241
contingencies (SMCs) (O’Regan and Noe, 2001). Despite being a commonly refer-
enced notion in the embodied cognition literature, Hohwy (2014, 2016) has claimed
that this view need not entail that the mind is embodied in any important manner.
Instead, he argues, concepts fundamental to embodied cognition can be subsumed
within an internalist PP. He states, when discussing the reliably occurring relation-
ships between movement and expected sensory input: “It is crucial to acknowledge
that accommodating embodied cognition in this way happens within the strictures
of the self-evidencing brain.” (Hohwy, 2014, p. 17)
We have elsewhere argued, contrary to Hohwy, that this aspect of embodied
cognition is implied by active inference (Burr and Jones, 2016), and does not suggest
an internalist reading. In addition, Seth (2014) has also proposed utilising SMCs to
extend the PP framework to account for phenomena such as perceptual presence,
and its absence in synaesthesia. To see why this is the case, we should first note that
reliable law-like regularities do not merely exist between the world and individual
(active) senses. There are also law-like regularities that can be detected between
senses, and are fundamental to an organism’s development.
For example, Dahl et al. (2013) explore the case of the development of a wariness
of heights. This appears to be absent in human infants with little or no crawling
experience, but becomes exceptionally strong (sometimes debilitating) over the lifes-
pan of an individual. To explain this, Dahl et al. demonstrate that when an infant
is carried there is no real correlation between the infant’s proprioception and vision,
but this changes when an infant begins to crawl. At this point, the infant is able
to keep their head oriented towards a particular point, and begin to learn about
their body by experiencing the reliable and consistent correlation between propri-
oceptive signals—importantly including the motor commands—and the optic flow.
As Soliman and Glenberg (2014, p. 209) highlight, it is this correlation that becomes
the “basis for a stable world”. This basis originates from (and is constituted by)
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sensorimotor interactions between the body and the world. Moreover, disrupting
this correlation, can provide useful information that the world is changing, while the
body remains stationary. For example, consider the case of sitting on a stationary
train at the platform while watching another train move, and the temporary feeling
of uncertainty that is experienced prior to your realisation that there is no correlated
feeling of acceleration. Returning to the crawling infant, an analogous disruption
can be caused by placing the infant near a visual cliff (e.g. a cliff that is covered
with a perspex sheet to give the illusion of an actual cliff-edge). Doing so causes the
infant distress, but only when they have learned to crawl and have thus experienced
the correlation between different sense modalities. (Dahl et al., 2013)
Other correlations also exist between different senses (e.g. detecting the location
of a sound-source by moving your head to alter the temporal asynchrony originating
from the ears, and simultaneously centring the visual field in order to detect the
cause). Prior to learning these sensorimotor contingencies, it may be that there is a
latent imperative to partake in what Hohwy (2013) calls “itinerant wandering”, but is
also known in some cases as ‘motor babbling’ (e.g. infant behaviour). This seemingly
random wandering can unfold while the agent determines which action is most likely
to minimise prediction error most effectively. Though this unguided exploratory
behaviour can result in local (temporary) increases of prediction-error, in cases of
high uncertainty the undirected initiation of movement can be helpful in exposing
further (potentially more valuable) options. This is a useful strategy for agents
to adopt when exploiting the current environment is no longer viable, but where
the possibility of exploration is over-determined by too large a number of possible
options. Although there may be uncertainty in the environment, there will always
remain a high-degree of reliability that emanates from sensorimotor interactions.
In (Burr and Jones, 2016) we argued that overlooking this reliability meant that
the significance of the body in cognitive processes would be diminished if one at-
243
tempts to subsume embodied cognition within the structures of an internalist PP.
An organism’s phenotype determines what is valuable (in the autopoietic sense dis-
cussed in chapter 4) for the organism at birth. The task of the organism is then
to find the most efficient ways to acquire valuable states—according to PP, this is
governed by the imperative to minimise prediction error. Therefore, by encoding
information that pertains to body-world interactions (i.e. action opportunities), an
organism can exploit this sensorimotor knowledge to reliably minimise prediction
error, over less reliable organism-independent representations.
An apparent problem at this stage is that there seem to also be law-like regulari-
ties in the world that do not immediately pertain to an agent’s interactions (e.g. the
regular rising and setting of the sun). Given this, it may seem like an agent with the
necessary cognitive capacities should also encode representations of this interaction-
independent causal structure. However, there are differences between our access
to environmental and embodied regularities worth noting. Firstly, it is possible
to decouple oneself from environmental regularities in a way that one cannot from
bodily ones. Secondly, in the case of sunrises, the sensory input will vary depend-
ing on contextual features such as the direction one is facing, whereas sensorimotor
contingencies are relatively invariant across contexts. We argue, that sensorimotor
interactions are more reliable because, unlike other statistical regularities in the envi-
ronment, the agent can exploit them through action-oriented representations, which,
as some have argued, could be adapted and reproduced over phylogenetic timescales
(for some theoretical arguments in support of this claim, see Clark, 2013c; Friston,
2010, 2013). To paraphrase, while the statistical regularities in the environment
would have to be internalised through interactions and learning, it is likely that the
statistical regularities pertaining to the ways in which our bodies interact with the
environment have been stable enough over evolutionary time-scales so as to be ge-
netically determined. It isn’t necessary to learn about most important sensorimotor
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relationships because they can be built in to an organisms morphology and neural
architecture, thereby setting the priors in advance (this is admittedly a speculative
claim). Furthermore, as we have just seen, the controllability of these interactions
by the agent during ontogenetic development is likely to contribute significantly to
the shaping of the representations.
Therefore, we would expect that an agent is more likely to exploit the sorts of
reliable organism-environment interactions that are contingent upon its phenotype
over less reliable (more uncertain) organism-independent worldly structures. Inter-
acting vicariously with the environment via sensorimotor contingencies affords the
agent a more reliable manner in which to minimise uncertainty. Just as scientists
test hypotheses by conducting experiments using well-calibrated lab equipment, per-
ceivers must likewise test their predictions by using their bodies to interact with their
environment.
Hohwy (2013, p. 224) argues that we are able to cope with noisy signals from the
environment because the world is a uniform kind of place that kindly affords reliable
statistical inference. However, as previously discussed, this reliability does not arise
merely because the world is uniformly reliable. It arises precisely because certain
parts of the environment, namely our bodies, behave in a more reliably predictable
manner than the rest of the environment beyond them. The world would be a far
less kind place if it werent for the fact that our bodies are part of it and that their
predictable behaviour is, in some sense, under our own control.
We are beginning to see how the body can offer adaptive constraints that afford
the agent a reliable basis for interacting with (and importantly learning) about the
world. These interactions are dynamic, but we have not yet considered the additional
temporal constraints that add important evolutionary and adaptive pressures. This
will be important for understanding how a distal goal-state, which initially appears
underspecified, is in fact more constrained than we may imagine. The ongoing pursuit
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of prediction-error minimisation demands learning the most efficient ways to achieve
these more distal goals, and environmental pressures play an integral part in this
process.
6.3.2 Responding to Urgency
PEM must be responsive to causes in the environment across a number of spatiotem-
poral scales. For example, perhaps a perturbing influence happens regularly at the
order of milliseconds, but is also nested within a further perturbing influence that
occurs on the timescale of minutes. The hierarchical structure of the brain is well-
suited to accommodate these changes, but it is also well-suited to regulate additional
factors such as the biomechanical costs involved with certain actions, which them-
selves may differ across spatiotemporal scales. Anyone who has done long-distance
cardiovascular activities (e.g. running or cycling) and suffered with the difficulty of
inadequate pacing over extended timescales will attest to the importance of being
receptive to the body’s changing demands across multiple timescales. The neural
mechanisms, which are responsible for encoding the relevant expectations associated
with biomechanical costs, must themselves be governed by efficiency constraints in
order to use energy effectively—the brain requires energy, just like the rest of the
body.
Some have argued that the efficient coding of information (e.g. predictive coding)
may be responsible for the existence of suboptimal choice behaviour (Summerfield
and Tsetsos, 2015), as the agent will not be receptive to all the relevant information
it could be. However, efficient coding schemes may also lead to more robust decision-
making abilities, which despite departing from optimality in many situations, may
nevertheless maximise information-processing for a limited capacity system situated
in an uncertain, changing world.
Recent work by Cos, Duque, and Cisek (2014) provides an interesting develop-
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ment to this idea. They argue that human subjects make a rapid prediction of
biomechanical costs when deciding between actions. For instance, when deciding
between actions that yield the same reward, humans show a preference to the action
that requires the least effort, and are remarkably accurate at evaluating the effort
of potential reaching actions as determined by the biomechanical properties of the
arm. Cos et al. argue that their study (a reach decision task) supports the view
that a prediction of the effort associated with respective movements is computed
very quickly, and furthermore, that measurements of cortico-spinal activity initially
reflects a competition between candidate actions, which later change to reflect the
processes of preparing to implement the winning action choice. Although there may
be a possible disagreement concerning the exact manner in which cost functions are
encoded (see chapter 4), note how the representation is encoded as an expectation
of the cost associated with motor control, rather than as a cost involving some eco-
nomic good. Studies like this provide further reasons for taking the work of Lepora
and Pezzulo (2015) seriously, due to the close connection with the aforementioned
commitment effects (see chapter 3).
Learning about the average biomechanical costs associated with performing cer-
tain actions could be a useful first-step in the formation of simple heuristics that
stand in lieu of rational deliberation, and may also explain the presence of purport-
edly maladaptive decisions (e.g. sunk-cost fallacy). In short, some tasks may simply
require more effort to formulate a deliberative plan, which outweighs the risk as-
sociated with simply choosing incorrectly (e.g. choosing between a pair of socks).
In situations like this the risk may be minimal, and may lead to the misapplica-
tion of a strategy that is maladaptive in the current environment. Being receptive
to these changes in context is therefore of the upmost importance, as the value of
many actions will vary contextually, dependent on factors such as fatigue, injury
and environmental resistance (e.g. hill-climbing). However, an alternative strategy
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is to simply allow the constraints of the body and environment to stand-in as a
constituent part of the decision-making process. This is where dynamic, responsive
feedback from the body, as input back into an ongoing decision is so important, and
where work in situated cognition can provide constructive assistance. As Lepora and
Pezzulo note:
“In situated cognition theories, the current movement trajectory can be
considered an external memory of the ongoing decision that both biases
and facilitates the underlying choice computations by offloading them
onto the environment.” (ibid., p. 16)
This also reflects work in embodied cognition such as Clark’s principle of ecological
assembly (first seen in chapter 1), which states that an agent will “recruit, on the
spot, whatever mix of problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a
minimum of effort.” (Clark, 2008, p. 13) An interactive, predictive brain, which can
flexibly alter its effective connectivity on the fly, is well-suited to such a distributed
form of adaptive decision-making. Sometimes, the best decision is to offload part
of the choice onto the typically reliable dynamics of the body. Moreover, in cases
where this strategy leads to undesired commitment effects, there may also be an
opportunity for researchers to learn about the cognitive architecture of the agent in
question.
Accommodating urgency exposes another important connection between PP and
embodied decisions. Given the level of urgency of an agent’s higher-level goal states,
the gain of incoming sensory information should be adjusted accordingly. Higher-
level goals should therefore encode more abstract expectations regarding the optimal
amount of time taken to deliberate in any given decision. Cisek and Pastor-Bernier
point to the importance of an urgency signal in their work:
“[...] in dynamically changing situations the brain is motivated to process
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sensory information quickly and to combine it with an urgency signal that
gradually increases over time. We call this the ‘urgency-gating model’.”
(Cisek and Pastor-Bernier, 2014, p. 7)
When the urgency of a decision is low, only an option with strong evidence will
win the probabilistic competition. However, as the urgency to act increases, the
competition between the options can increase, such that a small shift may be suf-
ficient to alter the distribution. Cisek and Pastor-Bernier highlight a number of
neuroimaging studies that support the existence of such an urgency signal, and ar-
gue that evidence accumulation may not be the only cause of the build-up of neural
activity seen during decision-making experiments.8 By emphasising the importance
of precision-weighting as a neuromodulatory mechanism for altering the brain’s ef-
fective connectivity, PP may be able to further develop this line of thought in a more
unified framework, which demonstrates the closely intertwined nature of perception,
action, emotion, learning and decision-making. Doing so will also provide an ad-
ditional, explanatorily relevant factor that could be fruitful in understanding how
more deliberative forms of choice behaviour unfold according to various embodied
constraints.
6.3.3 Stabilising Disorder: A coordinating role for emotions
Emotions play a key role in our ability to make decisions, and the impacts of this
role are becoming increasingly well understood. This is in large part thanks to work
in behavioural economics and cognitive neuroscience (see Lerner et al., 2015; Phelps,
Lempert, and Sokol-Hessner, 2014, for reviews). One significant area of develop-
ment comes from work in cognitive neuroscience that demonstrates how cortical and
8Connecting this with work on the dark-room problem in PP (Friston, Thornton, and Clark,
2012) could be of mutual benefit for the two areas.
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sub-cortical regions mutually influence each other, reflecting coordinated patterns of
activity. As Pessoa (2009, 2014) has argued, emotional processes can directly influ-
ence (i.e. enhance or impair) key regions associated with cognitive control, and have
a direct influence on behavioural performance. Further work needs to address these
important processes, in order to overcome what Pessoa (2014, p. 410) calls “cortical
myopia”, or a “cortico-centric” perspective. He defines this as follows:
“A cortico-centric framework is one in which the “newer” cortex con-
trols subcortical regions, which are typically assumed to be relatively
unchanged throughout evolution. In this view, cortical expansion is thus
a matter of cortical regions being set up so as to control “lower” centers.
In sharp contrast, if both cortex and subcortex change, they may change
in a coordinated fashion. In this case, the resulting circuitry is one in
which cortex and subcortex are mutually embedded.” (ibid., p. 413)
Add to this, work by Friston (1997), who demonstrated how activity in a given
region was functionally dependent on the activity of another region (e.g. whether
inferotemporal cortex is considered “face selective” depends on activity in posterior
parietal cortex), and we are again reminded of the earlier point regarding functional
plasticity in the brain’s networks. Does this principle help us understand the role of
emotional processing in decision-making, or does it simply add further complexities
to the picture? To attempt to answer this question, we can focus on two areas: a
difference between immediate and expected emotions, and emotions as modulatory
mechanisms.
In emotional theory, a common distinction is made between immediate and ex-
pected emotions. The former pertains to the emotions that are felt during the process
of decision-making, whereas the latter pertain to the emotional states that are ex-
pected to obtain given the outcome of a decision. It should be obvious how the
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differences between these states can affect decision-making respectively. For exam-
ple, if you are angry while making a decision, you may be more likely to make a
rash decision without properly considering the various options, whereas if you are
currently experiencing fear and expect that performing some action will result in a
more positive state, you may rank this option as most desirable—potentially over-
looking whether it has a higher probability than alternative options. Traditionally,
decision theory has focused on the latter emotional state, but the importance of im-
mediate emotions for decision-making cannot be overlooked. Loewenstein and Lerner
(2003) review a wealth of behavioural studies to demonstrate the importance of both
kinds of states—the details of the studies need not concern us. What is important
is that if an embodied account of PP is to accommodate a complete account of
decision-making, it should be able to provide an explanation for how these states re-
spectively influence our choice behaviour. This is where the aforementioned work on
the mutual influence between cortical and sub-cortical regions, and the widespread
effects of neural modulation is so important.
Consider again the ideas discussed in the previous chapters regarding the empir-
ical evidence for a distributed, mutli-systems perspective on the neural mechanisms
that underlie our decision-making capacities. In addition to the anti-cognitivist pic-
ture that is supported by the ACH and embodied PP (i.e. a probabilistic competition
between action-oriented representations in key sensorimotor regions), there is also ev-
idence that cortical and sub-cortical regions mutually interact to influence cognitive
control and emotional processing. Why would the brain have evolved to employ so
many regions in a distributed fashion, and how does this bear on the distinction
between immediate and expected emotions?
Two responses can be given to the first part of this question. Firstly, neural
reuse is an efficient method of minimising the costly production of building new
neural regions. If redundancy and pluripotency (e.g. mixed-selectivity) can support
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robust, adaptive interactions in a less demanding manner, this principle of efficient
(predictive) coding seems sensible. Secondly, we can ask how many kinds of values
an agent must be receptive to? Consider the case of possible starvation. In these
instances, few other action opportunities will take priority (except maybe protecting
oneself from a threat). Therefore, actions that lead to obtaining food will exceed,
and possibly suppress entirely, any other non-food options. However, once food is
obtained, attention can be directed towards an alternative need (perhaps encoded in
a separate region). Although it seems like the cognitivist picture, which emphasises
deliberation over multiple representations in an executive region (using a common
currency), is compatible with this idea, the empirical evidence seems to point towards
a different view.
As has already been discussed, key regions like the amygdala (Pessoa, 2010),
the AIC (Gu et al., 2013; Seth, 2013) and the thalamus (Barrett and Simmons,
2015; Kanai et al., 2015) have been shown to play fundamental roles in the inte-
gration and modulation of affective information, and in turn a key role in active
inference. Cisek and Pastor-Bernier (2014) argue that this information is inseparable
from decision-making, acting as a biasing input that is a proper part of the proba-
bilistic competition that underlies our decision-making capacities. If we are to take
this view seriously, the view of a detached cognitive module, which sits upstream
of sensory processing and integrates and deliberates over abstract representations
needs to be thrown away. In its place we need to consider decision-making in the
brain in a more dynamical manner, with less strict boundaries between perception,
cognition, action and emotion (chapter 4). An embodied account of PP, developing
on the work of embodied decisions, is well-suited to fill this role.
So what does this mean for the distinction between immediate and expected
emotions? As Bickhard has argued, in an interactive brain we can understand higher-
level processes such as cognitive control and emotional processing as a contextualising
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basis for lower-level processes:
“[...] (local) temporally slow processes set parameters for—thus modulate—
the dynamics of faster processes, and large spatial scale processes can
induce weak coupling among smaller scale processes, thus inducing and
modulating attractor landscapes in the dynamics of those faster, smaller
scale processes.” (Bickhard, 2015, p. 233)
In PP, these slower processes will take place at the higher-levels in the hierarchy,
and cascade down to influence the lower-levels, which will in turn propagate back
up through the hierarchy communicating error signals. This bi-directional influ-
ence dovetails nicely with the aforementioned mutually-influencing communication
between different regions in the brain—communication that is assisted (and influ-
enced) by key neuromodulatory mechanisms (see chapter 5).
We propose, tentatively, that the difference between immediate emotions and ex-
pected emotions can fit naturally into this scheme by appealing to the multi-level
processing of PP. Immediate emotions would thus be considered as a contextualis-
ing influence that is realised by the (slower) higher-level processes, which in turn
coordinate the lower-levels, and determine what is considered valuable in any given
instance. These higher-level emotions will impact how incoming information is per-
ceived and evaluated, and which regions are assembled in order to assist in action
selection. Expected emotions would correspond to the goal-state associated with
multi-modal predictions, which would likely include predicted interoceptive states,
as well as other possible perceptual predictions commonly associated with the rele-
vant emotional episode. Support for this view can be found in the work of (Lewis
and Todd, 2005).
Lewis and Todd (ibid., p. 211) view the synchronization of neural structures
as a “rapid self-organizing process that consolidates activity across all levels of the
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nervous system”, and posit that emotions act as a coordinating influence within this
process. The emotional episode is posited to explain how an agent selectively attends
to certain perceptual states, and is not perturbed by alternative goal obstructions (i.e.
alternative action opportunities). An emotional episode thus acts as an important
coordinating process within the aforementioned synchronisation.9
The dynamic approach to emotions is important, as it means that an emotion is
an evolving process, rather than simply an end-point. As such, they are well-suited
to perform long-term, action-guiding roles, as according to Lewis and Todd, they are
directly concerned with “improving our relations with the world through some action
or change of action.”10 For example, under Lewis and Todd’s account, an emotional
episode can direct attention away from obstructions that prevent the agent from ob-
taining some goal. They take this to be a fundamental factor that (partially) defines
an emotional episode, and means that an emotion can assist an agent in overcom-
ing and responding to goal obstruction, perhaps explaining why emotional episodes
persist over time. This is important for understanding how distal goal-states, which
require commitment to a series of coordinated actions, can be satisfied. Further-
more, it is during these stages that we can most clearly understand the difference
(and relation) between an immediate emotion and an expected emotion.
Under this interpretation, an agent’s immediate emotion, is partially responsi-
ble for co-ordinating actions by directing an agent towards some salient goal-state,
9Recall that an emotional episode is differentiated from core affect. The former is associated with
an intentional object, which is considered to elicit the agent’s attention along with a corresponding
cognitive appraisal of the stimulus (chapter 4). However, even when an emotional episode is not
present, there is always some felt core affect in the background, potentially ready to evolve into an
intentional emotional episode.
10Lewis and Todd (2005) also provide a dynamical model of how an emotion evolves from a
pre-reflective state to an attention-grabbing conscious state. Although interesting, we need not
worry about this aspect of their account for present concerns.
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but also impacts the evaluation of other goal-states that are associated with a sec-
ondary (expected) emotion. Alternate goal-states (and associated emotions) being
considered, will be evaluated (in part) relative to the current affective state of the
agent, and not independently of the current emotional episode. Recall that even if
an emotional episode is not conscious, there is always a core affective state that is
felt by the agent (see chapter 4). This means that the same option will be weighted
differently according to the current emotional episode (or core affect), and the value
of some action opportunity will thus be dependant on the contextual factors involved
(cf. Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).11
These constraints help the interactive, predictive brain to assemble the appro-
priate regions of the brain, best suited to respond to the current challenges it faces,
based on current expectations defined by its ongoing activity. Action opportunities
are thus selectively attended to, based partly on the needs of the organism as deter-
mined by affective information, and may be modulated by ongoing dynamics that
can be associated with action-guiding emotional episodes. Similar to alternative con-
straints, emotional episodes can be seen as playing a coordinating role, the absence
of which would likely result in unmanageable disorder. Although this picture is not
sufficient to account for how all distal goal-states are obtained through co-ordinated
action selection, it appears to be an important contributing factor—as suggested by
the work on embodied decisions.
11This principle is similar to the idea of narcissitic sensory systems explored by Akins (1996,
p. 345), who argues that rather than representing veridical information from the world, sensory
systems (e.g. pain system) work by encoding information in a manner that she characterises with
the phrase “But how does this all relate to ME?”. Under this view, the brain is not attempting
to reconstruct an organism-independent representation of the world, but is responding to incoming
sensory information on the basis of ongoing endogenous dynamics. This may not be a “rational”
way of responding to the world, but it is perhaps optimal given the limitations of the organism.
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6.3.4 Scaffolding Cognition
Finally, we turn to the social influences that are commonly associated with emotional
understanding and cognitive processing in general.
It is strange to consider how willing we are to recognise our physical limitations,
when we contrast this with the seemingly contrary attitude we hold towards our
mental abilities. When it comes to our physical limitations we embrace their exis-
tence, as is evidenced by the myriad physical constructions we assemble in society
to augment our natural abilities (e.g. bridges to help us cross rivers, transport that
enables us to move faster than we are able to otherwise, and medicine that allows us
to live longer). However, even if we acknowledge the existence of mental aids such
as calculators or external memory devices, we seem to be reluctant to see them as
anything other than convenient alternatives, which resemble the computationally-
equivalent inner workings of our minds, rather than the true augmentations that
they are. An embodied account of PP embraces our cognitive limitations, and looks
to explore how culture and the external world have been shaped to enable us to
smoothly interact with the world in the most efficient manner, as determined by
PEM. The need to move beyond a neurocentric perspective is nicely expressed in a
quotation from anthropologist Clifford Geertz:
“Man’s nervous system does not merely enable him to acquire culture, it
positively demands that he do so if it is going to function at all. Rather
than culture acting only to supplement, develop, and extend organically
based capacities logically and genetically prior to it, it would seem to be
an ingredient to those capacities themselves. A cultureless human be-
ing would probably turn out to be not an intrinsically talented, though
unfulfilled ape, but a wholly mindless and consequently unworkable mon-
strosity. (Geertz, 1973, pp. 67-68, quoted in (Lende and Downey, 2012))
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Of interest to this project is recent work by Lende and Downey (2012) on The
Encultured Brain, which explores recent interdisciplinary work in the fields of neu-
roscience and anthropology. The relevance of this interdisciplinary work (known as
neuroanthropology) to an embodied account of PP is captured in the following:
“A central principle of neuroanthropology is that it is a mistake to desig-
nate a single cause or to apportion credit for specialized skills (individual
or species-wide) to one factor for what is actually a complex set of pro-
cesses.”(ibid., p. 24)
Like embodied PP, neuroanthropology realises that exploring the brain alone is
insufficient to explain the myriad skilful interactions that define adaptive life, and
instead requires turning to the notion of enculturation. Enculturation can be de-
fined as the idea that socio-culturally shaped cognitive processes only emerge from
the interaction of an organism situated in a particular environmental niche. Neu-
roanthropology claims that many neurological capacities, such as language or skills,
simply do not appear without the immersion of an organism within a particular cul-
ture (i.e. enculturation). In fact, Lende and Downey (ibid., p. 47) even state that
“embodiment constitutes one of the broadest frontiers for future neuroanthropologi-
cal exploration”, and thus neuroanthropology is interested in “brains in the wild”, to
appropriate a phrase from (Hutchins, 1995). This requires understanding not only
how brains support skillful activity, but also how interactions with the environment
in turn re-wired our brains. Initial evidence for this is found in the following studies:
differences of neural structure and function between East Asian and Western cultures
that may account for differences in notions of self (Park and Huang, 2010); cross-
cultural differences in the ability of subjects to accurately judge the relative and
absolute size of objects (Chiao and Harada, 2008), as well as evidence for differences
in their spatial representation of time (Boroditsky and Gaby, 2010).
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Of particular interest for the current thesis, the notion of enculturation is of-
ten appealed to by those most accurately described as enactivists. For example,
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) appeal to a notion of participatory sense-making to
account for how social meaning can be generated and transformed through the inter-
actions of a group of individuals collectively participating in collaborative activities.
The notion of participatory sense-making is an extension of the enactivist notion of
sense-making, which is the process that describes how an autopoietic system creates
meaning through its lived experiences (Thompson, 2007) (see chapter 4). For the
enactivist, meaning does not exist independently of a system, but is defined by the
selective interactions that are specific to certain phenotypes. This is the idea behind
Francisco Varela’s statement that “living is sense-making”, which is captured in the
following example from (Thompson, 2004, p. 386):
“That sucrose is a nutrient isn’t intrinsic to the structure of the sucrose
molecule; it’s a relational feature, linked to the bacterium’s metabolism.
Sucrose has significance or value as food, but only in the milieu that the
organism itself brings into existence. [...] Living isn’t simply a cognitive
process; it’s also an emotive process of sense-making, of bringing signifi-
cation and value into existence. In this way the world becomes a place
of valence, of attraction and repulsion, approach or escape.”
The fact that sucrose has value to a bacterium is partly constituted by the au-
topoietic interactions of the bacterium. In a similar manner, meaning is constituted
by the participatory activities of a social group interacting with one another. How-
ever, although enactivism is commonly associated with an anti-representational ap-
proach to cognition, the notion that meaning is created in social activities need not
imply an anti-representational view.
For example, Steels (2003) describes some fascinating experiments using robots
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whose behaviour is controlled by simple control mechanisms that are themselves non-
representational. Each robot had simple phototaxic sensory systems that enabled it
to navigate towards a light-source, while avoiding obstacles. The light source was
connected to a charging station that re-charged the robot’s batteries. Importantly,
there was no centralised module that controlled the behaviours, rather the light-
seeking/obstacle avoiding behaviours emerged from simple mechanisms that were
active in parallel and interacted with the environment in real time. However, in this
initial set-up, there was no motivation for the robot to leave the charging station,
so Steels introduced a competitor in the form of a black box near the charging
station that diminished the available energy source unless regularly pushed away by
the robot. Secondly, multiple robots were placed in the same environment. These
additional influences resulted in fascinating emergent behaviours, that could not
be explained by positing some inner representational control system, as the robots
had been explicitly constructed without them. For example, cooperative strategies
relating to the robot’s distribution between workload (i.e. black box pushing) and
recharging developed, with multiple stable strategies emerging. In some cases, one
robot performed twice as much work as another, whereas in other cases the workload
was balanced.
In spite of this, Steels still refrains from advocating an anti-representational ac-
count. Instead, he believes that representations emerge from the need for agents to
co-ordinate increasingly more complex behaviour. Representations begin as material
structures that can later be internalised by sufficiently complex cognitive systems.
He gives the following example to highlight this emergence:
“Consider a grass lawn in the form of a square between two buildings
on a university campus. The buildings are on diagonally opposite sides.
There is a path around the square but people who need to go from one
building to another naturally take the shortest path, which cuts right
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across the lawn. Even though the gardener has planted a nice smooth
grass lawn (and perhaps put up a little sign saying ‘Do not step on the
grass’), a natural path arises sooner or later, as the grass starts to fade
away in the places where people step on it. The gardener can try to fight
this, but is probably better off creating a real path by clearly marking
the naturally emerging path with some sort of material structure and by
using gravel on the path so that the grass will not grow. Now everybody,
even someone who has never been on campus, will recognize instantly
that this is the logical path to take.” (ibid., p. 2390)
Representations emerge from interactions with an environment and become mean-
ingful because of their role in organising some activity (e.g. walking between build-
ings). These material representations may become internalised at some point to form
the basis of inner thought, but if they do they are still understood as “organizers of
activity rather than abstract models of some aspect of reality” (ibid.). Such a view
requires moving beyond the brain, to understand cognition as a distributed activ-
ity, constituted by a brain, a body and a world interacting with one another. Even
some of our most complex cognitive capacities, such as mathematical cognition have
recently been argued as examples of enculturation (Menary, 2015).
As our cognitive capacities have become increasingly advanced, we can now see
how our ability to shape our environment can be understood as a way of simplifying
the requirement to minimise prediction error, by making our environments more pre-
dictable. Hutchins (2014) offers a nice example of restructuring our material environ-
ment through certain behaviours that can be understood as cases of dimensionality
reduction. For example, he offers the case of queueing as an instance of enabling
a more straightforward perceptual experience. This is because the experience of a
one-dimensional line, is more predictable than the experience of a two-dimensional
crowd, and in turn the experience of a queue has a lower entropy (and thus a lower
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source of surprise) than the experience of a crowd. He states, “[t]his increase in pre-
dictability and structure is a property of the distributed system, not of any individual
mind.” (ibid., p. 40)
There are outstanding philosophical issues with the above claims. For example,
it is unclear whether enculturation commits us to defending an account of extended
cognition (Clark, 2008), scaffolded cognition (Sterelny, 2010) or distributed cogni-
tion (Hutchins, 1995). Despite being worthwhile questions, yet again they are too
tangential for the current discussion. More pertinent is explaining how the above
notion of enculturation can help with our current project of attempting to answer
the underspecification challenge raised at the start of this chapter.
To begin, by connecting with work in neuroanthropology and enculturation, PP
may find a complementary approach that provides a way of answering the ultimate
‘why’ questions behind how the brain co-evolved alongside our body and external
environment to supplement the ‘how’ questions that the PP framework seems well-
suited to explain. This is an important distinction to make, and was raised at the end
of the previous chapter in connection with the key components needed for an evolu-
tionary approach to decision-making. These components, outlined in (Hammerstein
and Stevens, 2012), were:
1. Understanding the origins of decision mechanisms
2. Exploring why these mechanisms are robust
3. Accounting for variation between and within individuals
4. Investigating the pressures of social life on decision making
Neuroanthropology’s connection with each, though especially (1), should be ob-
vious. However, each of the four constraints discussed above has the potential to
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elucidate one of these four components. For example, with (2) there is an obvi-
ous connection between what we termed the reliability of physiological constraints
and their “robustness”. Certain areas of evolutionary theory such as comparative
anatomy, which explore important concepts such as homologous and analogous struc-
tures, can undoubtedly provide evidence for why certain physiological constraints are
more robust in particular evolutionary niches, and how the exploitation of related
SMCs can assist with adaptive choice behaviour. Furthermore, where variation ex-
ists (3), we can also gain insight into differences in choice behaviour. And of course,
neuroanthropology is well-suited to investigating the pressures of social life on deci-
sion making (4). PP should not be concerned with this division of labour, but rather
embrace the additional theoretical constraints that can supplement the answers it
provides to the ‘how’ questions.
This complementary approach has the potential to help us understand how the
brain, working in collaboration with the body and the (sociocultural) world, has
evolved to facilitate more effective means of decision-making. Identifying constraints
is an important part of scientific discovery, and is vital when attempting to bridge
the sometimes large conceptual gaps that exist between disciplines that nevertheless
share a common interdisciplinary goal. We believe an action-oriented approach to
embodied predictive processing offers the most fruitful interdisciplinary framework
for the cognitive sciences. However, as was the case with Anderson’s positive proposal
in the previous chapter, by adopting this framework we appear to be required to
rethink the status of some of our concepts. We end this chapter with a speculative
suggestion for how to respond to the underspecification challenge, which requires
rethinking the nature of decision-making.
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6.4 Back to Scaling Up
We began this chapter by considering the relation between different forms of decision-
making (i.e. habitual and deliberative). We then explored a recent trend in the
cognitive sciences to a more action-oriented framework, and developed on this idea
by exploring several constraints that can inform our understanding of how decisions
are made. The purpose of this was to see whether the notion of embodied decisions
can scale up, by appealing to several constraints that may further our understanding
of the role of embodied and embedded interactions in decision-making. The notion
of the underspecification challenge in long-term decision-making was used to frame
this discussion.
Herbert Simon famously claimed that choice behaviour should be understood
as constrained by a pair of scissors, where the blades represent the limitations of
the environment and the cognitive capacities of the agent in question (Simon, 1990).
Although his ecological approach to (bounded) rationality was partially cognitivist in
nature (i.e. favouring an abstract symbolic approach), the core truth of his statement
remains valid.
PP has much to offer for the second of the blades, but if we acknowledge the
lessons of neuroanthropology and enculturation and seek a complementary approach,
it could also place important theoretical constraints on the first. For those familiar
with the literature, it may seem strange to emphasise this, given that so much time
has already been devoted to this task in the area of bounded rationality. It may
also seem strange that so little of this thesis has explicitly dealt with this literature,
aside from the scattered remarks in chapter 3. This is not an accident. There are
many conceptual differences that exist between the two frameworks, and attempting
to reconcile these difference before turning to the main focus of the thesis would
simply have been too great a task. Nevertheless, it seems apt to pay lip service to
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bounded rationality, especially given the following suggestion for how to reinterpret
decision-making in light of the work discussed in this thesis.
The previous sections have demonstrated how isolating the brain from the body
and the world impedes our ability to understand how effective decision-making and
the satisfaction of distal goal-states is possible. It has also been suggested that the
decision to perform some action is a product of a probabilistic competition between
multiple action-oriented representations encoded by the brain, which are further
constrained and coordinated by the dynamics of the body and the world. PP offers a
powerful framework to situate this reconceived notion of decisions as a more dynamic
process of selectively attending to relevant action opportunities, which unfold as a
result of worldly interactions. In this way, our decisions are enacted in a world
that consists of co-developed, emergent material structures, which have been shaped
through successive interactions, in order to facilitate effective choice behaviour and
minimise prediction error. Does this idea help us scale-up habitual cases of decision-
making to account for more deliberative forms?
We stated earlier that the distinction between these two forms should be ap-
proached as a matter of degree, following Clark’s (2013) suggestion that we could
understand this as a balance between the extent to which prior predictions or error
signals drive action (section 6.1.1). The more that prior predictions influence active
inference, the more we can associate the corresponding decision as deliberative in
nature (i.e. relying more on stored knowledge). By contrast, if the organism expects
high precision for the current sensory input (i.e. error signals) then we can treat the
corresponding choice behaviour as more situated, and guided by the environment
(i.e. utilising sensorimotor control loops or heuristics). Obviously we should treat
this balance in a dynamic, fluid manner, and we can appeal to work by Anderson
(2014) and others to reinforce this flexibility of the brain.
To connect this idea with decision-making, it is first important to note that
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this balancing occurs across multiple, hierarchically nested levels. This is especially
important in the case of long-term decision-making. As we saw earlier in this chapter,
long-term decisions will likely have distal goal states as their satisfaction conditions
(e.g. whether to go on holiday). Each of the necessary sub-events that are required
to obtain this goal state (e.g. book holiday online, arrange temporary visa, pack
bags etc.), are likely to occur over an extended timescale. However, many of these
components can be thought of as necessary components for the fulfilment of the
overall decision, and thus the agent requires some means of coordinating them. This
is where the above constraints can provide useful guidance, for each of these more
fine-grained behaviours can be treated as a decision in their own right. Just as we
saw with hierarchical cognitive control, the successive decomposition of each policy,
brings us one step closer to the sorts of embodied decisions that were evident in
the experiments of Cisek and Kalaska (2010) and Lepora and Pezzulo (2015). By
appealing to the brain alone to explain deliberative decision-making, we may be
adopting an unnecessarily restrictive and somewhat myopic perspective.
Instead, we claim that long-term decision-making may be best approached as
a progressive series of coordinated embodied decisions, partially constrained by an
agent’s socio-cultural niche, and partially constrained by the successive series of em-
bodied decisions, which themselves constrain future decisions by way of commitment
effects. As an example, rather than seeing the behaviour of an agent booking a hol-
iday online as a decision between whether to go to Tokyo or Lima, we could instead
view their behaviour as the first in a series of successive decisions. For example,
the decision to go on holiday is not made when you click the ‘Book Now’ button
online, despite producing a large commitment effect in the sense of a financial cost.
Nevertheless, as many potential holiday-goers will acknowledge, booking a holiday is
no guarantee that you will end up going. Although most people follow through with
their initial decision to book a holiday, due perhaps to a strong desire to have a rest
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and not waste their money, the initial decision in the above example is to ‘book a
holiday’, not a decision to ‘go on holiday’. The distinction may appear trivial, but
the manner in which we represent decisions has arguably led some in the decision
sciences (e.g. neuroeconomics) to overlook the more dynamic, embodied aspects of
how we actually make decisions, and instead place too much of an emphasis on the
brain alone.
We should also note that in the occurrence of events, which restrict an agent
from successfully obtaining their desired goal-state, we may wish to allow for the
agent to claim that they nevertheless made the decision to ‘go on holiday’. In these
cases, due to factors beyond their control, the agent was prevented from fulfilling
their decision. Such cases do not threaten the claim that deliberative decisions often
happen over extended timescales, and do not require us to posit a simple commitment
mechanism that exists in some central executive region of the brain, constructing and
deliberating over some set of abstract options. Instead a deliberative decision can be
thought of as composed of a series of more fine-grained policies (selected through a
distributed competition that here represents the decision process). These policies are
coordinated and constrained by the higher-level expectations that they are the most
probable sets of successive policies that will fulfil the desired goal-state. Each step
in the series can be thought of as subsequently constrained by virtue of the agent’s
prior (learned) belief that a significant cost (and corresponding expected feeling of
regret) would be incurred were she not to go ahead with the subsequently implied
actions (e.g. pack bags, head to airport etc.).
Similarly, in cases where social costs would be incurred (e.g. frustration caused
from backing out of a verbally agreed arrangement), it is still possible to view the
decision in an embodied manner. For example, where the choice is whether to utter
the words that commit the individual to later perform some future action or not (e.g.
getting married after proposing). Representations of social costs (with a key affective
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component) could possibly act as a further coordinating role on the unfolding of
a series of policies, leading from the initial goal state through to the event that
acts as the satisfaction condition. Here we see an obvious connection to work in
neuroanthropology and enculturation, but also work in affective science and the role
that emotions play in guiding social interactions.
Hierarchically-nested policies that reliably minimise prediction error, and are
strongly associated with rewards, may over time form more abstract representations,
which can be redeployed in habitual forms of decision-making.12 These represen-
tations will still be embodied because of their grounding in the control sequences
that gave rise to them initially, and will likely involve key sensorimotor regions to
be redeployed or emulated (as in mental imagery). We tentatively propose that we
treat decisions not as a deliberative process over a set of represented options, but as
a dynamic, interactive process between brain, body and world, which is constrained
by the many mechanisms pointed to in the previous sections.13
On this view, we are led to seek out expected action opportunities that satisfy
a (possibly distal) goal-state, which is determined by the needs of our lived (and
enculturated) body. Even if we are only able to account for a subset of what we wish
to term ‘deliberative decisions’, this would still be a noteworthy achievement.14
12By more abstract, we mean something like multimodal, rather than amodal.
13We should note that this recommendation is made for the case of the cognitive sciences.
Disciplines such as economics, which require a certain level of abstractness in order to deal with
systems such as markets, may gain nothing from adding this additional complexity to their accounts.
14We acknowledge that this idea needs development, and is at present incomplete. There are
many outstanding questions, but it is our understanding that part of the role of a doctoral thesis
is to identify questions and areas for future research—this is certainly an example of such an area,
and is one we intend to develop further.
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Further Remarks
Over the course of this thesis we have defended an embodied account of predictive
processing. Instead of adopting one specific aspect of embodied cognition (see chap-
ter 1), the approach has favoured a more general, complementary approach. We
hope this has the effect of demonstrating the wide explanatory reach of predictive
processing, rather than appearing to simply ignore important debates. We acknowl-
edge that some of these debates may eventually require a resolution (e.g. whether
external artefacts are constituents of cognitive processing). Nevertheless, this thesis
purposefully avoided engaging in them for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the main focus of the thesis was an exploration of decision-making, as
understood from within the PP framework. Promising lines of experimental and
theoretical evidence, which favour an embodied approach, were discussed, and it was
shown how PP provides a suitable framework to develop this research. With this
in place, we turned to the underspecification problem, and discussed how appealing
to various constraints (physiological, temporal, affective and sociocultural) can help
overcome the challenge. This investigation raised the possibility of a novel approach
to decision-making, which seems to be well-suited to embodied PP. At present, this
work is still in its infancy, and therefore it seems unwise to prematurely attempt to
draw any strong conclusions regarding conceptual interpretations.
Secondly, and in order to facilitate this integration, it was necessary to demon-
strate why PP is best construed as an embodied framework, rather than merely
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subsuming the notion within a more neurocentric framework. Therefore, focusing on
the shared opposition to cognitivism and neurocentricism, was of greater importance
than the potential disagreements between the various themes of embodied cognition.
As many questions have been left open, in this final chapter we would like to
point to some connected questions/topics in the philosophy of science. The treat-
ment of this literature is necessarily brief, but indicates some important discussions
that we believe should be addressed when developing the framework further. Specif-
ically, we discuss the interpretation of decision theory, and connect this with work
in comparative psychology. We also highlight a debate in the philosophy of science
that concerns possible meta-theoretical stances to explanation. Both of these points
are offered as further avenues for investigation.
The Interpretation of Decision Theory
In chapter 3 we looked at the history behind the emergence of contemporary ap-
proaches to decision theory, and explored the origins of expected utility theory. We
discussed how Bernoulli’s (1738) suggestion that agent’s maximise a utility function,
was formalised in order to show how an agent’s utility function could be derived from
more basic preference relations. Unlike a utility function, these preference relations
were in principle observable from the agent’s behaviour. This raises an interest-
ing question pertaining to the interpretation of decision theory that Okasha (2015)
explores.
Okasha claims that there are two stances that can be taken towards the in-
terpretation of decision theory: mentalistic and behaviouristic. The former states
that credences and utilities are psychologically real, and is commonly adopted by
philosophers. The latter, by contrast, takes them to be mere mathematical con-
structs (derivable from preference relations), and is often the perspective adopted
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by economists. However, in addition to this distinction, we can also ask what type
of decision theory we are interested in. Recall that decision theory is an interdisci-
plinary framework, and is also divisible into descriptive and normative approaches.
Okasha argues convincingly that if our aim is a normative account of decision theory,
then the behaviouristic interpretation is indispensable, as the normative constraint
of EU theory is on an agent’s preferences, and not on their credences. He states,
“it is quite wrong to view the normative content of the theory as saying that an
agent should maximise expected utility relative to a psychologically real utility and
credence function.” (ibid., p. 17). As we are here interested in descriptive decision
theory, we will accept this part of the argument and say no more on the matter.
With regards to descriptive purposes, Okasha claims that there is “no reason
not to interpret credence and utility functions as psychologically real, at least to
the extent that the theory fits the data.” (ibid., p. 23) In connection with this, the
behaviouristic interpretation is argued to be untenable on the grounds that modern
science routinely goes beyond observable behaviour, and posits unobservable theoret-
ical entities. This line of argument is also adopted by Dietrich and List (2016) who
claim that rejecting the mentalistic interpretation of decision theory goes against
commonly accepted naturalistic commitments to unobservable entities. They argue
for this while also rejecting the claim that economics can be reduced to neuroscience,
as is claimed by some neuroeconomists. The question that is of interest to us here
is: does the validity of the embodied PP framework affect this claim, and should we
reject the mentalistic interpretation of decision theory on the basis that embodied
PP eschews the existence of abstract representations such as value or utility? To
attempt an answer to this question, it is important that we follow the suggestion of
Dietrich and List (ibid., p. 252), and first “distinguish clearly between the notions
of mind and brain. The former is a higher-level, psychological notion, the latter a
lower-level, physiological one.”
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Work in neuroeconomics is the best example to use in order to demonstrate
this point. As is the case with many experiments in neuroscience, researchers often
have to rely on behavioural or psychological data, in order to constrain their search
for the neural correlates that act as measures of relevant variables. In the case of
neuroeconomics, these measures are often taken to provide a neurobiological basis
for the psychological construct of utility. Despite the many worries surrounding
the isolation of some neurobiological measure, and the subsequent inference to some
psychological construct such as utility (cf. Poldrack, 2006), the issue here goes beyond
the mere worry of underdetermination, and even beyond the conceptual challenges
raised by Anderson in chapter 5.15 Rather, if the goal is economic insight, the
concern is with how informative neurobiological measures can be. Few researchers
working in the cognitive sciences would doubt that neurobiological measures play,
or have the potential to play, some explanatory role. However, if we are interested
in understanding the material substrate for psychological factors such as decision
utility, is the brain the right system to focus on? Some in neuroeconomics, who argue
that the brain literally computes subjective expected utility (Camerer, Loewenstein,
and Prelec, 2005; Levy and Glimcher, 2012, e.g.), would seem to argue that it is.
Unsurprisingly, we disagree with this position.
Consider the following:
“[...] the operations within a mechanism are different from the phe-
nomenon produced by the mechanism. Within a neuron, for example,
neurotransmitters perform such operations as diffusing across a synapse
and binding to a receptor; but the neuron itself generates action poten-
15It should be noted that the most recent edition of Neuroeconomics, edited by Glimcher and
Fehr (2014b) contains a chapter dedicated to the challenges that arise from neuroimaging, which
touches on the same worries expressed by Anderson.
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tials.” (Bechtel, 2009, p. 560)
Here, Bechtel is drawing our attention to the profound conceptual differences that
exist between variables such as the action potential of a neuron, and the operations
of the mechanism that it is a part of. Why is this important? He continues:
“The point of organizing component parts and operations into a mech-
anism is to accomplish something that cannot be performed by the in-
dividual components. Hence, assuming a homunculus with the same
capacities as the agent in which it is posited to reside clearly produces
no explanatory gain.” (ibid., p. 561)
Bechtel has extensively defended a mechanistic account of explanation. He has
also developed this account into a multi-level approach, which ties a mechanism’s
function to a) its component parts, b) the component operations or activities (as
understood within a wider multi-level account), and c) their organization (Bechtel
and Abrahamsen, 2005). It is in virtue of both the organisation and operation of
the component parts, that a phenomena of interest is realised. Each level within the
mechanism is identified with the realisation of some specific phenomena of interest,
in virtue of the underlying component parts.16
Alternative accounts of mechanisms focus on other aspects. For example, Machamer,
Darden, and Craver (2000) focus on the metaphysical nature of entities and activi-
ties, investigating how they interact to produce changes in a particular mechanism.
Their characterisation includes the production of some change from the initial start-
ing point through to its termination, which appears to acknowledge the dynamic
nature of mechanistic production. However, Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have
16‘Level’ is employed here in a framework-relative manner, and should not be taken to identify
some global level of analysis. See (Bechtel, 2012) for further details.
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Figure 6.4: The mechanism of interest is shown in the top panel, and is responsible for
performing some function. The explanation of how this function is achieved
requires decomposition into its component parts and the operations they
perform (indicated by uppercase letters). These operations produce changes
in substrates (indicated by lowercase letters) of the system (middle panel).
Explaining how one component (B) performs its operation requires treating it
as a mechanism in its own right, and decomposing it per the steps above. This
means acknowledging that the top-level mechanism will also be a component
part in a wider, embedding mechanism. Reprinted from (Bechtel, 2012).
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expressed concern with this conception, and argue that it focuses on narrowly indi-
viduated mechanisms. Instead they suggest that we should focus on a mechanism’s
overall contribution to the larger embedded mechanism of which it is also a part (see
Figure 6.4). From this perspective an embedded mechanism is viewed as both con-
tinuously responsive to the changing conditions of the larger environment, but also
effects change in a manner reminiscent of the notion of circular causality discussed
in chapter 1.17
There are many aspects of Bechtel’s account of multi-level, mechanistic explana-
tion that are not only relevant to philosophy of science in general, but could also
support a possible reconciliation for some of the conceptual challenges raised in this
thesis. We shall not attempt this here, but do wish to highlight it as an area for
further research, especially given the following statement that Bechtel makes:
“Recently cognitive science has been confronted by challenges both from
those advocating refocusing attention on the brain and those calling for
attention to the embodied and situated aspects of cognition. The impli-
cation of the account of mechanistic explanation I have outlined is that
these ought not to be viewed as challenges to cognitive science or as ex-
clusive alternatives; both represent constructive avenues for advancing
inquiry in cognitive science.” (Bechtel, 2009, p. 563)
17It’s important to note that there is an extensive debate between those who are committed to a
mechanistic account of explanation, and those who employ dynamical systems theory to explain a
system’s behaviour. Discussing the intricacies of this debate is too tangential to the present aim (see
Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011; Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey, 2011, for a representative sample). We
restrict ourselves to discussion of Bechtel’s multi-level account, as he has provided the most extensive
discussion of the topic, and has importantly emphasised the dynamic nature of mechanisms, by
arguing that the decomposition of a mechanism and modelling its dynamics can be viewed as
complementary endeavours (Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011).
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We began this thesis by asking which system we should be interested in when
attempting to identify the mechanisms that underly some phenomena of interest.
The defence of embodied cognition, throughout the course of this thesis, should
hopefully make clear that the brain is an insufficient supervenience base if we are
interested in phenomena such as decision-making. We have argued that decisions
are behaviours made by situated agents, and that it is inappropriate to apply the
terminology of decision theory to systems such as the brain (as is sometimes done in
neuroeconomics). This applies equally for some psychological notions such as utility.
Far from being a trivial semantic worry, a failure to identify the appropriate level of
analysis can lead to significant methodological failures.
It makes little sense to isolate the components of the mechanisms identified by
PP and attribute decision-making capabilities to them. Unless they are (a) organised
in a particular fashion, (b) allowed to interact with other mechanisms (e.g. volume
transmission), and (c) connected to the body plant, it is unlikely that we will be able
to individuate their functional role at a level beyond that of cellular neuroscience (e.g.
generating action potentials or transmitting chemical messengers). Decisions are
dynamic behaviours taken by socially embedded agents, not the sorts of things that
neurons (or neural populations) partake in. A closer examination of the mechanisms
employed by PP, which utilises a multi-level mechanistic account, could help bring
further rigour to the PP framework, and further solidify its embodied nature.
One may worry that the abstract functional-level characterisation of PP may
present a challenge to this proposal. This is because functional level descriptions
have previously been associated with a certain degree of autonomy, which separate
the functional account from a description of its physical realisers. There are two
responses to this worry. First of all, as we have seen in previous chapters, many
have already started to provide accounts of the physical structures that could be
responsible for realising the more abstract functions of PEM. Secondly, some of those
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who favour mechanistic explanation have also argued that functional analyses can be
viewed as a mechanistic sketches (Piccinini and Craver, 2011). By this, they mean
that a functional analysis can be treated as an initial model of some phenomena,
with certain structural aspects omitted. Once these omitted aspects are filled in, a
functional analysis becomes a mechanistic explanation. This proposal, with further
development, could be viewed as a normative proposal for scientific discovery, and
as a way of working towards unification in the cognitive sciences, by integrating
multi-level mechanistic explanations.
This raises two points of discussion that are pertinent to the present enquiry.
The first involves the interpretation of decision theory discussed above. The second
concerns our place on a cognitive continuum with other non-human organisms.
Regarding the first, we can ask whether pursuing a unified, multi-level mecha-
nistic account of PP threatens accounts of decision theory (whether descriptive or
normative), which employ theoretical constructs such as utility or credences. We saw
previously how PP eschews the use of utility functions, but is it possible to reject the
pursuit of the neural encoding of utility functions, without rejecting the notion of
utility entirely? Perhaps we could identify the notion of a utility function with a more
emergent behaviour embodied in the interactions of an agent in an environment?
As Dietrich and List (2016) highlighted, there is a distinction between the physi-
ological concept ‘brain’ and the higher-level concept ‘mind’. If so, we could acknowl-
edge the psychological validity of concepts such as utility, by associating them with
mental states that have a wider supervenience base than merely the brain (e.g. em-
bodied mind). Unfortunately, this suggestion is unlikely to work. As Okasha (2015,
p. 15) notes, referring to utility and credence functions:
“These entities have a specific mathematical structure, and in this respect
are different from the internal states and processes that cognitive psychol-
ogy usually traffics in. Even if one is happy to posit sub-personal internal
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states to explain behaviour, one might have qualms about positing inter-
nal states that satisfy certain specific measurability assumptions.”
The point Okasha is making is that a real-valued utility function is measurable
on a cardinal scale, and thus the underlying states that realises this function must
lend themselves to this particular structure. He continues:
“[...] if EU theory is construed descriptively, as a theory about peoples’
actual preferences or choices, there seems no particular reason to inter-
pret the theory behaviouristically rather than mentalistically [...] On the
contrary, to the extent that the theory fits the data, there seems good
reason to adopt a realistic attitude to the utilities and credences which
the theory posits.” (ibid., p. 17)
However, it appears as though proponents of PP dismiss the claim that neural
structures should be descriptively modelled using utility functions, as they are not
in fact the best fit for the data. Moreover, it is not clear how embodied states or
behaviours could realise the specific mathematical structure required for grounding
the notion of decision utility.
A related argument has also been made by Oppenheimer and Kelso (2015) who
review a number of empirical findings that have questioned the descriptive validity of
EUT as a model of human cognition and behaviour. Instead they call for a paradigm
shift towards information processing models, which prioritise more basic cognitive
building blocks, and see decision-making as recruiting distributed processes to guide
action. This idea seems to be echoed in much of the work we have reviewed over the
course of this thesis (e.g. Anderson, 2014; Cisek and Pastor-Bernier, 2014; Lepora
and Pezzulo, 2015).
We will not worry about evaluating the competing accounts here. What is impor-
tant, as Okasha notes, is that this is an empirical matter; one that PP will need to
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address moving forward. To argue favourably against the mentalistic interpretation
of utility and credence functions requires positing an alternative, and this alternative
should be able to make predictions that can be experimentally verified. The embod-
ied decisions framework has begun this, but further work is needed. This brings us
to the second concern.
A Cognitive Continuum
“[...] much of what is true of us, even as cognitive agents, is true of
us, because it is true of all vertebrates—or, at any rate, all primates.
Moreover, whatever it is that is distinctive of us alone must be such that
it could have been built on that common foundation with only rather
modest physiological changes.” (Haugeland, 2002, p. 27)
Over the course of the thesis, the claim that cognition evolved was repeatedly
made, but some specific points need to be addressed. First, the discussion in this
thesis has focused primarily on human cognition.18 In short, the focus has been
relatively anthropocentric in nature. This assumption may appear innocent enough,
but can also lead to confusion when we attempt to transfer the account to other dis-
ciplines. For example, comparative psychology is concerned with the identification
of which, if any, cognitive processes are shared by other species. However, this ap-
proach often assumes that we have first identified an appropriate notion of cognition
in humans. If we haven’t, then transposing this notion to non-human organisms will
be problematic. Why?
18Although some of the empirical evidence pointed to throughout this thesis has come from
neuroimaging studies on non-human organisms, the implicit assumption has been that this evidence
is useful for uncovering the functional architecture of our own cognitive systems.
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One response is that an inappropriate (often inflated) notion of human cognitive
capacities leads to a sorting procedure whereby some creatures possess intelligent,
flexible thought and behaviour, and others possess merely non-cognitive, instinctive
responses to environmental stimuli. For some this sorting procedure may assist in the
identification of evolutionary antecedents to the more complex processes that humans
possess. Furthermore, it seems to fit with the claim made in earlier chapters that the
brain evolved through descent with modification (Anderson, 2014). However, there
are a number of worries that we can point to, which seem to stem from an unchecked
anthropocentricism inherent in the early cognitivist approaches.
Anthropofabulation
“[...] our own introspection about how our own minds work need not be an
accurate guide to how they actually do work. Our decision making may
be much simpler than our conscious self-monitoring suggests.” (Barrett,
2011, p. 13)
The inference from introspection to a working hypothesis of a cognitive archi-
tecture can easily mislead. Like the rest of our cognitive capacities, our ability to
introspect evolved, and has been shaped and developed over evolutionary and de-
velopmental timescales. Given this, it is fair to state that it has been selected due
to some adaptive role that it played in our survival, and continues to play in the
standard practice of cognitive psychology. In comparative psychology, however, it
is connected to a different strategy known as ‘double induction’. This process takes
as its starting point the existence of an inferred psychological state in humans—not
necessarily inferred solely on the basis of introspection—and subsequently infers sim-
ilar states in other non-human animals based on their observable behaviour. This
strategy is wrought with methodological and conceptual worries, and overlooks the
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magnificent variety and richness of problem-solving mechanisms that natural selec-
tion has endowed upon life. What has been adaptive for humans, may not have been
so for other animals.
Attribution of mental states identified in humans to other non-human animals
not only risks over-generalising, it is also ignores the possibility that our own cogni-
tive capacities have been overestimated, and that non-human animals may provide
conflicting evidence regarding our possibly rudimentary psychological taxonomies,
rather than simply failing to meet some overblown human standard.
Over-confidence in our own ability to accurately infer the structure of our mental
lives is, therefore, not only a conceptual worry for our own folk psychology. The
confabulation of our own mental abilities, combined with the anthropomorphic bias,
leads to us stacking the odds against non-human animals by utilising a potentially
mistaken, anthropocentric yardstick with which to measure their psychological ca-
pacities. This leads to the observation of a number of methodological biases, which
Buckner (2013, p. 861) captures in his slightly awkward term ‘anthropofabulation’.
He defines this as the “tendency to set the criteria for psychological capacities to an
artificially-inflated sense of what humans can or routinely do.” The biases that lead
to anthropofabulation are a) taxonomic anthropocentricism (the anthropo-morphic
aspect) and b) an exaggeration about typical human cognitive performance (the
con-fabulation aspect).
The anthropomorphic part of the bias, in which it is argued that we should avoid
the attribution of purported human psychological capacities to non-human organisms
with insufficient evidence, was made famous by Conway Lloyd Morgan. To caution
against such a methodological and taxonomic bias, he put forward the following
claim, which has subsequently become known as Morgan’s Canon:
“[...] in no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise
of higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms
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of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and
development.” (Morgan, 1894, p. 59)
Both Barrett (2011) and Buckner (2013) argue that too much research in com-
parative psychology has ignored Morgan’s canon (and sometimes misinterpreted it),
leading to the mistaken endowment of psychological capacities on non-human ani-
mals, which they don’t possess, and more importantly don’t need. Furthermore, as
Barrett (2011, p. 4) worries, “it promotes the idea that other organisms are interest-
ing only to the degree that their capacities and abilities match our own.”
Spotting this bias in experimental work is often hard, and made worse when
psychology papers are published with insufficient specification of the conditions nec-
essary or sufficient to obtain the results claimed, in turn leading to the sorts of
reproducibility crises that were highlighted in a recent Science paper published by
the Open Science Collaboration (2015). If many experimental studies are failing
to meet the requirement of reliable, statistically significant effects that can survive
possible theory change (Hacking, 1983), then spotting the first of these biases may
be difficult.
A particularly salient example is explored by Heyser and Chemero (2012), who
focused on object exploration studies in mice. Increasingly popular since its intro-
duction in 1988, the setup of an object exploration study allows experimenters to
test various effects on memory, using the premise that long-term exposure to familiar
environments results in habituation and decreased exploration—as novelty decreases,
so too does exploration. Conversely, the introduction of novel objects to the envi-
ronment should result in increased exploratory activity. The validity of this premise
allows for experimental manipulation of independent variables that range from ge-
netic factors, effects of drugs on learning, and the role of particular brain areas.
Rather than being interested in the effect of causally intervening on the physiolog-
ical variables of the mice, however, Heyser and Chemero studied a different effect
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that the environment had on the results: the choice of objects by the experimenter.
By considering the choice of objects in terms of what actions they afforded the
mice, as opposed to the typical objective properties highlighted by the experimenter
(e.g. colour, size etc.), Heyser and Chemero found that the habituation effect could
be significantly modulated according to whether the object afforded the mice a touch-
ing or climbing relation—two organism-relative properties. If a novel object was
introduced that only afforded a touching relation to the mice, the time taken to ha-
bituate was significantly shorter than if the object was one that the mice could climb
on. In other words, mice explored objects for a duration of time correlated with the
type of action afforded to the mouse, not whether it had some discernible property
identified by the experimenter (e.g. colour, shape or size). This study demonstrates
how a failure to recognise the importance of anthropocentric biases, can easily creep
in and effect the reliability of the results uncovered by a study. In this instance,
the assumption was that the novelty of the properties perceived by the mice, were
the same ones identified by the experimenters. Chemero (2011) argues that a more
embodied, action-oriented approach could help overcome some of these challenges.
Furthermore, in a review of 116 articles published in neuroscience articles alone,
Chemero (ibid.) reports that 44% of the articles, “gave little or no information con-
cerning the specific objects that were given for exploration”, and of the remaining
56%, 28% of these used objects that offered nonequivalent affordances, e.g. objects
that were climbable and some that were non-climbable. Far from simply falling prey
to an anthropocentric bias, by selecting objects based on the relation their properties
have to humans, rather than the test subjects (i.e. mice), almost half failed to even
meet the standard of reproducibility that is so fundamental to the scientific method.
Avoiding anthropofabulation does not mean pursuing independent psychologies
for each species, so that we end up with a human psychology, a dolphin psychology,
a giraffe psychology and so on. This would of course be undesirable, and the cost
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incurred would be never knowing which capacities we share with animals (and each
other), as well as a potentially improved understanding of their function in our own
lives. Instead, as Barrett (2015) argues, what we need is a “better kind of continuity”,
one which can help inform questions concerning the extent to which animals are
similar to us, and indeed the extent to which we are similar to animals. The research
explored in this thesis argues in favour of an embodied approach, but also emphasises
novel approaches to constructing psychological taxonomies (see chapter 5), and a
novel framework that offers a wide explanatory scope (Clark, 2016b; Friston, 2010).
It seems each of these elements is appropriately informed by evolutionary theory,
and thus may be able to progress towards an ontology for the cognitive sciences that
is able to account for more than merely human behaviour.
Behaviour and Cognition
“We have many vocabularies for describing nature when we regard it as
mindless, and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for describing thought
and intentional action; what we lack is a way of describing what is in
between. This is particularly evident when we speak of the “intentions”
and “desires” of simple animals; we have no better way to explain what
they do.” (Davidson, 1999, p. 11)
Achieving a greater degree of continuity between ourselves and other non-human
animals requires of necessity, that we adopt an evolutionary perspective; one which
acknowledges the integral role that our natural environment has had in shaping our
cognitive development. Though we are likely to find similar neural structures in our
evolutionary ancestry, and nearby cladistic neighbours, bodies have been around long
before brains were on the scene.
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This is an important consideration in embodied theories of cognition, which em-
phasise the fundamental role that our bodies have in constituting our cognitive pro-
cesses over evolutionary and developmental timescales. For example, as Barrett
(2011, p. 37) nicely points out:
“[...] as Vygotsky conceived of it, a child’s mental processes are not the
source and cause of her behavior in the world; rather a child’s behavior
in the world is the source and cause of what eventually ends up in her
head: the exact reverse of what most modern psychology would have us
think.”
We see a similar acknowledgement in neuroanthropology and enculturation (see
chapter 6). Given that our bodies are also products of our evolutionary history,
emphasis should be placed on the way that our bodies engage with their environ-
ment, and may have engaged with our earlier environments. This requires a greater
understanding of not only our own behaviour, but the behaviour of other animals.
Statements such as the above, however, have led some to criticise embodied ac-
counts as conflating the notion of cognition with behaviour. As we saw in chapter 1,
by rejecting behaviourism, cognitive science made it acceptable to posit inner states
that functioned as the cause of an organism’s behaviour, but which were not identical
with the behaviour itself. Aizawa (2015) argues that by conflating these two notions,
the embodied cognition theorist has lost any appeal to explanatory force provided
by positing inner cognitive states. As an example, he highlights the following quote
by Chemero (2011, p. 212):
“I take it that cognition is the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust
animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception
and action.”
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Aizawa argues that as a definition of cognition, the above fails to distinguish how
cognition is different from behaviour. Moreover, as the behaviour of an organism
is necessarily embodied, if cognition is simply behaviour redefined, this trivialises
the notion of embodied cognition. Responding to this worry is important, especially
given the emphasis on the interpretation of decision theory at the start of this chapter.
Aizawa (2015) appears to acknowledge that construing Chemero’s position as
the equation of cognition with behaviour is perhaps too unsympathetic a reading.
He seems to pay lip service to a more charitable interpretation by situating the
above quotation in its full context (see below). However, the supposed ‘context’
that Aizawa provides omits relevant aspects of the original paragraph. To see why
this is important, here is the paragraph from (Chemero, 2011, p. 212) (in full), with
emphasis added to the section that Aizawa (2015) actually quotes:
“Adams and Aizawa (2008) argue that defenders of the sort of view of
cognition that I am defending here need to give a definition of “cogni-
tion.” In comments on a draft of this chapter, Ken Aizawa suggests
that I am defining “cognition” as “intelligent behavior,” which definition
[sic] Aizawa points out is almost surely circular. I do not intend such
a definition, and I disagree that proponents of radical embodied cognitive
science actually require a definition of “cognition.” That aside, I will say
a few things about what I mean by “cognition.” I take it that cognition is
the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system,
achieved by closely coordinated perception and action. This understanding
of the nature of cognition is intended to reflect claims by radical embod-
ied cognitive scientists in philosophy, psychology, AI, and artificial life.
(See Maturana and Varela 1980; Reed 1996; Beer 2003; Thompson 2007.)
Note, finally, that these brief remarks are not intended to supply a set
of necessary and sufficient conditions, or criteria for what Adams and
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Aizawa call the “mark of the cognitive.” In chapters 6 and 7, I lay out a
Gibsonian theory of perception, action and cognition. This also does not
provide criteria for the “mark of the cognitive.” There is no such thing.”
Without speculating on Aizawa’s intention for selectively choosing to include only
the middle portion of this paragraph, a few things can be said. Firstly, Chemero is
explicit that the very thing that Aizawa is considering as a possible interpretation,
and in turn criticising, is not what he intends (i.e defining cognition as behaviour).
Far from undermining Chemero’s position, it undermines Aizawa’s own critique,
when he later argues:
“If we read Chemero as offering a stipulative definition, then his account
is misleading, it marks no theoretical advance, and it trivializes the hy-
pothesis that cognition is embodied.” (ibid., p. 764)
Sure, we could read Chemero in this way, but he explicitly states that it is the
wrong interpretation, and thus fails to take his framework on its own terms. Aizawa’s
omission of the latter part of the above paragraph is also interesting. Here, Chemero
states “these brief remarks are not intended to supply a set of set of necessary and
sufficient conditions, or criteria for what Adams and Aizawa call the “mark of the
cognitive.” [...] There is no such thing.” Unfortunately, at this point, it appears that
the two authors are simply talking past each other. Aizawa’s commitment to the
cognitivist paradigm, appears to prevent him from construing the terms adopted by
Chemero in the manner they were intended. This itself is understandable, and may
represent a simple matter of incommensurability between competing paradigms—in
this instance ‘cognitivism’ and ‘radical embodied cognitive science’. For example,
Aizawa’s claim that Chemero’s terminological shift of the term cognition to mean
something like behaviour (as understood qua cognitivism) would lead to a trivialisa-
tion of the notion of embodiment, goes as follows:
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“If one understands ‘cognitive processes’ as behavioral processes, then
of course, “cognitive processes” are typically realized in the brain, body,
and world. Behavioral processes are typically realized in the brain, body,
and world. That is just the consensus twentieth-century view. It is quite
far from offering a radical embodied cognitive science; by itself, it is com-
pletely pedestrian twentieth-century cognitive science. What would be
radical would be the conclusion that cognition understood as a particular
kind of computation over representations is embodied. What would be
surprising would be to find that what has commonly been thought to oc-
cur only within the brain in fact occurs in an unexpectedly larger space.”
(ibid., p. 762)
The first claim about what would be radical acknowledges an embodied perspec-
tive attributable to the likes of Andy Clark. However, it is clear that this is not
what Chemero (2011) intends given the great lengths he goes to, in order to defend
a dynamical, anti-representationalist view. However, the second claim is something
that Chemero (and others who defend the replacement theme (see chapter 1)) defi-
nitely offers an account of. By showing how, we can both reject Aizawa’s criticism
that cognition is simply behaviour in the traditional sense, and also see how the
alternative proposals retain their explanatory force.
Although Chemero (ibid.) provides relevant examples, a more striking example,
which is consistent with Chemero’s view, is offered by Louise Barrett (2011) in a
chapter of her book aptly titled ‘The Implausible Nature of Portia’. Portia is a
genus of jumping spiders referred to as salticids, which have an incredible ability to
seemingly stalk their prey, by appearing to plan complex routes, and use clever meth-
ods of distraction and deception. Most importantly, Portia have brains no bigger
than a pinhead, and thus appealing to complex inner neural representations, as Bar-
rett puts it, seems “implausible”. Although it may be simpler to ascribe intentional
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psychological states, and speak of Portia as if it were ‘planning’ and ‘deceiving’, the
simplicity of their brains demands a more biologically plausible account—one which
Barrett is happy to offer.
Consider the following. When stalking prey that may be situated in a hard
to reach location, Portia spiders appear to ‘scan’ their surroundings, acting as if
they were considering and planning alternative routes. However, planning is often
considered to be an example of a ‘representation-hungry’ process, which implies that
an agent must construct an internal representation of the goal-state, which can be
consulted during the period in which the goal is out of sight (i.e. during planning
and decision-making). How does the small brain of a Portia spider achieve this
remarkable feat?
To answer this, it is important to consider how things appear from the perspective
of the Portia spider, and to avoid anthropofabulating. Barrett puts it as follows:
“During scanning, the spider gives every impression of weighing up the
routes for their suitability, planning its way around obstacles, and then
setting off once it has worked out a suitable route. But is this really what
the spiders are doing? Just because it looks like planning, in ways that
make sense to us, doesn’t mean that the spiders are necessarily operating
in that way.” Barrett (ibid., p. 62)
To consider how the perspective of the spider appears, Barrett provides a careful
examination of the physiology of the salticid’s eyes. Salticids have eight types of
eyes evenly spread around the front part of their bodies. Two of these eyes are
considered their principal eyes, which face forward and can detect fine detail and
colour. The other six, so called “secondary” eyes detect movement in lesser detail.
The construction of their primary eyes can be thought to function as a narrowly
focused magnifying lens, or like a pair of binoculars. However, unlike in normal
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binoculars, where focus is attained by altering the refraction of light, salticid’s eyes
are not constructed in a manner that allows this. Instead, the salticid’s eyes are
composed of multiple layers that splits the light into four layers, each with different
levels of focus. Additionally, the saltcid’s eyes are active, allowing the spider to
perform the aforementioned scanning behaviour. Barrett claims that this means the
salticid’s principal eyes function a lot like a torch in a darkened room does, focusing
selectively on small regions of space.
“In this way, the eye itself acts a filter that excludes irrelevant informa-
tion, a task that would otherwise have to be achieved by neural process-
ing; spiders can compensate for their small brains by having their eyes
do most of the work.” (ibid., p. 63)
Combined with the lower-resolution secondary eyes, which detect movement quickly,
the Portia spider is well-adapted to hunting, and at the same time avoiding other
predators. But what about the apparent planning behaviour?
Once the functions of the Portia spider’s eyes have been acknowledged, the scan-
ning behaviour can be revisited in the context of the spider hunting its prey. This
is exactly what Tarsitano and Andrew (1999) did, in a number of ingenious experi-
ments. The apparatuses shown in Figure 6.5 were set up in order to test the hunting
behaviour of Portia. The spider was initially placed on the starting platform in the
middle, with a prey spider fixed to the lure. The scanning behaviour was observed
across a number of varied setups (i.e. some with multiple complete choices leading
to the prey, and some with gaps in either the left or right ramps). In the case of the
two complete routes (a), it was found that no preference was given to either route.
However, in cases where one of the routes to the prey was prevented by a gap, the
Portia spider demonstrated interesting “scanning” behaviour. The distribution of
their scanning is not split equally across the routes, as in the first case, but is con-
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Figure 6.5: A number of detour apparatuses designed to observe the planning behaviour
of Portia. (a) Two complete routes to prey. (b and c) one of the routes
obstructed by a gap. Reprinted from (Tarsitano and Andrew, 1999, p. 201).
290
centrated initially on the gap in the wrong route. Over time, the scanning behaviour
begins to fixate on the correct ramp that leads the prey, and eventually on the sup-
port pole of the respective ramp, shortly before movement occurs. By analysing the
patterns of scanning behaviour, Tarsitano and Andrew (ibid.) found that the crucial
factor appears to be whether the spider detects an unbroken horizontal line in its
visual field. If the horizontal line is unbroken, the scanning behaviour proceeds away
from the prey until the support pole is perceived. However, if the line is broken, or
if the gap is perceived, the spider returns its scanning back to the prey, and switches
directions until a complete path is detected. This pattern of behaviour thus seems
to rely on a very simple feedback mechanism that involves two rules emphasised by
Barrett (2011, p. 67):
“If the end of a horizontal feature is detected, then change scanning
direction,” and “If the end of a horizontal feature is not detected, then
continue to turn in the direction of the previous turn.”
The point of this is to demonstrate that, given the basic neural system of the
Portia spider, what initially appears to require an overly complex (and somewhat
implausible) account can be successfully accommodated by providing a more in-
depth understanding of the physiological characteristics of the organism’s body and
the properties of its environment. The scanning behaviour is not for the purpose
of building a representation, but is much more simple and should be thought of as
something akin to detecting. This is not to deny that inner cognitive processes are
also necessary—Barrett acknowledges the importance of simple feedback mechanisms
that are responsible for coordinating sensorimotor processes. Instead, we should
treat it as a response to Aizawa that highlights how something initially thought
to be a prototypical cognitive process (i.e. planning), may in fact be a product
of simpler brain-body-world interactions, and thus not attributable solely to inner
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cognitive processes. The fact that these coupled components work so closely with
one another to achieve the cognitive task of “planning” a route, is reason not to
strictly demarcate the inner from the outer, and reserve the term ‘cognitive’ solely
for the inner processes—if it even makes sense to try to delineate a strict boundary
in the first place.
Perhaps this is a more charitable interpretation for why Chemero wishes to avoid
providing a stipulative definition of cognition, and why he rejects the existence of the
‘mark of the cognitive’. In the case of the Portia spider and its hunting behaviour, it
truly seems arbitrary to separate its neural processes from the closely coupled body-
environment system. We are free to adopt the intentional idiom, and describe what
the spider does as ‘scanning’ or ‘planning’, but we should be careful to acknowledge
that it is only able to achieve this as a result of distributed mechanisms. And if
the adamant cognitivist still wishes to cling to the more traditional definition of
symbol-processing in spite of this, there is always the worry explored in Chapter
5 by Anderson and others. The pursuit of contentful inner symbols that represent
anything like the sorts of objects required for a more traditional psychological gloss
are unlikely to be found in the massively-recurrent networks of the interactive brain.
Therefore, returning again to the issue raised by Dietrich and List (2016) at the
start of this chapter, we can retain mentalistic attributes, and intentional psycholog-
ical states, because one of the fundamental lessons of embodied cognition (regardless
of whether you’re a representationalist or not) is that the mind is not the brain.
The failure of neuroeconomics is not the attempt to supplement explanations of eco-
nomic behaviour by appealing to neuroscience (this is a praiseworthy endeavour). It
is to incorrectly transpose intentional psychology into the ontological commitments
of neuroscience. Likewise, PP can make do without value functions when describing
the activities of the brain, but it may want to exercise caution when trying to scale-up
to higher-levels of description. One suggestion is to adopt an explanatory pluralism,
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and to take as its primary focus, not merely predictive brains, but brain-body-world
systems.
Explanatory Pluralism
“Given computation determines perception and cognition, perception and
cognition happen in the brain. The mind can then be understood in
internalist, solipsistic terms, throwing away the body, the world and other
people.” (Hohwy, 2014, p. 7)
To end, we return once again to the matter of whether PP should be best viewed
as an embodied framework. Rather than repeating the reasons for adopting the
affirmative position, we shall consider the alternative, as expressed by Hohwy’s brand
of internalist PP. Hohwy is certainly no cognitivist in the sense that we first discussed
back in chapter 1. Nevertheless, as the above quotation indicates, he does adopt a
neurocentricism that is opposed to the embodied account we have been defending
over the course of this thesis. In fact he delineates his version of neurocentricism for
us very specifically:
“[...] the mind begins where sensory input is delivered through exterocep-
tive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive receptors and it ends where pro-
prioceptive predictions are delivered, mainly in the spinal cord.” (ibid.,
p. 18)
Insofar as cognitive scientists are interested in understanding the mind, the valid-
ity of a statement such as this entails a metatheoretical approach known as method-
ological solipsism (Fodor, 1980), and sometimes as methodological individualism
(Chemero and Silberstein, 2008). More specifically, methodological solipsism is con-
cerned with what is the object of analysis for scientific enquiry. In the case of the
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cognitive sciences this translates to questions such as: is the object of the cognitive
sciences the brain, the organism, or the coupled brain-body-world system? Hohwy’s
adoption of this stance is evident in the fact that the neurocentric mechanisms of
PEM are taken to subsume other domains of enquiry (e.g. embodied cognition), and
provide the relevant explananda for understanding cognition and thus behaviour.
Instead, the inferentially-secluded brain is able to do all of the explanatory work:
“PEM says that prediction error minimization is the only principle for
the activity of the brain [...] This is a very ambitious theory. If this is all
the brain does, then perception, action, attention, and all other mental
processes, must come down to prediction error minimization.” (Hohwy,
2014, p. 2)
Methodological solipsism commits one to a particular epistemic goal of scientific
explanation: aiming to uncover a single set of underlying, unifying principles to
account for a diversity of phenomena and theories, which are themselves nothing more
than approximations or derivations of the underlying theory (Dale, 2008). Advocates
of this metatheoretical stance, should therefore aim to uncover these unificatory
principles in their research. Although Hohwy is not alone in advocating the unifying
power of PP (also see Clark, 2013c; Friston, 2010), his account is set apart by
the appeal to an underlying computational principle (PEM) that explicitly rules
out alternative research strategies such as embodied cognition, except inasmuch as
its claims can be accommodated within the strictures of a neurocentric framework
(Hohwy, 2014, p. 17). This is problematic, as we can see if we return to the decision
tree from Chapter 1 and replace ‘cognitivism’ with neurocentric PP.
As is shown in Figure 6.6, given the ambitious claims of neurocentric PP, it cer-
tainly appears as though it is aiming to encroach on the subject matter of embodied
cognition (i.e. cognition and behaviour). Furthermore, it should be evident by now
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Figure 6.6: The decision tree from Chapter 1 modified to contrast embodied cognition
with neurocentric PP. Adapted from (Shapiro, 2011, p. 201)
that they offer competing explanations of the subject matter, insofar as they adopt
different attitudes to the acceptance of methodological solipsism and the function of
inner computational processes. Therefore, either the claims of embodied cognition
are subsumed within the neurocentric PP framework, and consequently lose much of
their explanatory worth and philosophical significance, or we acknowledge that the
two methodological pursuits are in conflict, and “adopt the better explanation”.
However as a metatheoretical approach, methodological solipsism is not the only
option. In fact, it is increasingly common for philosophers to argue in favour of an
explanatory pluralism (Chemero and Silberstein, 2008; Dale, 2008), at least as far
as the cognitive sciences are concerned. For example, we saw at the start of this
chapter how Bechtel and others have argued that some cognitive processes may be
best explained mechanistically, and how mechanistic and dynamical approaches can
be considered complementary (see also Clark, 1997b). Bechtel has even proposed a
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way of determining when a system will be amenable to a mechanistic explanation,
and when it will not (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010). Again, this is not to deny
that the debate between those who defend mechanistic explanation, and those who
favour dynamic explanations is settled. However, as far as a strategy for discovery
goes, it seems sensible to adopt an explanatory pluralism, as it forces us to consider
how decision-making is not simply a product of our brains, but is rather constituted
over time by the many ways that our brains, body and world interact. A staunchly
internalist account of PP is unlikely to accept this, but we predict that an embodied
PP will be able to embrace this meta-theoretical approach to develop and evolve
into an even more powerful framework for the cognitive sciences—we hope that the
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